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Preface
Expectations are mounting as the ongoing climate negotiations approach their cul-
mination in Copenhagen in December 2009. Th e road travelled has been a learn-
ing process: many insights have been gained during the gradual establishment of the 
international system to address the daunting problems of climate change. Today we 
better understand the nature of man-made climate change, not “just” as an environ-
mental problem, but indeed as a critical development issue.
By now it is evident that the impacts of climate change have become a major threat 
to the eff orts to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals in 
general. In order to lead to sustainable outcomes, all development actions must take 
this emerging factor into account. Neither livelihoods of rural peasants, habitats of 
urban dwellers, nor economic and social infrastructure can be improved unless plans 
are adapted to take into account the changing climate. In many cases, stand-alone 
adaptation measures will be required.                                                        
At the same time, development policies, programmes and projects need to be part 
of the solution, not part of the problem. In order to keep the social and economic 
costs of adaptation aff ordable for humankind, the root causes need to be addressed. 
Rethinking of our development path by all actors is needed, with a view to bringing 
the greenhouse gas emissions down to a sustainable level. Rich countries obviously 
have the greatest responsibility, but developing countries can also contribute by dis-
carding the choices that have proven to be dangerous.  Development aid can help in 
this task. Ways and means have to be found through which people in all countries can 
lead a life worthy of human dignity, in a way that is compatible with the constraints 
set by nature.
Rarely has the concept of sustainable development been as valid as now: there is 
a pressing need to reconcile the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
development. Th e current economic crisis has made it all the more evident. But at the 
same time, the crisis has also highlighted our opportunities. Basic economic structures 
are being reviewed, and governments are taking measures to reinvigorate economic 
development. Th ese measures can be directed towards stimulating environmentally 
sound production and consumption, thereby continually and permanently reducing 
environmental stress.                                         
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Th e issue of climate change and development has many facets, and the authors of 
this book approach it from a variety of angles, with special reference to development 
cooperation. As such the articles can provide enriching, substantive inputs not only 
into the process leading to Copenhagen, but also into practical development work. 
For climate change negotiators and experts, the articles can help in setting policies 
in a wider context with a view to fi nding practicable win-win-win solutions. For the 
benefi t of the development community, they elaborate underlying interlinkages and 
present practical suggestions for improving day-to-day work. 
Th e book covers immediate concerns, but ends by providing long-term visions. 
Both elements are essential: visions are required for choosing the direction of travel, 
but it is also necessary to understand the immediate as well as the future challenges 
of the route. We need many books as companions on the way to climate security, let 
this be one of them.
Outi Berghäll
Director, Climate Change
Finnish Ministry of the Environment (2000-2007)
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Overview
Eija Palosuo
In search of a revised vision
In the last few years, increasingly loud warnings of the eff ects of climate change have 
been sounded by infl uential groups of scientists, rolling out scenarios so startling 
they are diffi  cult to fully comprehend or act upon. Th e Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) warns of frequent heat waves, heavy precipitation events, 
droughts and tropical typhoons. Th e much cited Stern Review on the Economics of Cli-
mate Change counts the monetary costs, predicting for example that cereal production 
will drop signifi cantly in the Southern hemisphere, with severe consequences. Maybe 
because of the scientifi c nature of climate discussion, it has been diffi  cult for many 
sectors of society to deal with it and to decide how seriously the whole issue should be 
taken. If the worst scenarios are realised, that would mean prioritising climate change 
above all our current concerns. However, uncertainties remain that allow us to stall, 
debating on how big a risk we are willing to take. Furthermore, the impacts of the 
economic crisis on the international climate regime are yet to be seen.
Links between development and climate change have increasingly been made and 
brought into the spotlight, resulting in progress in certain areas. Despite the initial 
steps taken, bridging the gap between the climate change community and the devel-
opment community remains a challenge, as noted by the OECD specialists Shardul 
Agrawala and Florence Crick in their article in this book. Th e two communities have 
diff erent priorities, often operate on diff erent temporal and spatial scales, and do not 
necessarily speak the same language. Signifi cant proportions of annual offi  cial aid 
fl ows are being directed towards activities aff ected by climate risks: failing to consider 
these risks – apart from the possibility of wasting resources - could even contribute to 
increasing the vulnerability of societies to the impacts of climate change in some types 
of development projects.
Even more diffi  cult than trying to identify the changes needed in current develop-
ment activities, is trying to see the big picture: the vision we hold about development 
in general and development cooperation specifi cally. What is “the better world” that 
we are trying to build, and how relevant to creating it are the current strategies we 
embrace? In a very short period of time, prospects for future conditions all over the 
planet have seriously been shaken, with climate change and numerous other, emerg-
ing environmental problems causing us to question the very basis of industrial civilisa-
tion. Development cooperation has grown as part of the same history, and based on 
the same assumptions, and consequently, would benefi t from being updated accord-
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ingly. It is this diffi  cult challenge that this book presents and discusses.
Where is our focus today, regarding development priorities? In 2005, the UNDP 
in its annual Human Development Report named development assistance, interna-
tional trade, and security as the three pillars of cooperation to pay attention to, in 
order to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Th ese pillars 
may well be used as examples here, as all three are of central importance in the current 
development paradigm; at the same time, they cannot be dealt with “outside” of the 
impact of climate change.
1. Increased aid is required in order to reach the MDGs, but how much is enough 
in the new situation? Th e growing fl ows of money for adaptation and the questions 
about governing the new funds are changing the picture quite a bit. Th ere is also the 
question of the costs of reacting to climate change in donor countries: how will the 
required measures infl uence their political will and national budgets? 
2. International trade has proven an eff ective motor of development for numer-
ous previously poor countries: how far and in which way should we count on it in 
the future? If for example, the abovementioned predictions for the future of cereal 
production prove correct, the resultant lack of grain will obviously have consequences 
not only for food security, but also for the trade prospects of those countries, whose 
development scenarios depend on agricultural exports. In addition, the high hopes of 
tourism as a boost to development might require re-evaluating, as the results of the 
mitigation policy regime may easily be refl ected in increased costs of international 
travel. Of course, the entire fi eld of tourism is very much in the centre of the climate 
change discussion.
3. In regard to security, the prospects for decreasing the number of violent confl icts 
and spreading democracy might face new obstacles brought about by climate change. 
Good governance has been one of the key concepts in development cooperation for 
some time now, and based on the articles in this book, that emphasis should be fur-
ther increased and reinforced.
Although these questions are fundamental to creating a vision of successful de-
velopment, trying to address them can be very daunting. However, there could be a 
positive side to all this, with new possibilities emerging. Development and climate 
change discussions often seem to be on a collision course, but they do not need to be: 
common goals and targets can be set and common interests found. Th e global nature 
of the problem ensures that both the North and the South will remain strongly inter-
dependent by each others’ actions in trying to fi ght climate change, and new struc-
tures of international cooperation and new coalitions could be formed in the process. 
Could we fi nally hope for more equity? Could we create a vision of development that 
is based on cleaner energy and less consumption, one that leads to a redistribution of 
global resources on a more equal basis?
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Structure and themes of the book
Th is book aims to provide Elements for Discussion for those involved in development 
and development cooperation as practitioners, decision-makers and researchers, at a 
crucial moment just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Conference. Th e contribu-
tors include researchers from academic institutions, as well as representatives of UN 
organisations and NGOs. For the purposes of this book, the contributors were asked, 
based on their fi eld of expertise, to examine the underlying fundamentals within a 
specifi c area in the light of climate change and to come up with suggestions – even 
new “visions” – within the context of development cooperation.
Th e discussion of the scientifi c uncertainties of climate change is beyond the scope 
of this book. Th e assessments given by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in their Fourth Assessment Report, synthesising current state-of-the-
art scientifi c knowledge of climate change, and representing a joint eff ort of hundreds 
of internationally acknowledged scientists, have been used as the starting point.
Climate change and the foundations of development
Th e book has three sections, all of which have a slightly diff erent approach to the 
topic. Th e fi rst section tries to outline on a general level some of the burning questions 
that have arisen from the anomalies between the predicted changes in global climate 
and the current aims and assumptions of development.
Shardul Agrawala and Florence Crick provide an overview of the linkages between 
climate change and development, and then focus on how well climate change adapta-
tion considerations are presently being taken into account in development activities, 
based on their work at the OECD. A wide range of development policies and projects 
will need to incorporate the risks posed by climate change, both to enhance resilience 
and also to reduce the risk of “maladaptation”. Typical examples of projects facing 
climate risks are agricultural investments that may not pay off  as expected if the cli-
mate becomes unsuitable for particular crops; promoting human settlement in areas 
that may become unsuitable; or developing infrastructure that may not be designed 
to cope with changed weather extremes. Th e authors analyse the use of annual offi  cial 
aid fl ows, as well as the status of climate change in various assessments, development 
plans, strategies and projects. 
Even though considerable progress has been made by donors in recent years at 
the level of individual assessments and projects, very few core development plans 
explicitly consider the implications of climate change. In general, little attention has 
been given at the strategic levels of decision-making to climate change and adap-
tation considerations. In order to make progress, it is important that the current 
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project-based approach be replaced with a more strategic and programmatic track, 
focusing on long-term planning and linking of diff erent decision-making levels. Th is 
would require more than simply additional resources: there is a need to ensure access 
to relevant climate information, and institutional changes are required in both host 
countries and donor agencies. Th e authors also see a need to establish greater clarity 
on the relationship between mainstreaming eff orts and the adaptation activities that 
are fi nanced under the international climate change regime.
Th e two remaining articles in the fi rst section deal with the internationally de-
fi ned goals of development – the Millennium Development Goals – and questions of 
funding and increasing energy needs for their achievement. According to the IPCC 
report, countries have to adopt diff erent strategies to advance MDGs, and “the paths 
they adopt will have important implications for the mitigation of climate change …
Consideration of clean energy services, even though not explicitly mentioned in the 
MDGs, will be a vital factor in achieving both sustainable development and climate 
mitigation goals.” (IPCC 2007, p. 697)
Sarah Mohan and Bill Morton argue that while the MDGs may remain the 
overarching framework for development cooperation eff orts, the realities of climate 
change will play a major role in determining the best way to achieve the goals, and 
in the cost of doing so. Indeed, investments in reducing vulnerability and augment-
ing adaptive capacity may be among the most high-return investments for achieving 
both the MDGs and climate goals. In this context, the authors discuss the role of 
development cooperation and Offi  cial Development Assistance (ODA) in supporting 
and fi nancing climate change adaptation. Th ey point to existing problems within the 
development cooperation system, including the lack of adequate developing country 
ownership, voice and representation, which undermine the eff ectiveness and legiti-
macy of ODA-fi nanced adaptation measures. Th e authors attempt to calculate how 
much climate change could increase the costs of attaining the MDGs, and the impli-
cations for the prevailing ODA target fi gure of 0.7% of GNI in donor countries. Th ey 
conclude that a dramatic change in political will is needed to mobilise the signifi cant 
new funds and implement the important development cooperation reforms that are 
necessary in an era of climate change.
Th e two objectives of improving energy access and mitigating climate change may 
seem irreconcilable, as mitigation is usually associated with reducing energy con-
sumption. Th e need for greater energy access is urgent however. Virginie Schwarz and 
Yannick Glemarec note in their article that, because of population growth, if no new 
policies are put into place 1.4 billion people will still lack access to electricity in 2030. 
To reach the MDGs, this number would need to fall to less than one billion by 2015. 
According to the authors, there is room for win-win strategies, but the traditional ap-
proach is not the answer: paradoxically, eff orts to reduce poverty by counting on fossil 
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fuels could end up having adverse impact on the poorest populations in the likely case 
that international fuel prices continue to rise in the future. 
Clean energy technologies are often superior options for meeting the needs of 
developing countries, as they can increase energy security, reduce the energy bill of 
oil-importing countries, increase access to energy services in a cost-eff ective way, and 
provide local jobs. However, their deployment is handicapped by a wide range of 
policy, technological, attitudinal and fi nancial barriers. Development aid can play a 
critical role in increasing awareness of the potential of clean energy technologies by 
promoting supportive policies, strengthening institutional and individual capacities, 
and facilitating access to appropriate funding. In order to meet the overall energy re-
quirements of developing countries, the challenges of attracting enough direct invest-
ments and driving them towards lower carbon technologies also need to be addressed. 
Th e authors argue that these issues – for which private funds are scarce – should 
become a priority for development assistance. 
Changing the focus: some key areas
Th e second section of the book looks at specifi c fi elds of activity where the approach 
to development which is chosen could have a great impact on climate change and vice 
versa. It tries to place some of the issues that have been discussed as relevant to “saving 
the planet” in the context of development cooperation, and looks to see if common 
interests can be found. As an example of some of the priorities put forth outside of 
the actual development literature, the President of the Earth Policy Institute, Lester 
R. Brown, in his book Plan B 3.0 advises his readers to “make a case for the inclusion 
of poverty eradication, family planning, reforestation and renewable energy develop-
ment in international assistance programs” and to “urge an increase in these appro-
priations (…)” (Brown 2008, p. 286). However, the topics chosen for this section are 
meant to serve merely as suggestions, and examples of some of the key areas, rather 
than attempting to identify them systematically.
Population growth and size have often been defi ned as being at the root of many en-
vironmental problems, note George Martine and José Miguel Guzman in their article 
on population dynamics and climate change. Th e United Nations expects the world 
population size in 2050 to be in the range of 7.8 to10.8 billion, and few would ques-
tion that the diff erences in the environmental implications between the two fi gures 
would be crucial. Assuming that the issue could be easily resolved simply with massive 
family planning programs in poorer countries, the authors argue, is too simplistic; 
even though population size and growth do matter enormously, there is no “quick 
fi x”. Th e fastest-growing countries are not the ones that will be making the largest 
contribution to global environmental problems in the near future. Furthermore, the 
17R E T H I N K I N G  D E V E L O P M E N T  I N  A  C A R B O N - C O N S T R A I N E D  W O R L D
D E V E L O P M E N T  C O O P E R A T I O N  A N D  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E
majority of population growth today is less the result of current fertility patterns than 
those of fertility and mortality patterns of previous generations. Th ere are also other, 
less-discussed components of demographic dynamics that need to be incorporated in 
the debate, such as age structure, household composition and immigration.
Th e world is undergoing a rate of urban growth that is unprecedented in human 
history: current projections suggest that the urban population of developing coun-
tries will double in the space of a generation. How, where and in what conditions 
such growth will occur will have a huge eff ect on sustainability in general and on 
climate change in particular. Attention should be paid to poverty, income inequality, 
and segregation, all of which are key elements in the vulnerability of urban popula-
tions to climate change. Th e authors encourage decision-makers to urgently reverse 
the current trend in many Asian countries where government policies support the 
expansion of dwellings in low elevation coastal zones. Apart from population growth, 
cities are centres for many other environmental concerns, such as pollution, resource 
degradation, and waste generation, but at the same time, demographic concentration 
can reduce per capita costs and energy demand while minimising pressures on land. 
Paradoxically, the authors argue, cities could therefore hold our best chance for a sus-
tainable future.
Trade has received a great deal of attention as an engine of development. Yet, while 
a fair amount of work has been done to mainstream climate change adaptation into 
development assistance, there has been little or no work that considers the trade-relat-
ed impacts, writes Aaron Cosbey. Th ere are a number of signifi cant consequences to 
take into account. As a result of changes in agricultural production, the prices of food 
are predicted to rise, almost entirely to the benefi t of exporters in higher latitudes, 
while the need of developing countries to import cereals is expected to rise by 10% to 
40% by 2080. Th e infrastructure of ports will demand heavy investment due to rising 
sea levels; but new transport opportunities may also appear, such as the opening of 
new trade routes through the previously impassable Northwest Passage in Canada’s 
Arctic waters. One way or another, air transport will certainly become more costly, 
with implications for such goods as fresh-cut fl owers and high-end perishable pro-
duce. Cosbey also notes that there have been a number of moves to implement trade-
related measures that seek to punish carbon-intensive imported goods, and these tend 
to be formulated with developing country competitors in mind.
On the other hand, forms of energy that are less carbon-intensive may become new 
sources of export revenues for developing countries, such as electricity from North 
African concentrated solar thermal installations. While climate change may have both 
positive and negative infl uences on the potential of trade to act as an engine of devel-
opment, the uneven burden of the shifts in the prevailing patterns appears to fall most 
heavily on developing country producers and exporters. It seems clear that, in many 
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cases, the most eff ective development policies will rely less on promoting traditional 
export-led growth and instead resort to non-traditional exports, where those can be 
developed, or to place more emphasis on endogenous development processes that de-
pend less heavily on foreign markets. A realistic assessment of future policy measures 
is needed, to serve as the basis for development assistance that avoids risks and exploits 
potential opportunities. Climate policies, in turn, should be formulated so that they 
take the concerns of developing country exporters into account.
Tourism presents a policy dilemma for many countries and agencies in the face 
of climate change. What has often been described as pro-poor tourism has been in-
creasingly promoted by organisations and development agencies such as the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the UNWTO, the 
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as an important element in 
national poverty reduction strategies and in development fi nancing. Tourism seems to 
provide a potential “quick-win”: currently international tourism is a primary source 
of foreign exchange earnings in 46 out of 50 of the world’s LDCs. At the same time it 
both contributes to and is strongly aff ected by climate change.
Th e economies that most depend on tourism tend to be island states, which are 
also some of the most vulnerable to the eff ects of climate change. According to the 
authors of the article on tourism, Stefan Gössling, C. Michael Hall and Daniel Scott, 
there are many factors that may aff ect future prospects in this fi eld: for example, 
climate policies leading to higher cost for air travel, consumer awareness of the envi-
ronmental impacts and increasing threats to the economic and political security of the 
destination. Climate aff ects a wide range of attractions and other factors critical for 
tourism, such as wildlife productivity and biodiversity, water levels and quality, and 
snow conditions and glacier extent. Climate also has an important infl uence on en-
vironmental conditions that can deter tourists, including infectious disease, wildfi res, 
insects or extreme weather events. 
Th e current development of tourism in most countries follows pro-growth para-
digms in which annual growth in arrival numbers is considered an indicator of success 
and a proxy for wealth transfer to poor local populations. In the light of the results 
presented here, the authors argue, there may be reasons to reconsider such strategies. 
Destinations would seem well-advised to assess their dependency on and vulnerability 
in regard to energy-intense tourism, and to restructure their tourism products to fa-
vour low-carbon, high value tourism. Addressing the large information gaps regarding 
the vulnerability to climate change of the tourism sector in developing nations must 
be a core component of any future strategy, if tourism is to contribute to poverty al-
leviation and achieving the MDGs.
Global food supplies have increasingly come under pressure for various reasons. 
According to preliminary estimates, the year 2008 saw another 40 million people 
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pushed into hunger. Climate change puts an added burden on agricultural produc-
tion, as it has the potential to irreversibly damage the natural resource base on which 
agriculture depends, notes Lim Li Ching in her article. Meanwhile the agricultural 
sector has, for the last two decades, suff ered neglect and underinvestment in terms 
of priorities in ODA and of national governments, as well as in the lending policies 
of development banks. Th ere now appears to be a resurgence of agriculture on the 
development agenda; however the question of what type of agricultural development 
is required is equally crucial. Th e “business-as-usual” scenario of industrial farming, 
input and energy intensiveness, collateral damage to the environment, and marginali-
sation of small-scale farmers, is no longer tenable, Lim argues. 
Instead, the international community and national governments should system-
atically redirect agricultural knowledge, science and technology towards sustainable 
biodiversity based agriculture and agro-ecological sciences, while simultaneously ad-
dressing the needs of small-scale farmers. Indigenous and traditional knowledge are a 
key source of information on adaptive capacity, as many poor farmers already attempt 
to minimise crop failure through e.g. increased use of drought-tolerant local varieties, 
water harvesting, mixed cropping and agroforestry. Supporting and facilitating these 
autonomous adaptation measures needs to be critically enhanced by the development 
community, while a longer-term planned approach for adaptation is also necessary. By 
rethinking the current model of development, agriculture has the potential to change 
from being one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters to a much smaller emitter and 
even a net carbon sink, while also contributing to poverty alleviation. In essence, in-
vestments of the development community in sustainable agriculture projects and ac-
tion plans, supported by the right policy and institutional environment, could bring 
about a ‘win-win-win’ scenario for agriculture – climate adaptation, climate mitiga-
tion and increased productivity, the author argues. 
Forests provide biomass fuels and traditional medicines for billions of people, and 
in many developing countries, forest-based enterprises create at least a third of all ru-
ral non-farm employment. Meanwhile the role of forests in the global carbon balance 
is important, as one-fi fth of global carbon emissions originate from forest destruction 
and forest conversion. According to Markku Kanninen, PRSPs and other poverty alle-
viation policies have been overlooking the importance of forest ecosystem services in, 
for example, providing food and fuel wood, or regulating water, climate and erosion. 
Th e loss of these forest ecosystem inputs will reduce human wellbeing at all levels and 
on all scales. Promoting tree and forest planting can be a win-win option in many 
cases, by simultaneously producing ecosystem goods and services for local livelihoods 
and industries on the one hand, and carbon sequestration services for climate change 
mitigation on the other. 
Th ere are also possible synergies between carbon sequestration and adaptation 
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measures, e.g. through aff orestation of vulnerable areas, watersheds, and rehabilita-
tion of degraded lands; so far these possibilities have not been well refl ected in the 
national adaptation plans of action (NAPA’s). Reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD) is recognised as one of the major actions necessary 
for mitigation of climate change, and regardless of the form the mechanism takes 
in the post 2012 climate regime, signifi cant fi nancial resources could fl ow from the 
developed world to developing countries in the future. Increased investment into 
protection and sustainable management of forests through REDD, CDM and simi-
lar mechanisms off ers an excellent opportunity to foster economic development in 
rural areas, based on sustainable use of forest resources, the author argues. Successful 
implementation of these measures will often require strengthening the stake of local 
communities in protecting their forests assets and allowing them to use and benefi t 
from these resources.
Violent confl ict was highlighted in the Human Development Report 2005 as the 
most brutal suppression of human development: it disrupts food systems, contributes 
to hunger and malnutrition, and undermines progress in health and education. Nine 
of the 10 countries ranked at the bottom in the human development index (HDI) 
in the Report had experienced violent confl ict at some point since 1990. Th e Report 
also notes that “preventing and resolving confl ict and seizing opportunities for post-
confl ict reconstruction would demonstrably accelerate progress towards the MDGs” 
(HDR 2005, p.151).
Over the past two decades, the world has seen a decline in the number of armed 
confl icts and, in some cases, democracy has gained stronger ground. After a period of 
relative improvement, the consequences of climate change now heighten the risk of 
political instability, especially in countries faced with poor governance, state fragility, 
recent armed confl ict, and poverty. According to Dan Smith and Karina Kristiansen, 
pressures to migrate may be strengthened by confl icts erupting between diff erent 
groups over access to diminishing resources. Health systems will come under unprec-
edented stress; and reduced economic input is closely correlated with increased risk 
of violent confl ict. At the same time, the resilience that traditional societies could fall 
back on has diminished: farming communities in many African countries are half-in 
and half-out of the modern market system, and their vulnerability in the face of eco-
nomic change and political pressure is already high. 
However, climate change could also provide new opportunities for peace, the au-
thors argue. In divided communities, climate change poses a threat against which to 
unite, while adaptation eff orts off er a task on which to cooperate. Th ey suggest a for-
mula where poverty reduction, adaptation to climate change, and peacebuilding are 
combined into a single coherent approach. Th e key points of synergy to be targeted 
are good governance and local participation. Simultaneously addressing peacebuild-
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ing needs and climate change adaptation requires building the capacity of commu-
nities to understand the linkages and act on them. With good governance being an 
increasingly signifi cant part of development cooperation, helping to create the right 
institutional context is a challenge that donor governments have every opportunity to 
act on, the authors conclude.
Towards a better world: updating the vision
Th e third section of the book focuses on the “ultimate goal” of development eff orts: 
our vision of the world as we would like to see it. Th e model adopted by the industrial 
world obviously cannot be followed by everyone on the planet, since climate change 
is already threatening to undo decades of progress and undermine eff orts to achieve 
the MDGs. What are the alternatives to this vision? What are the most important 
choices on a structural level that defi ne the development pathway of a given country, 
and what is the role of diff erent actors in the fi eld of development cooperation in 
determining that? Replacing the issue of growth with issues of equity and distribu-
tion poses a challenge for the entire concept of development, and answers need to be 
found quickly. A repeated warning in all of the articles in the last section is that the 
window of opportunity is rapidly closing. 
According to the IPCC report, the choice of development policies can be as conse-
quential to future climate stabilisation as the choice of climate-specifi c policies (IPCC 
2007, p.700). Rather than trying to look for ideal and general instruments, eff ective 
results can be achieved by focusing on relatively marginal changes in certain key sec-
toral decisions. As Jayant Sathaye argues, it would be important to identify relevant 
non-climate policies e.g. in the areas of trade, fi nance, rural and urban development, 
insurance, and forestry. One sector to watch is transportation, where diff erences in 
urban planning policies generate widely diff erent outcomes in terms of energy con-
sumptions and CO
2
 emissions. Some of the alternative measures discussed in the 
article, such as energy effi  ciency lead mostly to reduced emissions; but in some cases 
the link is more ambiguous. For example, the impact of the removal of energy sub-
sidies on CO
2
 emissions is likely to be positive in most cases, as higher prices trigger 
lower demand. However, this may also result in increased emissions if poor consumers 
are forced off -grid and back to highly carbon intensive fuels, such as non-sustainable 
charcoal or diesel generators. 
Similarly, while improving access to commercial fuels tends to increase emissions, 
it simultaneously decreases unsustainable use of fuelwood and related deforestation. 
Mitigation options can create tradeoff s between carbon emissions reduction and other 
sustainable development criteria, and it is often diffi  cult to assess the net outcome of 
the various eff ects. Weighing other development benefi ts against climate benefi ts will 
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be a key basis for choosing development sectors for mainstreaming climate change 
considerations. In some cases, it may even be rational to disregard climate change 
considerations because of an action’s other development benefi ts. As Sathaye points 
out, what matters is not only that a “good” choice is made at a certain point in time, 
but also that the initial policy persists for a long enough time – sometimes several dec-
ades – to truly have an eff ect. Th is, in turn, raises deep institutional questions about 
the possibility of governments to make credible long-term commitments.
A key question in current climate policy, according to Axel Michaelowa and Kath-
arina Michaelowa, is whether high levels of human development can be reached at 
low levels of per capita emissions. Th e authors compare countries with similar levels 
of development but diff erent levels of emissions, and key elements contributing to 
the outcomes are analysed. According to the data, it is possible to achieve a quite re-
spectable level of human development – an HDI of 0.8 – at very low per capita emis-
sions levels. Emissions surge rapidly as soon as an urbanised middle class develops, 
however, and in order to reach universal human development of over HDI 0.9, the 
authors argue, world emissions would have to grow by at least 30%. Some of the key 
elements of a low emissions path are identifi ed, such as an integrated planning policy 
that prevents haphazard urbanisation and related rapid growth in car traffi  c, and a 
far-reaching energy effi  ciency policy for domestic appliances. 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa urge that the focus of the future climate policy re-
gime should be on options that prevent a rapid rise in emissions. Th ey remind us of 
the fi nancial challenges at the beginning of such a phase: for example, development of 
energy effi  ciency standards and a credible enforcement structure could be supported 
by development cooperation. As for ways out of the current global situation, the au-
thors present three possible solutions: increasing energy effi  ciency, decarbonising all 
energy sources, or limiting consumption. In their fi nal summary, they see huge chal-
lenges with the fi rst two, which leaves the politically unpalatable option of limiting 
consumption the decisive one.
Th e role of diff erent actors in the new paradigm of development is the focus of 
Peter Newell’s article. He charges that some of the world’s most powerful institutions 
in the areas of trade, aid and fi nance, are continuing to fund and encourage activities 
that are energy intensive, export-oriented and produce widespread social and environ-
mental externalities – often even in cases where they were intended to address climate 
change. Instead of coordinated strategies, the activities of one set of institutions sys-
tematically undermine those of others. New trade agreements increase the transport 
of goods over longer distances, adding to the emissions that climate negotiators are 
struggling to reduce, while Multilateral Development Bank lending supports projects 
that commit vast amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. For instance, 
Newell notes that in 2006, as the World Bank raised its energy sector commitments, 
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the oil and gas sector received a 93% increase in funding, while investments into “new 
renewables” increased by only 1.4%. 
Nonetheless, Newell argues that the current situation may provide an opportune 
moment to question the development architecture in relation to climate change. In-
creasingly global bodies will have to justify their role in relation to eff orts to tackle 
climate change, and those that fail to do so will ultimately be disbanded. Eff orts 
should be made towards greater coherence, coordination, accountability and repre-
sentation. Newell warns of the consequences of a “honey pot eff ect”, where actors 
gravitate towards new sources of funding around climate change on an issue where 
they sometimes do not have a track record or the capability to deliver. Moving from 
a crowded and competitive market to a division of labour which allows each actor 
to do what they do best is critical. Concrete proposals are also needed for an energy 
round in the WTO, aimed at meeting the needs of the poor and addressing climate 
change. One way of garnering trust amid the current stalemate in the talks would be 
to develop an agreement that sought to reduce barriers to low-carbon technologies, 
allowing market leaders such as China, Mexico and India to export the latest in re-
newable technologies. Th e author also suggests assessments of what roles multi-lateral 
and regional development banks might realistically play in facilitating a shift to a 
lower carbon economy, as well as of the incentives and disincentives necessary to get 
businesses of diff erent sizes and sectors fully engaged in the transition.
Th e end of conventional development has left us facing a tragic dilemma, argues 
Wolfgang Sachs in the fi nal article of the section: with the imagined vision of a better 
life being thoroughly shaped by Euro-Atlantic civilisation, the means for everyone 
to attain it are ever less available. With the current model, the exit from poverty and 
powerlessness leads straight into overuse and overexploitation. For example, Sachs 
notes that the annual economic costs of environmental damage as a result of eco-
nomic growth were estimated in the 1990s at between 8% to 13% of China’s domes-
tic product, which translates into losses higher than the growth-rate of the national 
economy. Th e prerequisites of development have changed: while in the old days the 
world appeared full of nature but void of people, today the satisfaction of needs and 
wants is not constrained so much by the paucity of hands and brains as by the scarcity 
of resources and living systems.
Th e answer, Sachs suggests, is to move out of an economy wasteful of both natu-
ral resources and people, towards an economy privileging non-fossil resources and a 
decentralised and smaller-scale production pattern where people will in part have to 
be substitutes for natural resources. Rather than laying off  people, gains should come 
from laying off  wasted kilowatt-hours, barrels of oil, and pulp from old-growth for-
ests. As an example of a development path that might bring the world to a greater level 
of resource justice, Sachs mentions the model of “contraction and convergence” pro-
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posed by Aubrey Meyer. It schematically envisages two diff erent development paths – 
one for industrial countries, one for developing countries – whereby no nation has the 
right to a disproportionate share of the global environment. Each country endeavours 
to achieve the common goal of material and energy consumption compatible with 
the demands of other countries, while remaining within the carrying capacity of the 
biosphere. Th is is what the argument inspired by Kant comes down to, Sachs notes: 
institutional patterns of resource consumption should be considered unjust if they 
rest upon rules which cannot in principle be adopted by all other nations.
In the context of development cooperation, Sachs’ article emphasises the need 
to rethink the concepts of justice and equity. Previously, justice was understood as a 
greater share for more and more people in a growing world economy, and the “ris-
ing tide” was to “lift all boats”; this was also the tacit assumption behind the United 
Nations system and bilateral development cooperation. For decades, development 
experts defi ned equity primarily as a problem of the poor. Th ey highlighted the lack 
of income, the lack of technologies, and the lack of market access; they advocated 
remedies for raising the living standards of the poor, thereby working at lifting the 
threshold rather than modifying or even lowering the ceiling. Comfortably enough, 
linking the idea of justice to growth allowed us to evade the hard issue of distribution. 
Th is approach has turned out to be defi nitely one-sided, Sachs argues: either well-
being remains confi ned to a global minority because the prevailing styles of produc-
tion and consumption cannot be generalised across the world, or sustainable models 
of well-being gain acceptance, opening the opportunity of suffi  cient prosperity for all. 
Poverty alleviation, he concludes, cannot be separated from wealth alleviation.
Responsibility and opportunity: towards Copenhagen
Many of the measures most often suggested for fi ghting climate change have connec-
tions with activities central to development cooperation. We are dealing with a tricky 
concept, however, as it is much less visible than poverty and hunger, the fi rst and 
most important areas to target as defi ned by the Millennium Development Goals. In 
order to address these two primary problems successfully, we need to make sure we 
do not end up in a situation where MDG 7, Environmental Sustainability, becomes 
the Goal from which everything else has to be derived when alternatives no longer 
exist. As Aaron Cosbey states in his article, any development assistance initiatives that 
can simultaneously achieve development objectives and contribute to mitigation and 
adaptation should be pursued as a priority, given the urgent need, from a development 
perspective, of successfully addressing climate change.
In a sense, we already hold the keys to success with regards to integrating climate 
change mitigation and adaptation with development eff orts. Th e thing to do, as in 
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the case of a number of other issues in the fi eld of development cooperation, would 
be to live up to the existing ideals and promises: many of the articles in this book em-
phasise the need for more coherence and better cooperation among diff erent fi elds of 
activities and diff erent actors, improvement of participation and ownership, increas-
ing of funding, and mainstreaming of climate change concerns into the development 
agenda. While these observations are valid and essential in order to tackle the issue, 
climate change may face the risk of being treated as yet another “slogan” to use at the 
level of speeches and setting of goals. Th e development community is familiar with 
the discourse of mainstreaming, and the list of important areas to mainstream grows 
by the year; it is much more diffi  cult to implement these intentions meaningfully. In 
his article here, Jayant Sathaye notes that the extent to which mainstreaming leads to a 
sustainable development path will depend on the technological, social, economic and 
political processes that aff ect the current and future development path trajectories: 
merely piggybacking climate change onto an existing political agenda is unlikely to 
succeed.
It is time to identify the responsibilities and opportunities provided in the area of 
development for building a more sustainable future, and to study the vision behind 
development eff orts – the right medicine cannot be prescribed if the diagnosis is not 
up to date. Th e context of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 provides an opportu-
nity that should also be grasped by the development community. At this point in the 
history of humankind, the gravity of the situation may be such that failing to see the 
larger context is not an option.
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Climate Change and Development: 
Time to Adapt
Shardul Agrawala and Florence Crick
Introduction
Th is has been a period of renewed hope and concern for the fate of the climate sys-
tem. On the one hand, a broad coalition of actors including international negotia-
tors, national and sub-national governments, as well as civil society and the private 
sector, has coalesced around the need for strong policy action on climate change. On 
the other hand, scientifi c evidence continues to mount that climate change is already 
underway and will increasingly aff ect the basic elements of life for societies around 
the world, including access to water, food production, health, and the environment. 
Th e Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) warns that climate change will result in more frequent heat waves, heavy 
precipitation events, droughts and tropical cyclones. Th e report also notes that while 
poor countries and poor people are most vulnerable, even advanced societies remain 
inadequately adapted to the risks posed by current climate, let alone climate change 
(IPCC 2007).
Clearly, while we continue the process of negotiating international commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, that alone will not be enough. Th ere is also an ur-
gent need to place climate change and its impacts within the mainstream of economic 
policies, development projects, and international aid eff orts. 
Bridging the gap between the climate change and development communities, how-
ever, requires more than a simple handshake. Th is is because the two communities 
have diff erent priorities, often operate on diff erent temporal and spatial scales, and 
do not necessarily even speak the same language. Many development practitioners 
are not familiar with the intricacies of climate science or of the climate negotiations, 
as they continue their annual journey from one exotic locale to the next. Meanwhile, 
few in the climate change community have even heard of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Eff ectiveness or the Accra Agenda for Action which guide the agenda for development 
co-operation. 
Beyond the need for a common vocabulary, successful integration of climate 
change risks in development planning also requires specifi c information for assessing 
the signifi cance of climate change for development activities, along with operational 
guidance on how best to take such information into account within the context of 
other pressing social priorities.
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Th is article examines some of the key linkages between climate change and devel-
opment. While these linkages have implications for both greenhouse gas emissions 
and societal vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, the focus of this article is 
primarily on the latter. Th e article then examines how adaptation planning and action 
has progressed within the context of development cooperation, fi rst from the perspec-
tive of international donors and then from the vantage point of developing countries. 
Th e article concludes by outlining a comprehensive approach to integrating climate 
change adaptation in development activities.
Climate change and development: Key linkages 
Unquestionably, climate change is closely intertwined with development. Climate is a 
resource in itself, and it mediates the productivity of other critical resources, including 
food and fi bre, forests, fi sheries and water resources. However, climate can also be a 
hazard. Extreme weather events, for example, routinely cause widespread disruptions 
in society’s ability to utilise critical resources. It is equally the case that human develop-
ment choices are having a demonstrable impact on local and global climate. Land use 
changes, particulate pollution, and overconstruction all have a discernible infl uence on 
local and regional climate patterns. Meanwhile, development paths fuelled predomi-
nantly by continued or enhanced consumption of carbon-intensive energy sources are 
causing signifi cant changes in the global climate. Th is presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity for many developing countries, which are projected to account for more 
than 70% of the increase in world primary energy demand, and over 70% of the in-
crease in carbon dioxide emissions over the period 2004-2030 (IEA 2006). 
How development occurs also has implications for the vulnerability of societies 
to its impacts. In many instances, business as usual development may automatically 
help raise the capacity of societies to cope with climate change. In principle, a range 
of development activities oriented towards reduced poverty and improved nutrition, 
education, infrastructure and health would automatically help decrease vulnerabil-
ity to many climate change eff ects. A healthier, better-educated population with im-
proved access to resources is also likely to be in a better position to cope with climate 
change. Further, in situations where vulnerability is primarily contextual, adaptation 
to climate change might simply reinforce existing development – alleviating poverty 
and improving nutrition, health care, livelihoods and so on – as these activities will 
also boost the capacity for coping with climate change. However, high levels of devel-
opment do not necessarily enhance adaptation to climate change. Developed coun-
tries, themselves, remain vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Th e devastation 
caused by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the high death toll from the heat 
wave that hit France in August 2003 remind us of the current vulnerabilities of devel-
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oped societies to climatic extremes. 
Furthermore, some types of development projects could, inadvertently, by failing 
to consider climate risks, contribute to maladaptation by increasing the vulnerability 
of societies to the impacts of climate change. For example, new infrastructure may 
not be designed to cope with changed weather extremes and thus may either provide 
inadequate protection from extreme events or may have a shorter useful lifetime than 
intended. Such outcomes could retard development by allowing climate extremes to 
result in larger losses of life and destruction of property than would occur if infra-
structure was built to withstand risks from climate change. Agricultural investments 
may not pay off  as expected if the climate is becoming unsuitable for particular crops. 
Yields could decrease and food might need to be imported. Promoting human settle-
ment or infrastructure development in areas that may become unsuitable because of 
climate change could even increase a region’s vulnerability. Such areas may become 
vulnerable to rising sea levels, changes in fl ood and drought frequency, more exposure 
to infectious disease or heat stress, and other climate change related risks. Th ere are 
also instances where climate change might adversely impact development projects, 
the effi  ciency with which development resources are invested, or the achievement of 
broader development objectives. 
Integrating adaptation to climate change within development activities will thus 
be essential if governments wish to achieve the targets set in the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, as well as related national poverty eradication eff orts and sustainable 
development. Th is is particularly true for policies, projects and decisions with a me-
dium to long term footprint, when the climate change impacts will become much 
more signifi cant.
Adaptation planning and 
actions by international donors
Recent years have witnessed a signifi cant increase in the degree of attention to the 
risks posed by climate change and to adaptation within the context of development 
cooperation activities. Traditionally the concern of one or two environment specialists 
within donor agencies, adaptation to climate change is now being increasingly recog-
nised as key to good development practice. 
Th is growing interest within development co-operation agencies is partly in re-
sponse to the growing signifi cance of climate change adaptation within the interna-
tional climate change negotiations, particularly since 2001 when three international 
funds were established to address adaptation1. It was also around this time that three 
1 The Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, and the Adaptation Fund. These funds are part of a more complex 
architecture of international funding sources for adaptation that also include the GEF Trust fund, and bilateral initiatives.
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development agencies – the World Bank, the German development agency (GTZ), 
and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – commissioned studies 
examining the implications of climate change on some of their activities and the ex-
tent to which their projects and plans pay attention to climate risks (Burton and van 
Aalst, 1999; Klein, 2001; Eriksen and Naess, 2003). Th ese assessments concluded 
that the awareness of and attention paid to climate change in these agencies was gen-
erally low, and that few or no links to climate change had been made even in areas 
where climate was already posing considerable risks to the achievement of develop-
ment goals (Klein et al., 2007).
Another impetus was provided by the Multi-Agency Report on Poverty and Cli-
mate Change (2003) authored by development and environment practitioners in ten 
development agencies, that helped raise awareness amongst development practition-
ers about the signifi cance of climate change on their core activities. 
It was a subsequent analysis by the OECD that quantifi ed for the fi rst time the 
exposure of offi  cial development assistance to climate risks, including climate change. 
Based on case studies of six developing countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Fiji, Nepal, 
Tanzania, and Uruguay) the OECD analysis showed that a signifi cant proportion of 
annual offi  cial aid fl ows are directed towards activities aff ected by climate risk (Figure 
1, below). Estimates ranged from a high of 50-65% of total offi  cial aid fl ows in Nepal 
to a low of 12-26% in Tanzania. In monetary terms, over half a billion US dollars 
might be aff ected in Bangladesh and Egypt and around 200 million in Tanzania and 
Nepal (van Aalst and Agrawala 2005). In Fiji, while the absolute amount is low, ap-
proximately one-third of all aid fl ows is nevertheless directed towards activities that 
might be aff ected by climate change. 
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Note: Based on Creditor Reporting System; Offi cial fl ows averaged over 1998-2000
Figure 1. Annual offi cial fl ows and share of activities potentially affected by climate change 
(van Aalst and Agrawala 2005).
Despite the risks of oversimplifi cation that come with such a classifi cation, this analy-
sis highlights that the consideration of climate risks (including climate change) could 
be essential to the successful achievement of general development goals as well as to 
the success of individual projects and investments. However, an examination of na-
tional development plans as well as donor country assistance and sectoral strategies 
of these six case study countries revealed a rather nuanced picture. While developing 
countries and international donors have contributed to considerable progress in terms 
of climate change vulnerability and impact assessments, as well as towards the imple-
mentation of capacity building eff orts and projects specifi cally dealing with adapta-
tion, it remains the case that very few core development plans, strategies and projects 
explicitly considered the implications of climate change. 
Recent progress by donors
Considerable progress has been made by donors since the publication of the OECD 
analysis in 2005, although it remains far from homogeneous on all fronts. Perhaps the 
most signifi cant progress has been made in terms of recognition of the signifi cance of 
climate change and the need to integrate adaptation within development activities at 
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the highest levels within donor agencies. Th is includes the Declaration on Integrating 
Climate Change Adaptation into Development Cooperation adopted by Develop-
ment and Environment Ministers of OECD Member countries in April 2006, the 
EU Action Plan for the period 2004-2008, the G8 Gleneagles Plan of Action and the 
World Bank’s Clean Energy and Development Investment Framework. Th ere are also 
a number of high level policy initiatives at the national or agency level. Th ese include 
White Papers on development cooperation, sustainable development strategies and 
environment or climate change action programmes. For example, the White Paper 
on the Australian Government’s Overseas Aid Programme identifi es climate change 
adaptation as one of the three priorities for future Australian environment-related de-
velopment assistance, particularly in the Pacifi c. Another example is the UK’s White 
Paper on International Development ‘Eliminating World Poverty – Making Gov-
ernance Work for the Poor’ which makes the challenge of fi nding adequate climate 
change adaptation options for developing countries a high priority for the govern-
ment’s development goals over the next fi ve years (Gigli and Agrawala 2007). Th ese 
high level initiatives play a critical role in establishing priorities and incentives at the 
level of donor agencies, and facilitate the downstream consideration of climate change 
adaptation at the operational level.
Another area where considerable progress has been made in recent years is with 
regard to the screening of development portfolios for climate risks. Donors which 
have initiated such climate risk screenings of their development cooperation projects 
or programmes include Netherlands, UK, Switzerland, and the World Bank, among 
others. Screening approaches and methodologies, however, are not harmonised. Th ey 
range from qualitative “quick scans” of development portfolios (e.g. van Aalst et al. 
2007) to the use of formalised risk screening tools at the project level (e.g. IISD/
World Bank/IDS 2007). 
Progress is also being made in terms of developing operational guidance on im-
plementing and mainstreaming climate change adaptation. Denmark, for example, 
is currently implementing its operational guidance in select pilot countries, with the 
aim of developing an approach for ‘climate proofi ng’ Danish development coopera-
tion. Th e UK, meanwhile, has developed the Opportunities and Risks from Climate 
Change and Disasters (ORCHID) process, which is a systematic climate risk man-
agement methodology designed to assess the relevance of climate change and disaster 
risks to an organisation’s portfolio of development projects. Th e United States and 
the Asian Development Bank, meanwhile, have developed guidance on incorporating 
adaptation considerations at the project level. At the time of writing, relatively few 
agencies have developed such operational guidance, and the ones that have are still in 
the process of testing and refi ning it. 
Finally, the need for a harmonised approach towards operationalising the integra-
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tion of adaptation measures in development activities has also been recognised by 
international donors. Th is in turn, has led to the development of the OECD Policy 
Guidance on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Cooperation 
which aims to service both international donors and developing country partners. 
Th e OECD Guidance has been under development since 2006, and is scheduled for 
release in mid2009.
Adaptation planning and actions by 
developing countries
While the challenge of adapting to human induced climate change is a relatively new 
policy priority, societies have a long record of adapting to the impacts of weather 
and natural climate variability. Th ese include proactive measures such as crop and 
livelihood diversifi cation, disaster risk reduction, insurance, water storage, and ir-
rigation. Also included are reactive or ex-post adaptations, for example, emergency 
response and migration (IPCC 2007). Signifi cant advances have been made since the 
mid1990s in terms of the capacity to adapt proactively to seasonal and interannual 
fl uctuations in climate such as El Niño and La Niña in many developing countries in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacifi c. For example, the Sahara and Sahel Ob-
servatory was founded in 1992 to improve early warning and monitoring systems for 
agriculture, food security and drought in Africa. Meanwhile, regional climate outlook 
forums have been initiated since the late 1990s in East, West and Southern Africa, 
parts of Latin America and Asia, where seasonal climate forecasts are used to plan for 
the upcoming rainy season. Despite these advances, many parts of the developing 
world remain poorly adapted even to current weather extremes, as evidenced by the 
signifi cant loss of life and livelihoods in a number of extreme weather events each year.
Anticipatory adaptation for the impacts of climate change, meanwhile, has come 
into policy focus only since the mid-1990s following the negotiation of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developing coun-
tries in particular have made progress in conducting climate change vulnerability and 
impact assessments, organising adaptation workshops and capacity building initia-
tives, establishing institutional mechanisms to address climate change, and develop-
ing their First National Communication to the UNFCCC. Th ese National Commu-
nications do in principle address national adaptation priorities, although the focus of 
these documents has so far been much more on greenhouse gas emissions inventories 
and projections, as well as mitigation policies. Subsequently, a number of adaptation 
projects are also being implemented in a wide range of developing countries through 
a variety of funding mechanisms to support adaptation within the climate regime. 
For example, the Strategic Priority on Adaptation fund of the Global Environment 
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Facility (GEF) is being used to fund Community Based Adaptation programmes of 
developing countries.
Th e Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund meanwhile has provided support to 
these countries in the preparation of their National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPAs) which address their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation 
to climate change. A key output from these NAPAs is a list of priority adaptation ac-
tivities, whose further delay could lead to increased vulnerability or increased costs at 
a later stage. By mid-2008, 38 LDCs had submitted their NAPAs to the UNFCCC. 
Projects identifi ed in NAPAs cover a wide range of activities, including general capac-
ity building and awareness raising, research and information, early warning systems, 
investment in changing resource management, institutional reform and regulation, 
and mainstreaming into development plans (Osman-Elasha and Downing, 2007; Ay-
ers, 2008).
Despite this progress in terms of dedicated adaptation eff orts, adaptation gener-
ally does not feature within core development plans and activities. For example, an 
analysis by the OECD looked at the national development plans of six developing 
countries (Bangladesh, Fiji, Egypt, Tanzania, Uruguay and Nepal) and found that 
in general climate change was not mentioned in their long-term national planning 
documents. Current climate risks were occasionally mentioned in these documents, 
although generally there was no explicit consideration of how these risks might aff ect 
the achievement of the development objectives. However, the Republic of Kiribati 
provides an example of a country making eff orts to mainstream adaptation into its 
national development policies. It has implemented two national adaptation processes: 
the NAPA and the Kiribati Adaptation Programme. Whilst the NAPA gives atten-
tion to urgent and immediate adaptation needs, the Kiribati Adaptation Programme 
focuses on long-term planning for climate change adaptation. Lessons learnt from 
both of these initiatives will be used to plan the Kiribati national response to climate 
change from 2008-2009 onwards. A framework to integrate these two programmes 
into the overall national policy development process is provided by the National De-
velopment Strategy 2004-2007, which is supplemented by the Climate Change Ad-
aptation Policy and Strategies and the Government Budget. Th e Strategy notes that 
“climate change is posing costly risks to economic growth, and calls for the develop-
ment of participatory and cost-eff ective ways of minimizing and managing risk of 
loss from climate change related events”. It thus provides an opening for integrating 
climate change adaptation planning into the national policy process.
Th ere are now also some examples of countries integrating climate change con-
cerns in their poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). For example, Rwanda and 
Bangladesh have created clear links between their NAPA and PRSP in order to fa-
cilitate the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change. In addition, a number 
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of priorities identifi ed in Tanzania’s PRSP (e.g. early warning systems, irrigation and 
development of drought resistant crops) could be synergistic with adaptation to cli-
mate change, although climate change risks are not explicitly considered (Agrawala 
and van Aalst 2008). 
In the Rwanda NAPA, the process of selecting the priority adaptation activities 
was closely linked to the various national and sectoral policies of Rwanda as it took 
into account the urgent and immediate needs established in the PRSP, Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and other development pro-
grammes. In addition, one of the criteria used to select between the diff erent priority 
adaptation options was the contribution of that option to sustainable development. 
Furthermore, for each high priority project identifi ed, links are made between the 
objectives of these projects and key development strategies of Rwanda (including the 
Rwanda Vision 2020, the Rwanda PRSP and other relevant national and sectoral pol-
icies). Such explicit links should help facilitate the integration of the identifi ed high 
priority adaptation projects into overarching development frameworks. In addition 
to these links, the Rwanda NAPA was actually used to inform the second national 
PRSP, the EDPRS. Th e review of the fi rst PRSP in February 2006 helped to integrate 
environment and other aspects of climate change into the EDPRS as an essential 
element of economic development (Republic of Rwanda, 2006). Th e EDPRS itself 
includes a clear recognition of the importance of providing the required framework to 
facilitate adaptation and mitigation activities (Republic of Rwanda, 2007). Th e ED-
PRS specifi cally states that “an incentive framework will be put in place to implement 
the National Programme for Adaptation on Climate Change (NAPA)” (Republic of 
Rwanda, 2007).
Th e Bangladesh PRSP highlights how a national policy framework can provide the 
basis for mainstreaming climate change adaptation programmes, such as the NAPA 
and the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme. Th e PRSP recognises 
climate change as a cause of ‘grave concern’ to the country, highlighting the chal-
lenges posed by sea-level rise. Th e poverty diagnosis discusses extensively the rela-
tion between natural disasters, growth and poverty. Climate change is considered as 
one of the challenges for water resource management and environmental protection. 
Th e PRSP has 19 policy matrices that were developed to operationalise the strategy, 
one of which focuses exclusively on comprehensive disaster management. One of 
this matrix’s key targets is to ‘factor vulnerability impacts, and adaptation to climate 
change into disaster management and risk reduction plans, programmes, policies and 
projects’. Th is, together with an acknowledgement of the NAPA as a national im-
plementation programme, helps to ensure policy coherence for adaptation activities. 
Th e Bangladesh NAPA also took the PRSP into account as the priority adaptation 
strategies identifi ed were specifi cally prepared to complement it. Th e NAPA refers to 
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PRSP policy matrices on ‘comprehensive disaster management’ and ‘environment and 
sustainable development’ in developing strategies to address climate change issues and 
raise awareness. 
While climate change considerations have in general not been integrated with-
in national development policies, there are examples at the sectoral level of sectoral 
policies explicitly taking climate change considerations into account. For example, a 
number of Tanzania’s environmental and sectoral policies developed in the 1990s are 
intended to increase its ability not only to cope with current environment problems, 
but also with the additional risks posed by climate change (van Aalst and Agrawala 
2005). Tanzania’s 1997 National Environmental Policy provides a framework for 
mainstreaming environmental considerations into decision making processes. In Fiji, 
several sectoral plans contain examples of specifi c adaptation strategies, such as pro-
motion of non-sugar crops and commodities to enhance food security (agricultural 
sector), a switch to sustainable management strategies (forestry sector) and a review of 
the Mangrove Management Plan (fi sheries sector). In Bangladesh, the national water 
policy (1999) and national water management plan (2001) both recognise that Bangla-
desh’s future water supply and demand will be affected by climate change. 
Th e abovementioned examples, however, still remain the exception rather than the 
rule. In general, little attention is paid to climate change and adaptation considera-
tions at the strategic levels of decision-making. Th ere is more action at the project 
level, but even here the initiatives are still at a relatively early stage of implementation 
and rather fragmented. Th ere is a need to combine bottom-up action on adaptation 
with a more programmatic approach that facilitates the consideration of both current 
and future climate risks at multiple levels of decision-making.
Moving towards a programmatic 
approach to adaptation
Th e previous sections have highlighted the progress being made on adaptation within 
developing countries and international donor agencies. Progress is evident at the in-
ternational level with high-level declarations, at the level of scientifi c assessments of 
climate change impacts, and at the local level with the implementation of adaptation 
projects. National level priorities for adaptation have also been identifi ed for some 
countries, especially LDCs who have developed NAPAs.
Given the fact that adaptation has received signifi cant policy attention only over 
the past few years, this progress is quite signifi cant. At the same time, however, a 
number of challenges remain. Implementation of high level policy declarations on 
integrating adaptation in development still remains in an early stage. Progress, mean-
while, is more pronounced on the assessment of climate change impacts, than on the 
36 C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  T H E  F O U N D A T I O N S  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T
drivers of vulnerability, and is still very limited with regard to adaptation responses. 
Further, while several adaptation projects have been implemented, their scale is as yet 
rather limited relative to overall societal needs. Finally, there remains a very signifi cant 
gap between the estimated costs of adaptation and the available resources to imple-
ment and mainstream adaptation.
Overall, the implementation of adaptation actions and their integration into de-
velopment processes remains piecemeal, fragmented, and largely project-based. Th e 
multiplication of on-the-ground adaptation projects and activities, although impor-
tant, is not necessarily scalable to signifi cantly aff ect broader societal vulnerabilities. 
Further, many local level actions are conditioned by incentives and constraints which 
are imposed from higher level processes. Th ese include regulation, pricing of climate 
sensitive resources like water and coastal mangroves, and investments in infrastructure. 
If deeper progress is to be achieved on adaptation, it is important to complement 
the current approach, which focuses on the implementation of a collection of indi-
vidual and fragmented local level projects, with a more strategic and programmatic 
track focusing on long-term planning and on linking the diff erent decision-making 
levels. Th is will require an integrated or ‘whole of government’ approach, where adap-
tation is taken into account at all levels of decision-making (trans-national, national, 
regional, local) and within a variety of decision-making processes, such as develop-
ment planning, regulatory and budgetary processes, as well as decisions made by in-
ternational donors, civil society and private actors. 
Th e OECD has developed Policy Guidance which takes such an integrated ap-
proach to the integration of adaptation within development processes. Specifi cally, 
this Policy Guidance examines four levels of governance where adaptation should 
be integrated: centralised National Ministries and decision processes at the national 
level, sectoral Ministries, project level, and the local level which includes both urban 
and rural contexts (OECD 2009).
Th e integration of adaptation at each of these levels will require an analysis of the 
governance architecture and the diff erent stages of the policy cycle to identify entry 
points where the consideration of climate change adaptation could be incorporated. 
At the national level, typical entry points could include various stages in the for-
mulation of national policies, long term and multi-year development plans, sectoral 
budgetary allocation processes, as well as regulatory processes. On the other hand, 
the entry points would be very diff erent at the level of on-the-ground projects, where 
climate change adaptation considerations might need to be factored within specifi c 
elements of the project cycle. 
Th e identifi cation of various entry points does not necessarily require that changes 
need to be made in order to successfully incorporate adaptation considerations. Rath-
er, these entry points provide critical junctures to examine existing decision-making 
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processes (policies, plans, resource allocation, projects) in the light of the implications 
of climate change. In some cases, signifi cant changes might indeed be warranted, 
while in others available information might not justify any, or perhaps only modest, 
changes.
Th is is what we refer to as applying a climate lens, which involves examining: i) the 
extent to which the policy, plan or project under consideration could be vulnerable to 
risks arising from climate variability and change; ii) the extent to which climate change 
risks have already been taken into consideration; iii) the extent to which the policy, 
plan or project could inadvertently lead to increased vulnerability, leading to mala-
daptation or, conversely, miss important opportunities arising from climate change; 
and iv) for pre-existing policies and plans which are being revised, what amendments 
might be warranted in order to address climate risks and opportunities. 
To take one illustration, planned development of certain geographical zones 
(e.g. coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges) or sectors (e.g. hydro-
power) may be viewed in a diff erent light when the medium to long term risks posed 
by climate change are taken into consideration, or infrastructure might need to be 
designed with regard to diff erent standards in areas exposed to increased climatic risk. 
Th e result of applying a climate lens should be a better policy, plan, or project that is 
more capable of achieving its intended objectives in the face of a changing climate, 
including variability and extremes. 
Implementation of such an integrated, programmatic approach, as outlined by the 
OECD, would require more than simply additional resources. It calls for close coordi-
nation across government agencies, across all government levels, between government 
and donors, and with civil society and the private sector. It would also require coming 
to grips with some more fundamental challenges.
One such key challenge is clearly the inadequate availability of, or access to, rel-
evant climate information critical to integrating adaptation. For example, at the na-
tional level, this information includes historical climate data, current vulnerabilities 
to weather and climate, projections of climate change and their associated impacts, 
as well as information on possible adaptation responses and techniques for evaluating 
and prioritising them. An initial step, therefore, might be for national authorities to 
assess what information is currently available and disseminate it to key stakeholders 
via user-friendly, tailored products. Th is can also result in a needs assessment in terms 
of what additional information might be required, which could then be used to estab-
lish priorities for action.
At the same time, however, it must be recognised that climate information will 
always remain imperfect, with considerable uncertainties. Th erefore, decision-making 
on other fronts to better integrate adaptation should not be put on hold pending the 
availability of signifi cantly improved climate information. For example, institutional 
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changes, such as moving the coordination of adaptation eff orts closer to centres of 
national authority, can be accomplished now. Likewise there are a number of “no 
regrets” actions that can already be implemented even in cases where more specifi c 
information on climate change impacts might be lacking. Th ese could include forging 
better linkages between eff orts to implement adaptation and existing mechanisms for 
implementing disaster risk reduction.
International donors also have a key role to play in facilitating the implementation 
of stand-alone adaptation measures, as well as the integration of adaptation into core 
development priorities and projects. Donors can support capacity building eff orts to 
better monitor climate, as well as to assess future climate change impacts and adapta-
tion priorities at the national level. In this context there is a need for greater awareness 
raising within donor agencies as to the risks posed by climate change. Th ey might 
also use high level policy dialogues as a vehicle to raise the profi le of adaptation in 
the eyes of senior offi  cials in partner countries, particularly in key Ministries such as 
Finance and Planning. Finally, there is also a need for donors to better coordinate and 
harmonise their eff orts on adaptation within specifi c countries. Th e fi ve overarching 
principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Eff ectiveness – partner country ownership, 
donor alignment with partner country priorities, harmonisation, managing for de-
velopment results, and mutual accountability – should be major reference points for 
guiding development co-operation eff orts in this area.
In addition to better aligning climate change adaptation mainstreaming eff orts 
with the Paris Declaration and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action, there is also 
a critical need to clarify the relationship between mainstreaming eff orts and the adap-
tation activities that are fi nanced under the international climate change regime. Th is 
is particularly timely in the current context for three reasons. First, the Adaptation 
Fund is becoming operational, with the promise of scaling up dedicated adaptation 
fi nancing to several hundred million dollars per year. Second, mainstreaming eff orts 
initiated by various donors are also being scaled up. One example is the Pilot Pro-
gramme on Climate Resilience that has been launched by a coalition of multilateral 
and bilateral donors to mainstream adaptation. Finally, international negotiators are 
focusing on fi nancial commitments from developed countries to support adaptation 
in developing countries as part of a post-2012 climate regime. On the one hand, these 
developments off er the possibility of implementing an ambitious adaptation agenda 
that complements project level and programmatic initiatives, and in which dedicated 
fi nancing and mainstreaming eff orts complement each other. On the other hand, 
there is a risk of duplication of eff ort, vague mandates, and inadequate benchmarks 
for evaluation.
Adaptation as a development challenge has only just emerged.
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The Future of Development 
Cooperation in a Changing Climate
Sarah Mohan and Bill Morton
Introduction 
While there has been much debate regarding the role that development cooperation 
and offi  cial development assistance should play in addressing climate change, a pos-
sible road map for the way forward is now emerging. Firstly, the current development 
cooperation paradigm – with its focus on achieving the MDGs, sustainable develop-
ment approaches, and improving the political, social and economic well-being of 
the poor – represents a solid starting point for addressing climate change adaptation. 
Secondly, this paradigm can be built on, and updated in two crucial ways: through 
a greater emphasis on reducing the vulnerability of the poor to a range of risks, and 
through ramping up the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into general 
development programs. 
As is discussed in this paper, however, there are signifi cant obstacles to following 
this road map. Re-orienting offi  cial development assistance (ODA) towards address-
ing vulnerability will require a change in both thinking and approach. Th e main-
streaming of climate change adaptation remains in its infancy. More serious than 
these obstacles, however, is the question of whether the development cooperation 
system, in its current form, is fi t for the task of playing a signifi cant and eff ective role 
in supporting adaptation to climate change. A number of shortcomings have emerged 
during the past decade, including the increasing complexity and fragmentation of the 
aid architecture, and lack of progress in building developing country ownership of the 
development process. 
Th e most serious problem, however, concerns the question of fi nancing and what 
role ODA should play. Signifi cant new funding will be necessary to achieve the Mil-
lennium Development Goals in an era of climate change, and to bring climate change 
into the development mainstream. At the same time, new and additional funds are 
needed to address the challenge of mitigating and adapting to climate change as goals 
in their own right. Yet development cooperation’s viability as part of the fi nancing 
solution is compromised by a crisis of legitimacy: the lack of equitable governance 
mechanisms for international policy and decision-making in which developing coun-
try interests are adequately represented. Th is undermines developing country buy-
in and participation in existing development cooperation measures, which suggests 
that adaptation measures fi nanced through development cooperation will be similarly 
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aff ected. Th is article explores these issues. Th e fi rst section concerns development 
cooperation’s role in reducing vulnerability and in mainstreaming climate changing 
adaptation. Th e second section examines existing problems in the development coop-
eration system, and the third section addresses the question of ODA and fi nancing for 
climate change adaptation. Th e fourth section summarises and presents conclusions. 
Reducing vulnerability and mainstreaming 
climate change adaptation 
It is now widely recognised that the reduction of vulnerability is a key strategy for 
strengthening climate change adaptation, and that development cooperation can play 
an important role in this area while maintaining its core objective of contributing to 
the MDGs. One approach that development cooperation can take involves support-
ing dedicated activities to reduce specifi c climate change risks (Agrawala 2005). Th ere 
is a growing literature, and agreement within the development cooperation commu-
nity, however, that the focus of interventions should be diff erent (Eriksen et al. 2007; 
Schipper 2007; Smit et al. 2001; IISD 2005); and that a more broad-based, program-
matic approach that emphasises building adaptive capacity is needed. Th is alternative 
view suggests that, instead of adopting a project approach to specifi c risks, a key focus 
of development cooperation should be on tackling the underlying factors that cause 
vulnerability itself, and on expanding the capacity to cope with shocks (Eriksen et al. 
2007; Leary et al. 2006; Schipper 2007). 
Th ere are several hurdles, however, to the adoption of such programmatic ap-
proaches. First, interventions are highly context specifi c, since the factors driving 
vulnerability depend on local conditions (Eriksen et al., 2007). What works in one 
situation may therefore not work in another; but context-specifi c approaches may be 
prohibitively time-consuming and expensive, and may stretch the capacity and com-
petencies of development cooperation agencies and their staff . Secondly, there are po-
litical hurdles. Programmatic approaches to reducing vulnerability may be unpopular 
with some donors, since they lack the “visibility” of discrete projects. Th is may make 
it diffi  cult for donors to demonstrate to taxpayers that their eff orts to support climate 
change adaptation have had clear results. 
Despite these potential drawbacks, investments in reducing vulnerability and 
augmenting adaptive capacity may be amongst the most high-return investments to 
achieve both the MDGs and climate goals – and they are relatively underfunded 
(McGray et al., 2007; UNDP 2007: 193). Development activities that use this ap-
proach can go hand in hand with adaptation activities such as climate-proofi ng of 
infrastructure and disaster response and rebuilding, as well as mitigation activities 
which facilitate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
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A major shift will be required, however, if this climate-oriented vision of develop-
ment cooperation is to be become reality. Development cooperation agencies will 
need to re-focus policy, and integrate climate change responses across all aspects of 
their practise. Early experience demonstrates the diffi  culties associated with such a 
shift: climate change was too often interpreted solely as an environmental issue, and 
rarely seen as a development concern in its own right (Schaar 2008: 3). When aware-
ness existed, it focused mainly on mitigation issues. Virtually no agencies considered 
how their projects would augment or weaken a country’s ability to cope with climate 
change (Eriksen et al., 2007; Schaar 2008). 
Th is situation is now starting to change, and there is a growing understanding 
that “good development practice is the best way to deliver adaptation: increasing the 
resilience and capacity to manage the impacts of a changing climate.” (Vernon 2008). 
Th e preferred approach is through mainstreaming climate change considerations into 
development cooperation, so that climate change is addressed within development 
planning, sectoral decision-making and regular budgeting processes, rather than 
through stand-alone measures or as a separate sector (Eriksen, 2007). Mainstreaming 
has gained signifi cant high level endorsement, as demonstrated by OECD countries’ 
agreement on the 2006 Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into 
Development Cooperation. Nonetheless, the integration of adaptation measures into 
development processes “remains piece-meal, fragmented and largely project based” 
(Agrawala and Crick, 2009: 7). 
If mainstreaming does start to take hold, development cooperation agencies may 
then need to deal with “mainstreaming overload” (OECD 2005), and to ensure that 
at the operational level, mainstreaming is not reduced to a “box-ticking” exercise. 
Without strong leadership at the political and management levels, climate issues 
may continue to meet resistance and create confusion. Indeed, the presence of a 
high-level champion for gender concerns was a determining factor in the success of 
mainstreaming that issue into development agencies. One survey of gender assess-
ments found that in the absence of a strong central supervisor for mainstreaming 
eff orts, attempts to include gender considerations at the operational level “were met 
with a great deal of passive opposition and little enthusiasm” (Aasen, 2006), a fi nd-
ing confi rmed by the World Bank (2005). Mainstreaming must therefore be part of 
management’s responsibilities and management must be held accountable for work 
in this area for it to be successful.1 To avoid cutbacks and marginalisation, the issue 
must be institutionalised through capacity building that demonstrates how factoring 
in climate change concerns will contribute to more successful and sustainable project 
outcomes (Gibb, 2009).2
If the current obstacles to mainstreaming can be overcome, it has much to of-
fer as a strategy for how development cooperation can play a constructive role in 
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strengthening climate change adaptation. Equally importantly, mainstreaming can 
also play a part in ensuring that ongoing development activities do not exacerbate 
climate change or its impacts. When development activities are undertaken without 
due attention to climate change implications – for instance when tourism is promoted 
in ecologically and climate-sensitive areas – they risk maladjustment: in other words, 
they risk undermining or preventing adaptation or mitigation of climate change. In-
ternational development cooperation that does not consider climate change implica-
tions may take countries down carbon-intensive development paths, as with funding 
for coal-driven power plants in China. Th is may bring short-term results in generat-
ing economic growth, but in the long term these benefi ts may be reversed. Growth 
policies therefore need to be re-thought to ensure they are climate resilient and that 
they encourage investment in sectors that are globally competitive, dynamic, resistant 
to climatic impacts, and highly adaptable (Vernon, 2008). 
Existing shortcomings in the development 
cooperation system
With committed leadership, development cooperation may be able to meet the chal-
lenges associated with establishing a stronger focus on reducing vulnerability and on 
mainstreaming climate change adaptation. It is important to recognise, however, that 
the overall development cooperation system – comprising the countries, institutions, 
and processes that govern the delivery and management of development assistance –
faces existing and substantial challenges that it is struggling to overcome. Unless these 
are addressed, it is unlikely that development cooperation will be in a position to play 
a positive and eff ective role in supporting climate change adaptation. 
Th e fi rst challenge relates to the substantial growth during the last decade in the 
number of countries, channels, and private actors involved in development assist-
ance. A number of countries (China and India) have established signifi cantly larger 
aid programs, and others (such as Brazil, Malaysia, Th ailand and South Africa) have 
established aid programs for the fi rst time. Including middle income and some high 
income countries that are not part of the OECD Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC), there are now around 34 countries playing a new or more signifi cant role 
in development cooperation, bringing the total of bilateral donors to 59. Equally 
signifi cant is the increase in the number of individual channels providing aid, which 
now numbers around 230 agencies, funds and programs. In addition, there are thou-
sands of private actors, including a growing range of foundations, philanthropic bod-
ies, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and community based organizations 
(CBOs) (Bhattacharya 2009). Th e proliferation of funds is similarly evident in the 
climate change domain, where no less than eight bilateral and six multilateral funds 
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emerged between January 2007 and June 2008 (Porter et al., 2008). 
Th e sheer number of actors now involved in development cooperation has provid-
ed more choices and opportunities for aid-recipient countries, but it has also spawned 
an overall system that is complex, fragmented, and unwieldy. Many of the actors that 
are not members of the OECD-DAC prefer, understandably enough, to pursue their 
own aid programs on their own terms. In so doing, they operate outside of existing 
structures and processes for the management and coordination of development coop-
eration approaches. Th is includes those that promote principles and norms based on 
agreed objectives, such as those articulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Eff ective-
ness.3 Th is further means that within the countries, institutions and processes that 
comprise the current development cooperation system, there is little existing basis 
for a comprehensive, coordinated approach to addressing climate change issues, let 
alone for integrating climate change adaptation across all aspects of programmes and 
activities. If agencies choose to mainstream, they are likely to do so on the basis of 
individual choice, rather than as part of collective action. 
Th e second challenge that threatens the development cooperation system’s ability 
to play an eff ective role in supporting climate change adaptation relates to the ques-
tion of ownership. Like all development cooperation approaches, a renewed focus 
on reducing vulnerability and on mainstreaming climate change adaptation depends 
on the engagement and support of developing countries. Aid will not be eff ective in 
facilitating climate change adaptation unless developing countries are centrally in-
volved in the development and management of adaptation and mitigation responses. 
Ultimately, the countries most aff ected must be in a position to lead, manage and take 
ownership of adaptation measures that are undertaken in their own countries. 
So far, however, the development cooperation system has a poor record of sup-
porting developing country ownership at the national level. Over the last ten years 
ownership has emerged as the central issue aff ecting aid eff ectiveness, and has been 
recognised as key to the donor-recipient aid relationship. It was intentionally placed 
fi rst on the list of Paris Declaration commitments, refl ecting the fact that it is the 
most important overarching factor in supporting the Declaration’s overall aid ef-
fectiveness objectives (Wood 2008). Both the Declaration and its 2008 addendum 
(the Accra Agenda for Action) describe ownership in terms of developing countries’ 
ability to exert eff ective leadership over the development of national development 
policy and strategy. Th is recognises, implicitly, that international development insti-
tutions and donor countries have previously exerted excessive infl uence over devel-
oping country policy, in particular through the use of conditionalities attached to 
aid. Progress in implementing the Declaration’s vision of ownership has, however, 
been varied. As the 2008 Evaluation of the Paris Declaration showed, there are wide 
diff erences in the extent to which donor countries are actually prepared to “let go” 
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and reduce past levels of control and leadership over development cooperation pro-
grams (Wood 2008). 
Th ere are also varying levels of commitment to assuming ownership in aid re-
cipient countries (Wood 2008). Th is suggests that, among other things, developing 
countries have understandings of ownership that are very diff erent to those articu-
lated in agreements such as the Paris Declaration. Indeed, southern analysts describe 
ownership in terms that go well beyond the Declaration’s relatively narrow vision. 
Ownership is seen as a complex issue integrated within a country’s economic, social 
and political make-up (De Mel 2007), and as “the exercise of national independ-
ence and sovereignty in a democratic process in the determination of development 
policies and strategies” (Tujan 2008: 2). Southern commentators also point out that 
national development plans are an inappropriate mechanism for the articulation of 
national ownership, given that donors require these plans as a basis for funding, 
and thus continue to exert infl uence over the plans’ content (Culpeper and Morton, 
2007). 
Ownership therefore constitutes a disputed and hotly contested aspect of the de-
velopment cooperation system. While this continues to be the case, it is unlikely 
that the development cooperation system can deliver climate change adaptation ap-
proaches that, at the national level, are led, managed and owned by the developing 
countries that are worst aff ected. Th is, in turn, is likely to signifi cantly undermine the 
viability of these approaches. 
Th e third and most serious challenge facing the development cooperation system 
concerns the processes that govern overall policy and decision-making at the interna-
tional level. If development cooperation is to play an eff ective role in fi nancing and 
supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation, these processes must have the 
involvement – and confi dence – of the countries worst aff ected by climate change. 
Yet decision-making and policy within the current development cooperation system 
is largely controlled by developed countries and by Northern-dominated institutions. 
Bodies such as the G8, the World Bank and the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee all play key roles in determining international policy on the role of devel-
opment cooperation, and on the norms and standards for aid quantity and quality. 
Developing countries – the recipients of aid – have either no, or disproportionately 
little representation and voice in the governance mechanisms of these institutions. 
For example, borrowers from the World Bank have “virtually no real control over [its] 
fundamental decisions” (CGD 2005: 24). A total of 46 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries are represented by only 2 chairs on the Bank’s Board of Directors. Th e OECD-
DAC played the driving role in crafting agreement on the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Eff ectiveness, but none of its 23 members are developing countries. 
It is little wonder, therefore, that in the eyes of many developing countries the de-
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velopment cooperation system lacks the legitimacy to represent their interests. Some 
analysts maintain that developing country voice and representation is the top priority 
for reform of the aid architecture (Evans 2006), and that solving the legitimacy prob-
lem is far more urgent than implementing Paris Declaration commitments, which are 
confi ned to the delivery of aid (South Centre 2008). 
Recent experience suggests a glimmer of hope for improvements in representa-
tion and voice. Th e DAC and OECD donors in general are working more closely 
with developing country partners, and civil society actors are now starting to play a 
stronger role in infl uencing international agreements such as the Accra Agenda for 
Action. Th e recently established UN Development Cooperation Forum has the po-
tential for taking a stronger role in the governance of development cooperation, has 
broad support from developing country governments and civil society organisations, 
and addressed climate change as part of its fi rst meeting in 2008. Overall, however, 
these small improvements are insuffi  cient: the Development Cooperation Forum has 
no decision-making mandate, and its precise role, including its level of infl uence, are 
still being determined (Brown and Morton 2007). If developing country interests 
are to be legitimately represented in the development cooperation system and in its 
responses to climate change, deep reform of the governance of the key development 
institutions and decision-making bodies will be required. 
Financing climate change adaptation: 
What role for ODA? 
Offi  cial Development Assistance (ODA) has a role to play in promoting the miti-
gation of, and adaptation to climate change, but more funds will be necessary to 
ensure that both development and climate objectives are incorporated, through 
mainstreaming, into development cooperation. As most estimates fi nd that the 
ODA available today is insuffi  cient for achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals, development agencies must ensure funds are not just diverted from existing 
development activities. Financing needs for adaptation are very large, and it is un-
likely, based upon past trends, that new and additional ODA will be made available 
to fulfi l all of this need. 
In light of the need for new resources for fi nancing climate change, and the 
limited amount of ODA available, counting ODA as both fi nance for development 
and climate change is inadvisable: it goes against the jurisdiction, authority and 
principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Instead, ODA should go to development activities that address the drivers of vul-
nerability to climate change and build response capacity through mainstreaming of 
climate change adaptation into development cooperation. A separate set of climate 
48 C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  T H E  F O U N D A T I O N S  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T
costs – relating to climate proofi ng infrastructure, and addressing particular climate 
risks – should remain the domain of the UNFCCC. 
Th ere are also, of course, substantial fi nancing needs for climate change mitiga-
tion. An additional investment of $200-210 billion will be needed, according to the 
UNFCCC, by 2030 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 2008 levels (UNFCCC 
2008). Th ese investments to return GHG emissions to the current level will have to 
come from a variety of sources: funding through the UNFCCC, national public and 
private investments, and some ODA (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2005).4
Two spheres of infl uence: ODA vs. climate fi nance 
in adaptation fi nancing
According to one useful conceptual framework for adaptation to climate change 
(McGray et al. 2007) there are four types of adaptation that need fi nancial support. 
Th ere is, fi rstly, fi nancing that responds to specifi c climate risks; secondly, that man-
ages climate risks; thirdly, that builds adaptive capacity more broadly; and fourthly, 
that addresses the drivers of vulnerability. Th ese four categories correspond to activi-
ties that range from a focus on the known impacts of climate change to a focus on 
building the capacity of communities to respond. Th e authors argue that UNFCCC 
climate funds under the GEF have focused on the fi rst category of confronting specif-
ic climate change risks. On the other hand, ODA, in its focus on reducing poverty, is 
focused on the last type, namely addressing the root causes of vulnerability to climate 
change: poverty and dependence on climate-vulnerable sectors. 
Missing, they argue, are investments in building adaptive capacity and manag-
ing climate risk. Mainstreaming climate change in development cooperation through 
a vulnerability approach, as described above, could clearly include investments in 
building adaptive capacity – that is, building the resilience of economies, societies 
and ecosystems – and thus go some way to addressing that crucial third category of 
adaptation activities. 
We can thus sketch out two separate spheres of infl uence for ODA and non-ODA 
fi nancing of adaptation fi nancing. On the one hand, there is fi nance through the UN-
FCCC and Kyoto Protocol instruments that addresses and manages specifi c climate 
change risks, and then there is ODA which addresses the drivers of vulnerability and 
builds adaptive capacity, including adaptive capacity as a means to address the MDGs. 
While there is undoubtedly some overlap in the type of activities that are fi nanced, in 
focus, intent and legal status, the fi nance provided is diff erent in nature. Th e next two 
sub-sections estimate and explore these two spheres of adaptation fi nancing.
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Financing for managing and confronting 
particular climatic risks 
Estimates of the cost of managing and confronting particular climatic risks range 
from $10 to $50 billion a year for the developing world, according to the World Bank 
and Oxfam respectively (UNFCCC 2008). Like all other estimates of the costs of 
climate change, these numbers are not exact, and the bases and assumptions for the 
calculations remain open to doubt.
Th e UNFCCC text includes a strong call for “new and additional resources” to 
assist developing countries in covering their adaptation needs. In particular, Article 
1 of the Convention makes reference to “common but diff erentiated responsibilities 
and capabilities”. In essence, this principle states that, owing to their historic respon-
sibility for greenhouse gas emissions and their greater capacity to pay for climate 
change impacts, developed countries are obliged to provide fi nancial transfers for the 
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change (LeGoulven 2008; Oxfam 2007). As 
such, developed countries should provide funding out of a responsibility to pay, both 
morally as those responsible for polluting, and legally under international law (Barrett 
2007 in LeGoulven 2008). 
Despite this strong mandate for voluntary contributions, the actual amounts pro-
vided to the funds created by the Convention have been extremely limited. In 2008, 
only $96 million was committed to the Global Environment Faculty (GEF) Funds es-
tablished for this purpose, and of this, a mere $26 million was actually disbursed (see 
Table 1 below). Th ere is some possibility that these amounts will be supplemented 
by a number of alternative arrangements, including the Adaptation Fund, which is to 
be fi nanced by a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) transactions.5 
However, the amounts that these mechanisms may yield are as yet unclear; and there 
are political barriers involved in the implementation of all of them.
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Table 1. Multilateral Vertical Funds for Adaptation to Climate Change
Mechanism Description Origin Amount Available Amount 
Disbursed
Strategic Priority on 
Adaptation 
Multilateral fi nancial mechanism 
funded by developed country pledges: 
funds go only to projects which dem-
onstrate global environmental benefi ts
GEF; UNFCCC $50 million $28 million commit-




Funded through pledges from devel-
oped countries, supports the prepara-
tion and implementation of National 
Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs)
GEF; UNFCCC $115 million $59 million com-
mitted, $9.8 million 
disbursed
Special Climate Change 
Fund (SCCF)
Developed country funding; goes to 
long term mitigation and adaptation 
needs of developing countries
GEF; UNFCCC $65 million $9 million commit-
ted, $1.4 million 
disbursed
Adaptation Fund Funded by 2% levy on CDM credits 
and voluntary pledges, potential 
recipients propose their implementa-
tion agency
Kyoto Protocol of 
UNFCCC
$160-950 million 
by 2012; $50 
million to date
Not yet 
operational as of 
early 2009
Pilot Program for Cli-
mate Resilience (PPCR)
UK, US, Japan contributors; focus on 
developing climate-resilient develop-
ment plans through program, tech 
assistance, and direct investment
World Bank Strate-
gic Climate Fund
$500 million Not yet 
operational as of 
early 2009
ODA for the MDGs, reducing vulnerability, and increasing adaptive capacity
Offi  cial Development Assistance (ODA) can, by reducing poverty and tackling 
inequality, address the drivers of vulnerability and help attain the MDGs. At the same 
time, development activities can work to enhance adaptive capacity, as analysed in 
more detail in Section 1 above, through mainstreaming climate change. Although 
less eff ort has been put into estimating these costs, the price of attaining the MDGs 
in an era of climate change can still provide a preliminary assessment of the scale of 
fi nancing needed. 
Climate change will make it more costly to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals; but even without meeting the costs of climate change, the MDGs face serious 
fi nancing shortfalls. Th e UN Millennium Project has estimated the fi nancing needed 
to achieve the MDGs in the absence of climate change. Th ey calculate that the cost 
of meeting the Goals in all countries will amount to $121 billion per annum in 2006 
and $189 billion per annum in 2015. Including emergency relief, capacity building 
and research, approximately $152 billion USD (2003 dollars) in ODA will be needed 
per annum by 2010 and $195 billion per annum by 2015 to achieve the MDGs. 
As a result, rich countries will need to increase the percentage of GNI dedicated to 
ODA up to at least 0.54% by 2015 just for the Millennium Development Goals to be 
achieved. Including ODA to address non-MDG concerns6 the project estimates that 
0.7% of GNP will need to be dedicated to ODA (Millennium Development Project, 
2005). Th is is the same level as the original target for ODA/GNP set at the UN in 
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1970 that most OECD donors have subsequently consistently failed to meet. 
According to Nicholas Stern, climate change could increase the cost of attaining 
the MDGs by as much as $100 billion (Stern 2008). Th is would bring the ODA bill 
up to $295 billion by 2015 and, using the Millennium project’s original estimates 
of developed country income, bring up the percentage of GNP dedicated to ODA 
just for the Millennium Development Goals up to 0.82% by 2015. Based upon the 
project’s assumed ratio of MDG to non-MDG ODA, this would require that at least 
1.06% of GNP be dedicated to ODA – well above the 0.7% that is the current tar-
get. Th e global economic slowdown will push this percentage up further by slowing 
growth in developed countries and lowering their GNP, while reducing developing 
country capacity to mobilize domestic resources for the MDGs. While it is too early 
to quantify these amounts, suffi  ce to say that by 2015 a very conservative estimate 
of at least 1.1% of GNP will need to be dedicated to ODA to meet the MDGs in a 
world facing climate change and slower economic growth. 
Previous experience and historic ODA levels suggest this is an unrealistic target. 
Indeed, there has been a long-term decline in the percentage of national income that 
has been dedicated to international aid, notwithstanding the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals and increasing per capita incomes that make aid more aff ordable. In 
1960, net ODA in US Dollars as a percentage of donor countries’ gross national 
incomes was 0.51%. In the 1970s and 1980s, net ODA ranged between 0.35% and 
0.32%, but steady decreases in the 1990s brought the proportion down to 0.22% 
by the beginning of the new millennium. Aid statistics peaked in 2005 and 2006, 
when net ODA was 0.33 and 0.31 % respectively, owing to one-time debt forgiveness 
grants. By 2007, net ODA was back down to 0.28% (OECD). On this basis, it would 
need a dramatic change in political will in developed countries to scale up ODA even 
to the 0.7% target – let alone to the level of 1.1% of GNP that will be required when 
climate change and the economic slowdown is considered. 
The governance of climate change fi nancing
Th e availability of funding for climate and development is not the only constraint 
on the involvement of development fi nance in the climate solution. Civil society and 
some developing country representatives have raised concerns regarding the involve-
ment of ODA for a number of reasons. Firstly, they argue, the poor representation of 
developing countries in decisions on climate change in development agencies is un-
dermining developing country ownership of climate strategies (CCIC 2008). In par-
ticular, opposition to the decision of developed countries to provide climate fi nancing 
through bilateral and multilateral ODA has focused on the governance implications 
of the involvement of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the World 
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Bank in climate change policy making. Criticism regarding the World Bank’s new 
Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change, its Climate Investment 
Funds, and the Pilot Project on Climate Resilience, have focused on the low repre-
sentation of developing countries in governing boards of funds and the organisations 
themselves (Muller and Winkler 2008 in Le Goulven 2008; CCIC 2009). 
Secondly, it is argued, funding provided through aid or loans weakens the UNFC-
CC. It is pointed out that the environmental convention is the global body which has 
the governance structure and legal mandate to mobilize funds for climate change and 
disburse them through a process which incorporates the voices of developing coun-
tries into the design of climate change fi nancing mechanisms (South Centre 2009). In 
reiterating the terms of their August fi nancing proposal (see FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/
MISC.2), developing country negotiators in Poznan emphasised that the UNFCCC 
must be strengthened as the central clearing house for climate change fi nancing. 
Th irdly, there are fears regarding access to funds. Developing country representa-
tives have raised concerns within the UNFCCC process that existing and proposed 
sources of fi nancing for adaptation to climate change are unwieldy and place too 
many demands on developing country applicants. Th is is not only true for World 
Bank funding, but also the GEF, whose extensive procedures and criterion have been 
described in depth elsewhere (Le Goulven 2008; CCIC 2008). In the eloquent words 
of the Indian delegation to the UNFCCC: “the proposed fi nancial architecture must 
ensure access to funds for adaptation instead of forcing developing countries to adapt 
to funds made available” (UNFCCC 2008).
Conclusion
Th is article has presented a potentially pessimistic picture of the role that develop-
ment cooperation can play in addressing climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Firstly, in order to help attain the MDGs and also meet climate change goals, ODA 
will need to increase to unprecedented levels, a hard task given current global eco-
nomic conditions. Second, development cooperation must address recently emerging 
problems as well as seemingly intractable systemic issues such as the lack of genuine 
developing country ownership, voice and representation. Th ese represent signifi cant 
challenges, but they are not insurmountable. Th e growing number of actors within 
the development architecture may provide an opportunity to take the mainstream-
ing of climate change adaptation beyond traditional country donors and multilateral 
institutions. Over the next few years the UN Development Cooperation Forum may 
emerge as a more representative and equitable forum for addressing aid and other 
development matters, including climate change. Th e increasing urgency of addressing 
climate change may lead to greater understanding of the respective areas of involve-
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ment of the development cooperation system and the UNFCC, including greater 
clarity on which aspects of adaptation ODA should fi nance, and which it should not. 
Ultimately, however, development cooperation will play only one, relatively small 
part in global eff orts at climate change mitigation and adaptation. Th e success of 
development cooperation and these overall eff orts will depend on high level political 
commitment to change. Th ere are signs that such commitment may now be emerg-
ing, and this is good news for everyone. 
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Endnotes 
1 This fi nding is confi rmed in the climate change arena, where countries with a high-level mandate for mainstream-
ing and leaders who implement it (such as the UK) are more advanced in their mainstreaming efforts than coun-
tries where government and management leadership is weaker (such as Canada).
2 The climate paradigm challenges people’s deeply held belief systems, albeit in a different way than the gender 
question. Work across development and environment ministries in developed countries, and environment and 
fi nance ministries in developing countries, can help challenge conventional development thinking. A focus on cli-
mate challenges how we think about development (as industrialisation, or as capacity to survive and thrive in the 
face of shocks), about growth (about short term GDP per capita growth, or longterm sustainability and real cost-
ing of environmental impacts) and about rural development (as just more agricultural yield, or about the resilience 
of rural economies, crops and communities).
3 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was agreed on in 2005 at a High Level Forum involving donor coun-
tries, multilateral agencies and aid-recipient countries. It sets out joint commitments on ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. It was followed in 2008 by a High Level Forum in 
Accra where participants agreed on an addendum to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action. 
4 Between 1998 and 2000, the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) spent 2.7 bil-
lion USD or 7.2% of total bilateral Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) on mitigation of climate change
5 Other mechanisms, including levies on the Kyoto Protocol’s two other fl exibility mechanisms, namely the Joint 
Implementation and Emissions Trading (ET) schemes, could also yield funding. Other proposals include a levy 
on emissions permits issued through cap and trade systems; the proceeds from a carbon tax; an airline levy; an 
international fi nancial faculty for the climate, through which bonds are issued based upon a long-term aid com-
mitment that acts as the capital; and public-private partnerships, particularly for investments in infrastructure and 
technology.
6 According to the Project (2005), this “…includes a basic extrapolation of various kinds of offi cial development 
assistance that are not related to the Goals (such as aid to countries of geopolitical importance for needs not cov-
ered in our costing). This is not a comprehensive measure of non-MDG needs. It is simply a baseline calculated 
on the basis of current ODA. We project that actual ODA needs for non-MDG-related goals — such as postwar 
reconstruction, the consolidation of new democracies, or the mitigation of climate change — will be considerably 
higher than this line.
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Energy Access and Climate Change Mitigation: 
Friends or Foes?
Virginie Schwarz and Yannick Glemarec
Today, 1.6 billion people in the world still do not have access to modern energy serv-
ices and 2.5 billion rely on traditional biomass fuels for cooking. In Africa and South 
Asia 70% and 59% of the population, respectively, do not have access to electric 
power. Th is is a major challenge to economic growth and global development goals. 
Modern energy services are central to achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
because they are positive catalysts for productivity, health, education, gender equality, 
safe water and communication services. Energy access is an important development 
priority in many developing countries. However, the IEA estimates that by 2030, 
there will still be 1.4 billion people without access to energy (IEA/2006 p.157& p. 
419). 
At the same time, the growing scientifi c consensus on climate change and its possi-
ble consequences make the necessity to reduce the world’s GHG emissions a growing 
concern for the international community. Th e next 10 years will be critical for the fu-
ture of our planet. Radical measures must be taken both mitigation of and adaptation 
to climate change before we lock into potentially irreversible, catastrophic climate 
transformations. All regions will be impacted by climate change with temperature 
changes, sea level rise, precipitation changes, droughts and fl oods that could lead to 
disruptions to ecosystems and biodiversity, changes in food production and water re-
sources, and even damage to human settlements. Developing countries are especially 
vulnerable to climate change because of their geographic exposure, low incomes, and 
greater reliance on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture. It is imperative to act 
before climate change negates decades of progress and undermines eff orts to achieve 
the MDGs.
To some, the two objectives of improving energy access and mitigating climate 
change seem irreconcilable. Th ere is a strong belief that improving energy access 
would necessarily mean increasing fossil energy consumption and therefore increase 
GHG emissions. Conversely, reducing GHG emissions would automatically imply 
limiting energy services, comfort and development. However, there is room for win-
win strategies that meet the needs for energy services but do not harm the environ-
ment. Policies and new fi nancing mechanisms designed to reduce GHG emissions 
can also improve the delivery of energy services. 
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Increased energy effi  ciency and reliance on local renewable energy solutions have 
the potential both to promote greater energy access, and to lower carbon emissions. 
However, their eff ective implementation is contingent on the removal of the barriers 
that limit their development. Development aid can play a critical role in this process 
by enhancing the capacity of developing countries to create favourable conditions for 
the development of policies, investments and the expansion of market-based instru-
ments (carbon cap-and-trade systems mechanisms, etc.) and innovative fi nance op-
tions (carbon levies, etc.), that would lead to better energy access for all. 
The energy access challenge
Th e number of people without electricity today stands at around 1.6 billion. Electri-
fi cation is very unevenly distributed worldwide. Overall, 80% of those without access 
to electricity currently live in the rural areas of developing countries. Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia have the highest proportions of people without access to elec-
tricity, in both urban and rural areas.
Figure 1: Population without Electricity, 2005
Source: IEA/2006 – World Energy Outlook 2006 
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From 1990 to 2005, the number of people with no access to electricity fell from 
2 billion to 1.6 billion. Progress was mostly in middle-income, densely populated 
areas of Asia, Latin America and North Africa, with China recording the swiftest 
progress. Excluding China, however, the number of people without electricity has 
steadily increased over the past 15 years. Because of population growth, if no new 
policies are put into place there will still be 1.4 billion people lacking access to elec-
tricity in 2030. To reach the Millennium Development Goals, this number would 
need to fall to less than one billion by 2015 (IEA/2006 p. 157). 
Since the vast majority of “energy poor” people live in rural areas and will continue 
to do so in the future, reaching them is a top priority. At the same time, meeting the 
needs of people and economies in periurban and urban areas that are experiencing 
rapid population growth is also critical. Governments are confronted with the double 
challenge of providing access to modern energy services to the isolated rural popula-
tions who currently rely entirely on traditional fuels, while at the same time meeting 
the rapidly increasing demand of growing urban populations and industrialising eco-
nomic activities.
Addressing energy poverty is an important driver for the achievement of the MDGs 
and for national development. Modern energy services – whether derived from fuel, 
electricity or motive power – relieve tremendous burdens and create development op-
portunities for the poor by igniting economic growth. 
Field evidence shows that benefi ts of access to modern energy services are real and 
signifi cant (UN Energy/2008 p. 6&7). A recent cross-country examination of the de-
velopment impacts of rural electrifi cation programmes by the World Bank found that 
development benefi ts from these programmes are manifold and signifi cant: improved 
levels of education, reduced indoor air-pollution, improved health services, develop-
ment of home businesses, and reduced CO
2
. Combined, the average estimated devel-
opment benefi ts amount to USD 40-70 per household per month, considerably more 
than the cost of service.  In Bangladesh, where over 40 million people have benefi ted 
from rural electrifi cation in the last three decades, a study shows that villages with 
electricity generate 11 times more jobs than those without. 
Linking energy access programmes to productive uses can amplify development 
benefi ts. Mechanical power for agro-processing in rural areas is one of the examples 
that generate signifi cant development benefi ts of energy investments through pro-
ductive uses. Development benefi ts can be signifi cantly increased through modest 
investments that link modern energy services directly to economically, socially or en-
vironmentally productive applications. 
Increasing access to modern energy services also brings major benefi ts for women 
and girls, especially in health, education, and productive activities. WHO estimates 
that indoor smoke arising from cooking and heating are responsible for 1.5 million 
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premature deaths annually in developing countries. Cost-benefi t assessments of the 
introduction of clean cooking fuels shows that the economic benefi ts are enormous: 
at least six to seven times the cost of public intervention, with positive impacts on 
health, forest resources, time available for productive work, and GHG emissions. In 
Kenya, fi eld research shows that use of improved stoves with a hood that draws smoke 
out through the roof reduces indoor concentrations of health-damaging pollutants 
up to 80%. 
Access to modern energy services can also reduce the time women spend on “un-
paid” energy related work (cooking, fuelwood gathering, agricultural processing, etc.) 
and free up time for paid activities. 
Greater energy access and climate change mitigation – 
Irreconcilable objectives? 
Improving energy access and mitigating climate are two major challenges in the com-
ing years. However, some analysts consider the policies and activities aiming to make 
progress on both these issues are irreconcilable, for the following reasons: 
• First of all, any emphasis put on climate change mitigation is considered a 
threat to development and energy access because mitigation is associated with 
reducing energy consumption and therefore reducing development possibili-
ties. 
• Secondly, mitigation is considered to be the responsibility of developed coun-
tries that have the highest current and historic emissions. Many developing 
countries have low greenhouse gas emissions in absolute and per-capita terms. 
Mitigation eff orts on the part of smaller developing countries are considered 
meaningless because of their limited impact on world emissions.
• Th ird, clean energy options such as renewable energy are considered inap-
propriate as an energy supply in rural developing areas. Th ese technologies 
are deemed too expensive and not market-ready. Th us, it is considered that 
they should be reserved for developed countries, and that developing coun-
tries should rely on traditional fossil fuel solutions, which are considered to be 
cheaper and easier to access.
• Fourth, clean energy options are also assumed to have less potential. Most 
renewable energy technologies are supposed to be at a Research and Develop-
ment stage only and to be unable to be scaled up quickly enough to meet the 
urgent energy needs of growing economies. Similarly, energy effi  ciency poten-
tial is seen as limited in countries with few heavy industries.
• Finally, clean energy solutions are regarded as impossible to fi nance in rural 
developing areas. Financing instruments which have been newly developed to 
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reinforce fi nancial pressures on fi rms to reduce emissions or provide fi nancial 
incentives to invest in low-carbon emitting technologies, such as carbon per-
mit trading, are considered to be inapplicable in developing countries. 
On the other hand, some analysts are concerned that the current strategy of proceed-
ing with a general reliance on traditional fossil fuel energy for immediate energy access 
and then, at some point in the future, switching to low-carbon solutions, could be 
self-defeating because of the dynamics of energy supply, demand and use in developing 
countries. Extended reliance on fossil fuel raises a series of sustainability issues, to wit:
Aff ordability is a key component of energy access. In a context where international 
fuel prices are rising – and are expected to remain high - the volume of fuels that low 
income populations can aff ord grows smaller and smaller, pushing more people into 
fuel poverty, even if they have the physical possibility to access energy. Paradoxically, 
eff orts to reduce poverty by increasing access to energy, where the energy is fossil fuel-
based, could end up having an adverse impact on the poorest populations. As energy 
demand could rapidly outstrip supply in the coming years, international fuel prices 
could keep rising, reducing the volume of fuels that low income populations can af-
ford. Th is would push more people into fuel poverty. Between 2004 and 2007, over 
50% of the incremental global demand for oil has come from Asia. As increases in 
demand – especially from rapidly industrialising countries such as China and India 
– have outstripped supply, the price of these commodities has risen (UNDP/2008 p. 
11-12), making energy less accessible for the poorest populations. 
Increased international fossil fuel consumption and higher resulting oil prices also 
have an adverse economic impact on oil-importing low income countries. According 
to the World Bank, higher oil prices are causing many net oil-importing Sub-Saharan 
African countries to lose economic ground, costing them a cumulative loss of over 3% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and increasing poverty in those areas by as much as 
4% to 6%. (World Bank/2006 p. 1)
Finally, uncontrolled increases in fossil fuel consumption have negative impacts on 
the environment, not only in terms of climate change but also on local air pollution 
and environmental health. In China, for example, the sulphur dioxide produced from 
coal combustion is estimated to contribute to about 400,000 premature deaths a year. 
Th ese environmental hazards are drawbacks for development.
The need for a paradigm shift
To overcome the apparent conundrum, this article argues that it is necessary to re-
think energy by focusing on the effi  ciency of energy use and the type of energy pro-
vided. More than the amount of energy supplied, socio-economic development is 
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linked to the type of energy services provided. People need clean, effi  cient, safe light-
ing and warm homes without the risk of indoor air pollution or fi res. It is possible to 
provide these services by using local renewable energy sources rather than fossil fuels. 
It is also possible to reduce the volume of energy necessary for the same result (thereby 
also reducing energy bills) by using effi  cient materials or appliances. Certain countries 
have also examine the possibility of meeting their growing energy needs through more 
controversial options such as coal generated electricity with carbon sequestration, or 
nuclear energy. Th ese technologies however raise questions in terms of costs, avail-
ability and/or safety.
Th e power of energy effi  ciency can be illustrated easily by looking at a compact fl u-
orescent lamp (CFLs). In the United States, a CFL can save over USD 30 in electricity 
costs compared to an incandescent lamp over the CFL’s lifetime and save 2000 times 
its own weight in greenhouse gases. Figure 2. illustrates the energy saving potential of 
CFLs compared to incandescent lamps for the same amount of visible light.
Th e use of renewable energy and energy-effi  cient options such as biomass gen-
erators, solar-powered lanterns and cooking stoves, compact fl uorescent lamps, and 
combustion of fatal gases can provide the same (or better) energy services while using 
less fossil fuels and emitting less GHGs. 
When implemented in urban centres in developing countries where individual en-
ergy consumption is signifi cant, energy effi  ciency solutions can help reduce per capita 
Figure 2: Energy Services versus Energy Supply
For a given light output, compact fl uorescent lamps use between one-fi fth and one-third of the power 
of equivalent incandescent lamps.































63C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  T H E  F O U N D A T I O N S  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T
or per unit consumption, thus freeing capacity to supply other areas of the country 
or a growing urban population. In rural areas, providing the population with effi  cient 
equipment (lighting, cooking, etc.) can open access to a number of services while 
requiring only minimal energy consumption that is easier to cover with decentralised, 
local renewable energy solutions.
In a number of countries, decentralised energy technologies have already made 
major contributions to expanding access to energy services for poor people in rural 
and remote areas with regards to electricity, cooking fuels/devices and provision of 
mechanical power.
In Nepal, for example, 4.7 million people lack access to electricity. Urban areas are 
relatively well-supplied, while rural areas, especially remote, isolated and dispersed 
hill communities, have little prospect of being supplied by the national grid in the 
near future. Beginning in 1996, Nepal’s micro-hydro programme has supported the 
installation of 10 MW grids in 40 districts, supplying renewable electricity to more 
than 100,000 households. By 2011, the micro-hydro programme is expected to sup-
ply 25 MW of energy to over 250,000 households. Th e maximum market potential 
for micro-hydro schemes in Nepal is estimated at close to 150 MW, bringing access 
to energy to 1.5 million households (UN Energy/2008 p. 13).
Clean energy solutions (energy effi  ciency and renewable energy) that increase en-
ergy access while also reducing GHG emissions provide a number of benefi ts:
First of all, these low carbon development solutions can increase the energy secu-
rity of oil-importing countries by reducing their degree of reliance on oil imports and 
their exposure to oil market fl uctuations. Many of the renewable energy solutions are 
now competitive compared to traditional centralised fossil fuel-based solutions. Th e 
cost of most renewable energy technologies has been decreasing rapidly over the past 
years. For solar photovoltaic cells, the cost of modules has been divided by 30 to 40 
since 1960, and with the progress made in R&D and currently booming markets, the 
Worldwatch Institute estimates that costs for solar photovoltaic power could decrease 
by an additional 40% between 2007 and 2010. 
Secondly, energy effi  ciency and renewable energy can help reduce the energy bill 
of oil-importing developing countries. Th e McKinsey Global Institute has estimated 
that we could cut projected global energy demand growth by at least half, simply by 
taking advantage of opportunities to increase energy productivity, that is the level of 
output we achieve from the energy we consume. Additional annual investments of 
USD 170 billion for the next 13 years would be suffi  cient to increase energy pro-
ductivity among all end users. Th e economics of such investments are very attractive: 
with an average internal rate of return (IRR) of 17%, they would collectively gener-
ate energy savings up to as much as USD 900 billion annually by 2020. (Mc Kinsey 
Global Institute/2008 p. 7-8) In this scenario, 57% of the investments would occur 
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in developing countries, notably China. Similarly, the IEA has shown that, on aver-
age, an additional dollar invested in more effi  cient electrical equipment, appliances 
and buildings reduces by more than two dollars the amount needed for investment in 
electricity supply. Th is ratio is highest in non-OECD countries (IEA/2006 p. 193). 
Renewable energy and energy effi  ciency can also increase energy access of oil-im-
porting developing countries. Th e supply capacity “freed” by clean energy projects 
can be used to reduce brown-outs and extend service coverage in sectors connected 
to the grid. In addition, clean energy options often take less time to implement than 
traditional energy projects. Renewable energy and energy effi  ciency solutions often 
lead to small scale projects and rely on more simple technologies. All the phases of 
the investment from preliminary studies to fi nding fi nancing, obtaining permits and 
construction can be done more quickly, ensuring faster access to energy. 
“Green” energy access options are well suited to rural, sparsely distributed areas. 
Because access to modern energy services is predominantly a rural problem, small-
scale, distributed technology options (usually off -grid) can reach inaccessible and re-
mote parts of countries where income is lower and volume of demand is lower. Many 
decentralised options, whether for cooking, mechanical power or electricity, are eco-
nomically feasible and can complement eff orts to expand grid electricity in rural and 
remote locations. 
Providing energy access through low carbon technologies can be more cost-ef-
fective. Preliminary analysis by UNDP indicates that delivering basic energy serv-
ices to poor people “beyond the grid” would require approximately USD 10 billion 
each year, which is less than onequarter of the USD 858 billion estimated by the 
World Bank to provide universal electricity access by 2030 based mainly on the grid 
option(UNDP/2008 p. 18).
Energy effi  ciency and renewable energy options can provide additional develop-
ment benefi ts because they generally have a higher content of local jobs. An estimat-
ed 2.3 million people worldwide currently work either directly in renewable energy 
projects or indirectly in supplier industries. Since many of these jobs are linked to 
the installation and maintenance of the equipment, they are of necessity local. It is 
the same for energy effi  ciency. A 2004 report found that renewable energy creates 
more jobs per megawatt (MW) of power installed, per unit of energy produced, and 
per dollar of investment, than the fossil fuel energy-based sector(Kammen, Kapadia, 
Fripp/2004 p. 3). New research reveals that these jobs are not for just the middle class-
es – the so-called ‘green collar’ jobs – but also for workers in construction, sustainable 
forestry and agriculture as well as engineering and transportation.” 
Because they rely on renewable sources and are small scale, most of the clean ener-
gy options, such as solar or micro-hydro power, have minimal or no negative impacts 
on the environment.
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Finally, most of these technologies are ready for roll-out. Th e IEA in its Technology 
Report 2008 has documented several cost-eff ective, proven technologies that can both 
reduce GHG emissions and assist in poverty alleviation.
Unleashing the potential of clean energy services, 
the role of development assistance
Despite the inherent advantages of clean energy based solutions, however, adoption 
of these technologies is not progressing at the desired pace. Th e principal barriers to 
market penetration include limited awareness of decision-makers and industry rep-
resentatives, as well as energy consumers, about the potential of clean energy tech-
nologies to meet national energy development objectives; limited supportive policies; 
limited institutional and individual capacities; and fi nancial constraints. 
A number of clean energy investments have negative (or very low) costs and short 
payback times because the savings they allow on energy bills over their lifetime are 
larger than their initial cost. Th is is particularly the case of energy effi  ciency projects 
(see Figure 3). Unfortunately, these potential win-win projects are often those con-
fronted with the strongest policy and information barriers, notably within the build-
ing and transport sectors. 
For example, the economics of energy effi  ciency technologies in the building sector 
work best with new construction, but builders have no incentive to save their custom-
ers money on their utility bills. Similarly, most utilities currently have little incentive 
to support energy effi  ciency programs without regulatory intervention. 
Figure 3: Marginal Emission Reduction Costs for the Global Energy System, 2050 
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Access to information can also be a major barrier to consumer adoption of energy 
effi  cient appliances. Despite the overwhelming economic case for using compact fl uo-
rescent lamps, CFLs face a strong consumer resistance because of initial bad press, 
behavioural inertia and fear of change. 
Finally, accessing fi nancing remains a challenge despite the development of new 
fi nancing instruments for clean energy and climate change management.
Until these barriers are removed, there is little chance of structurally transforming 
the markets of energy services towards widespread, lowcarbon energy access solutions. 
Development assistance can make a critical contribution towards the removal of these 
barriers by: (i) helping to establish supportive policy environments to enable markets 
to create eff ective solutions for clean energy for the poor; and (ii) facilitating access to 
appropriate fi nancing.
Establishing a supportive policy environment 
for clean energy development
Establishing a favourable environment is a pre-condition for creation and implemen-
tation of projects related to clean energy access. By reducing the costs, risks, uncer-
tainty and implementation time attached to the investments, barrier removal activities 
make these projects more attractive to potential private and public project developers 
and fi nancers. In addition to national public funds, ODA can play a decisive role by 
supporting these enabling policies.
Because of the fragmentation of providers and consumers of energy effi  ciency solu-
tions, there is no single market for clean energy services. Instead, the “market” consists 
of hundreds of providers, thousands of intermediaries, and millions of consumers. As 
a result, there is no single best solution to remove market barriers to clean energy de-
velopment. Instead, policy makers need to consider the unique workings of individual 
markets in order to overcome the barriers specifi c to each market. (Golove, Eto/1996 
p. xii&xiii). 
For example, skills development and risk mitigation activities (education, certifi -
cation programs, technological pilots, risk mitigation schemes, etc.) may prove more 
eff ective than regulatory mechanisms when the main barriers are attitudes, awareness, 
limited ability to obtain and process information, or perceived riskiness. Th is is par-
ticularly the case for access to clean, modern energy in rural and remote areas.
In most cases, establishing a supportive policy environment for clean energy de-
velopment will require a mix of measures, including regulatory, economic, skills de-
velopment, and awareness raising measures. In the wind energy sector for example, 
pre-conditions for the development of successful projects may require the preparation 
of wind assessments, standards for wind turbines, model contracts, training of local 
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technicians, information and communication, reviews of permit and licensing regula-
tions, and modifi cations of charges to connect to the grid. 
Even when barriers are mostly related to negative incentives that can be adjusted 
through regulatory changes, providing information may prove critical. For eff ective 
results, all levels of information are important: from general communication cam-
paigns on benefi ts of renewable energy or energy effi  ciency, to individual guidance 
related to project design choices such as technology selection or choice of suppliers 
and contractors. Ensuring wide understanding of the issue of climate change is also 
a condition for ensuring public acceptance and support of policies and investment 
projects.
In each case, a sound understanding of the market barriers to be addressed and 
of the strengths and limitations of the proposed measures will be required for any 
particular market transformation exercise to succeed. Private funds are rarely avail-
able for such barrier removal exercises, so there is little alternative to ODA when na-
tional public resources cannot be mobilised. Here, development assistance can make 
a signifi cant contribution to the development of the capacity of local and national 
decision-makers to identify the specifi c workings of individual markets and to imple-
ment an appropriate mix of market transformation measures. 
In this context, UNDP for example, has mobilised approximately USD 2 billion 
in the last 15 years to help countries remove the main barriers to the implementation 
of greater energy access and security, energy effi  ciency and clean energy development 
projects, principally through the GEF1 and associated co-fi nancing. 
Facilitating access to appropriate fi nancing
In addition to policy and information barriers removal, additional support is neces-
sary to improve the profi tability and attractiveness of investments for projects with 
anticipated lower rates of return. Th is is often the case of renewable energy projects 
even if they remain less expensive than traditional fossil-based supply modalities in 
a number of rural areas in developing countries. Although these technologies can be 
competitive over their life-cycle with fossil fuel technologies, there is still need to mo-
bilize the comparatively large up-front investment.
Most of the fi nancing for energy projects in the coming years will have to come 
from private sources. Current levels of ODA, while signifi cant, are unlikely to be 
suffi  cient to fi nance the necessary investments. For example, the IEA World Energy 
Outlook 2006 estimates that the investment required in energy infrastructure in de-
1 UNDP is also one of the three founding Implementing Agencies of the Global Environment Facility, together with the World Bank and UNEP 
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veloping countries to meet growing energy needs could reach USD 500 billion per 
year over the period 2001-2030. ODA, at present, provides USD 5-7 billion per year 
for energy-related activities, and is only a small percentage of what is required. 
Th e dual challenge is to fi nd ways to attract enough direct investment to meet the 
growing energy supply infrastructure needs of low income countries to sustain their 
economic development, and to drive these direct investments towards lower carbon 
technologies so that countries are not locked into unsustainable paths for 30 to 50 
years.
Recognising that public resources would prove insuffi  cient to fi nance climate 
change eff orts, the international community is currently piloting a number of new 
market-based instruments and innovative fi nancial mechanisms to attract and drive 
direct investment towards lower carbon and climate resilient technologies and prac-
tices. According to the 2008 Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment Report, 
in 2007 the private sector invested nearly USD 150 billion of new money in clean en-
ergy technologies in response to these new market opportunities. Private investments 
in clean energy are expected to reach USD 450 billion by 2012 and USD 600 billion 
by 2020. (UNEP/2008 p. 7)
A key issue with a number of these new and innovative sources of fi nance is their 
acute regional and technological unevenness, with the bulk of these funds going to 
a few large emerging economies and to a few technologies. Although an estimated 
575 million people still rely on traditional biomass for cooking in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(IEA/2006 p. 422), the region accounted for less than 1% of total private investment 
in clean energy in 2007. 
For example, the Kyoto Protocol has created the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) to promote both sustainable development and GHG emission reduction in 
developing countries. Th e CDM is a global cap-and-trade mechanism, which allows 
developing countries to earn credits for their emission reduction projects and sell 
these cheaper credits to industrialized countries. Th e UNFCCC estimated that the 
CDM could range between USD 10 and USD 100 billion per year by 2030, depend-
ing on emission reduction targets and the price of carbon credits. A recent World 
Bank study on CDM potential in Africa came to the conclusion that 170 GW of 
additional power-generation capacity could be created in Sub-Saharan Africa through 
low-carbon projects which were eligible for CDM (World Bank/2008). Th is would 
equal roughly four times the region’s current modern-energy production.
Despite this potential, there is strong concern that only a limited number of coun-
tries will benefi t from the CDM, and that this mechanism could entirely bypass Afri-
ca. Just fi ve countries – China, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Mexico – are expected 
to generate over 80% of CDM credits by 2012. Almost half of these credits will come 
from non-CO
2
 industrial gas emissions (such as HFC23 destruction) that are char-
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acterised by a high return on investment, but have limited sustainable development 
benefi ts.
While it holds the promise of attracting a greater volume of resources, it is clear 
that developing countries need assistance to truly benefi t from the carbon market and 
other emerging sources of fi nancing for GHG emission reductions. All too often, cur-
rent market rules are failing to attract direct investors into lower-carbon technologies 
in developing countries. 
Rather than directly fi nancing individual investments, development assistance can 
have a leveraging eff ect by helping countries assess the potential of these new fi nanc-
ing instruments and create the necessary environment for domestic investors to access 
them.
In this context, UNDP, for example has developed and is in the process of develop-
ing a number of project fi nancing and development facilities, including MDG Car-
bon Facility, and the Energy Access Facility. Th ese facilities are specifi cally designed to 
assist project developers in formatting and preparing their projects in ways that will 
maximise their chances to access appropriate funds such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism. 
Conclusion
Promoting energy effi  ciency and local renewable energy has the potential to make a 
signifi cant contribution to increasing access to energy services in developing countries 
while reducing GHG emissions at the same time. Clean energy technologies are often 
superior options for meeting the energy needs of developing countries, because of 
their negative or low costs and wide benefi ts. However, their development is handi-
capped by a wide range of policy, technological, attitudinal and fi nancial barriers. 
Th ese barriers are specifi c to an array of technology and area-based markets. 
Releasing the potential of local renewable energy and energy effi  ciency requires 
increasing eff orts to remove barriers which hinder projects, and providing an enabling 
environment to attract public and private fi nancing. Th ese issues – for which private 
funds are scarce – should be a priority for development assistance. Development aid is 
crucial for enhancing the knowledge and understanding of national and sub-national 
authorities of the risks and opportunities related to climate change and how they 
are linked to energy access. More development assistance should also be focused on 
increasing the capacity of these authorities to design and implement comprehensive 
strategies, including barrier removal activities and accessing new sources of fi nancing, 
for low carbon energy access, in a context were most of the investment will need to be 
fi nanced from private funds.
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Population Dynamics and Climate Change:
Recasting the Policy Agenda
George Martine and José Miguel Guzman
Introduction
Concern with climate change has recently become so acute as to supersede human 
anxiety over all other forms of environmental disturbances. Th ere is solid cause for re-
focusing the agenda as observed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC): “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (IPCC, 2007:30). It is 
estimated that if the emission of greenhouse gas (GHGs) is not curtailed, the earth’s 
temperature will rise between 1 and 4 degrees centigrade over the course of the 21st 
century (IPCC, 2007: 30). Th ese changes will evidently have enormous and multiple 
implications for humankind.
In an eff ort to get a better grasp on what needs to be urgently done to allay the dan-
gers of climate change, researchers are re-examining the impact of traditional agents 
in environmental transformations, while new combinations of driving forces are also 
being investigated. Population dynamics and their interactions with other mediating 
factors are unquestionably among the critical issues that have to be scrutinised when 
searching for sustainable solutions to the challenges posed by a changing climate. 
However, this article argues that some of the traditional views on population/environ-
ment relations,   which still prevail in the perception of the general public and in some 
policymaking circles, need to be refocused in order to refl ect changing population 
dynamics and to recast policies in a more realistic framework. 
Th e relevance of population dynamics to climate change has generally been con-
sidered in the context of mitigation eff orts.1 However, demographic changes not only 
aff ect the trajectory of climate change but also defi ne the profi le of the groups most 
vulnerable to the negative impacts of probable climate change. Hence, population 
dynamics must also be contemplated in any assessment and orientation of adaptation 
eff orts.
Although demographic size and rate of growth have been the focus of most atten-
tion, population dynamics also involve other less-discussed but increasingly impor-
tant aspects, such as the changing distribution of population over space, as well as its 
evolving composition by sex, age and household type over time. Th e various impacts 
of these diff erent and inter-related components of population dynamics on sustain-
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ability are, in turn, mediated by development processes, institutions and social organ-
isation. Th is article will focus primarily on two major aspects: the relations between 
population growth and size on environmental change, and the signifi cance of spatial 
redistribution patterns, particularly, urbanisation, for climate change. Given space 
limitations and the current state of research, other aspects of demographic dynamics 
will receive lesser attention.
Th is analysis of the interactions between diff erent components of population dy-
namics and climate change suggests more discriminating policy approaches are neces-
sary for the population fi eld than those which normally prevail in public opinion and 
in much of the literature. Th us, population size and growth are undoubtedly critical 
drivers of climate change, but this does not necessarily mean that investing in vigor-
ous family planning programs is suffi  cient to alleviate demographic pressures on cli-
mate change quickly and eff ectively. Similarly, urbanisation is undeniably the locus of 
some of the key processes that provoke climate change, yet the concentration of popu-
lation in urban localities can be viewed as critical to future environmental well-being. 
Meanwhile, ongoing changes in household patterns and age composition throughout 
the world need to be considered more explicitly since they aff ect the nature of the 
production and consumption practices that condition the emission of GHGs.
Population size and growth: Crucial but differentiated
Population growth and size have traditionally been defi ned by environmentalists as 
being at the root of many problems in their fi eld. Th is tenet has been routinely in-
corporated into discussions of climate change, with population growth frequently 
fi guring as the primary culprit in any recital of the list of factors underlying global 
change.  Th e appeal of this explanation is particularly attractive to the general public, 
since the linkage between population size and environmental damage appears obvi-
ous. Th e problem comes when people assume that the environmental problems stem-
ming from population growth and size could be easily resolved simply with massive 
family planning programs in poorer countries. Such expectations are unrealistic.
Th is article holds that the importance of population size and growth as drivers 
of climate change cannot be minimised, and that there is much that can be done to 
address this issue when tackling future and long-term sustainability. However,  such 
eff orts do not constitute quick fi xes to the present challenges. Currently, world popu-
lation has reached 6.7 billion, having doubled in size since 1965, and it continues to 
grow by some 78 million additional people each year. Th e United Nations expects 
world population to grow to 9.2 billion by 2050, on the assumption that fertility rates 
will continue to decline signifi cantly in poorer countries during the interim. Th e same 
source also indicates that the actual population size in 2050 could, in reality, be found 
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in the range between 7.8 and 10.8 billion, depending on the trajectory of fertility 
rates in coming years (UN Population Division, 2007). 
Few would question that the environmental implications of having 7.8 billion 
people on this planet are radically diff erent from those of 10.8 billion. Most environ-
mental problems tend to be aggravated by population growth and greater population 
size. As mildly put some years ago by Vaclav Smil, there is little reason to believe 
that greater population size will make for a higher quality of life  (Smil, 1993:207). 
Overall, lower rates of population growth and a smaller global population size would, 
ceteris paribus, favour better environmental outcomes. 
Yet, sheer numbers do not tell the whole story. A world population of 7.8 billion 
could actually infl ict greater damage on the global environment than one with 10.8 
billion, depending on its relative patterns of production and consumption. In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that traditional categories linking development levels 
to population growth rates are becoming blurred. Brazil now has fertility levels that 
are lower than those of France; several developing countries, including China, now 
have the type of low fertility rates that until recently were found only in high-income 
countries. Conversely, a doubling of population is being anticipated in the world’s 
most powerful developed country – the USA. Gaps in mortality and life expectancy 
between developed and developing countries are similarly decreasing.  
Th roughout all these changes, the population/environment nexus continues to be 
fundamentally mediated by development processes and by specifi c social and eco-
nomic contexts.  Th e population of the 50 poorest countries is expected to triple in 
the fi rst half of this century, yet these fast-growing countries are not the ones that will 
be making the biggest contribution to global environmental problems in the near 
future. Th e wealthiest nations, with less than 20% of the world’s population, are still 
responsible for the massive scale of natural resource consumption, much of it waste-
ful, as well as for the bulk of pollution. Th us, patterns of civilisation and styles of 
development, not numbers of people per se, have the greatest impact on the environ-
ment and on climate change today. Yet, the reason that today’s numbers are not as 
threatening as they could be from a climate change perspective is simply because the 
majority of the world’s population is still poor. 
In short, the impact of size and growth is rarely linear or exclusive, since distinct 
population groups impinge on the environment, and more specifi cally on climate 
change, in very diff erent ways. Population size, today, is much more damaging for the 
environment, given relative levels of consumption, in developed countries than in the 
poorest countries. Yet, it is vital to observe that, under current development models, 
the world’s developing areas are pressing to emulate, grosso modo, the consumption 
patterns of industrialised countries. Th e consequences of their eventual success in 
this endeavour are obviously disturbing, from a strictly environmental point of view, 
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exactly because of the enormous population size that the world and some of the coun-
tries pursuing economic growth have achieved. 
China and India together already account for onethird of humankind’s mass, and 
the ongoing rapid expansion of their middle classes could quickly tip the scales of 
sustainability. Th e fast-growing poorer countries of today could, in the future, make a 
huge impact on the global environment and on climate change if, as is desirable from 
a humanitarian standpoint, they are successful in pursuing development. Th e wide-
spread adoption of the consumption practices and living standards typical of the af-
fl uent in all these countries would seriously deplete existing resources, expand energy 
use, accelerate climate change and threaten global environmental well-being. Th e cur-
rent lifestyles and consumption patterns of the rich simply could not be generalised to 
the world’s entire population without causing severe environmental imbalances that 
could challenge humankind’s very survival. 
Yet, to condemn developing countries to permanent poverty in order to preserve 
the environment and reduce climate change risks for all is evidently unacceptable, 
particularly in view of the fact that the industrialised countries are not taking all the 
necessary steps to reduce their own large impact on climate change. Th is situation 
evidently presents humankind with very diffi  cult decisions concerning equity, styles 
of development, poverty alleviation, and sustainability. In the short term, a decrease 
in population size would have the greatest effi  ciency in developed countries where per 
capita consumption is highest. But, since most of these countries already have below-
replacement fertility, and are also ageing rapidly, the eff ects on the world economy 
might be more signifi cant than their eff ects on the environment. 
Realistically, what are the chances of a rapid reduction in population growth rates 
and the stabilisation, or even the reduction, of global population size? Two additional 
facts need to be considered in this connection. First, fertility rates generally cannot be 
brought down quickly by simply providing family planning services. Research indi-
cates that people need to have some positive indication of possible improvements in 
their lives (including a reduction of infant and child mortality rates) before they are 
motivated to signifi cantly reduce their fertility. In other words, abject poverty is not 
per se an eff ective motivator for fertility reduction; some glimmer of the potential for 
social mobility and improvement of living conditions has to be perceived by people 
for rapid fertility decline to take place. Access to reproductive health services is none-
theless clearly important for its own sake, as a basic human right and an important 
form of empowerment.
Secondly, it must be observed that even rapid fertility declines would not immedi-
ately produce the stabilisation or reduction of population sizes. Family planning just 
does not have retroactive eff ects! Actually, the majority of population growth today 
is due less to current fertility patterns than to imbedded demographic inertia, that 
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is, the result of fertility and mortality patterns of previous generations. Th is inertia 
results in a time lag of several decades between the initial reduction in fertility levels 
and any population decline. It is estimated that over half of world population growth 
from now to 2050 will be attributable to inertial factors (National Academy of Sci-
ence, 2000).
Such sobering observations on the limitations of eff orts to achieve rapid popula-
tion stabilisation, however, should not dampen greater eff orts to empower women, 
and to provide them with access to family planning services in the framework of 
high quality reproductive health services. A large proportion of the world’s women 
still do not have access to the means that would allow them to have the number of 
children that are desired (UNFPA and Alan Guttmacher Institute, 2004). Th is gap 
is also verifi able in the fastest-growing demographic groups within developed coun-
tries. Human-rights based policies that empower women and address unmet needs 
for reproductive health services, whether in developed, developing or poor countries, 
would have an important impact on reducing the rate of population growth, the even-
tual size of the world population and thus the long-term impact on the environment 
and on climate change, while also giving people more control over their lives. Even 
inertial growth could be reduced if the age at which people married was raised and the 
conception of the fi rst child was delayed (Bongaarts, 2007). However, these changes 
require important cultural changes.
In brief, the responsibility of increases in population size and rate of climate change, 
and particularly the possibility of rapid reductions in population mass or growth rate, 
is considerably more complex than generally perceived. On the one hand, there is no 
“quick fi x” for the magnitude of the world’s population mass that has been built up 
over time, especially during the last 60 years. On the other, it is simply impossible for 
the entire world population to practice the same levels and types of consumption that 
the developed world has become accustomed to without greatly accelerating the risks 
of climate change. Yet, it is equally unthinkable for the world to maintain current lev-
els of poverty and socio-economic disparities. In this framework, mitigating climate 
change eff ectively will require a much more profound scrutiny and re-orientation of 
our very pattern of civilisation.
Finally, it should be observed that population size and growth can be paramount 
when dealing with national adaptation policies. O’Neill et al. (2001), in a comprehen-
sive study of linkages between population and climate change, concluded that reduced 
demographic pressure, through lower fertility and slower population growth, would 
help developing countries in dealing with the expected eff ects of climate change. 
However, a declining population may have problems to adapt as it will come under 
intense fi scal pressure due to aging; in such a context, industrialised countries tend to 
revert to pro-natalist policies. Th ese aspects regarding the signifi cance of population 
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size and growth in adaptation merit further investigation and subsequent incorpora-
tion into national strategies.
Other demographic factors beyond 
total population size and growth
Other less-discussed components of demographic dynamics need to be incorporated 
in the debate on climate change. Th is sections looks briefl y at changing age structure, 
household composition and immigration. Th e subject of massive urban growth and 
its implications is discussed at greater length in the fi nal section of this article.2 
Th e importance of changing age structures (particularly ageing), as well as the 
changing size and composition of households, on climate change has only been re-
cently recognised (O’Neill and Chen, 2002; O’Neill, 2005). Th e issues are complex 
and much remains to be done in order derive a more complete understanding of their 
implications, especially in developing countries. Th is article will not purport to cover 
them in any depth, but simply to illustrate the fact that anticipating changes in num-
ber, size, and composition of households is becoming a critical element of monitoring 
and forecasting climate change emissions. 
A recent study by Dalton et al. (2008) concludes that, in the United States, popu-
lation ageing could reduce long-term emissions by almost 40% in a low-growth de-
mographic scenario. It also concluded that, in some cases, the eff ects of ageing on 
emissions can be as large, or larger, than the eff ects of technical change. Another study 
in the United States (O’Neill and Chen, 2002) shows that household size and type 
seem to have a minor eff ect on energy consumption. However, the researchers con-
sider that in developing countries: “Aging, behavioural changes favouring nuclear over 
extended families, later ages at marriage, higher divorce rates, and increased propen-
sities to live alone are expected to contribute to further shifts in size and structure.” 
Th ese demographic changes in developing countries could probably have stronger 
“eff ects on energy use than would be expected in industrialized countries.”
Along the same lines, Dalton et al. (2007) analyse whether changes in the demo-
graphic characteristics of households in China and India, considered in projections 
over the next century, could have an impact on consumption, economic growth, en-
ergy demand, and carbon dioxide emissions. Examining changes in population size, 
urbanisation, and the size and age structure of households, the authors conclude that 
urbanisation would lead to a signifi cant increase in emissions (presumably because of 
changing consumption patterns), while aging would contribute to a decline in emis-
sions. Combining both eff ects, demographic change would produce an increase in 
emissions from China by 45%, and from India, by 25-55% by the end of the century.
Another interesting aspect is the impact of immigration on GHG emissions. Given 
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that it is practically the only developed country experiencing signifi cant population 
growth, and that a sizeable proportion of this growth is attributable to immigration, 
the experience of the USA is particularly relevant in this respect. Pitkin (2007) ex-
amined whether immigration aff ects long-run projections of USA CO
2
 emissions, via 
the impacts on population scale, population ageing, and labour supply. He basically 
concluded that the rate of immigration would be less relevant than the relative suc-
cess of the immigrants in achieving the same earning and consumption levels as the 
native-born households.
Although such studies are still limited to only a few countries and are based on 
models that require further improvements, they clearly show the need to consider the 
relevance of population composition in mitigation eff orts. Future research should pay 
greater attention to this aspect.
Urbanisation and urban growth 
Massive urban growth in developing countries can be viewed as the most impor-
tant social and demographic trend of the 21st century. Historically, environmentalists, 
whose earlier attention was primarily centred on the preservation of nature in rural ar-
eas, have traditionally taken a dim view of urbanisation and city growth. In their view, 
cities were mainly seen as the locus of the critical environmental problems generated 
by the production and consumption patterns of modern civilisation. 
Cities do indeed have a large ecological footprint. Nevertheless, recent years have 
witnessed a remarkable turnaround in environmental thinking, due to the gradual 
realisation that the size of the urban footprint stems, not from the concentration of 
population, but from the fact that they are the major sites in which modern produc-
tion and consumption is concentrated. Clearer perception of the potential advantages 
of cities in addressing social and economic problems has further contributed to this 
change in mentality (UNFPA, 2007). Moreover, the role of urbanisation in reducing 
population growth in developing countries is clear: urban areas universally have lower 
fertility than rural areas because they off er few incentives and many disincentives for 
large families. Th us, it is increasingly recognised that urban localities actually off er 
better chances for long-term sustainability, starting with the fact that they concentrate 
half of the Earth’s population on less than 3% of its land area. Th e dispersion of popu-
lation and economic activities, at similar levels of consumption, would surely make 
the problems worse rather than better.3 In addition, this article argues that towns and 
cities are also critically important in the world’s eff orts to address global environmen-
tal outcomes, including climate change. In contrast, however, given the way cities are 
growing in the developing world, the urban population is at greater risk of the eff ects 
of such change. 
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UNFPA’s Th e State of World Population 2007 draws attention to the fact that the 
battle for a sustainable environmental future is being waged primarily in the world’s 
cities. Th ey concentrate many of Earth’s major environmental concerns: population 
growth, pollution, resource degradation and waste generation (UNFPA, 2007). Para-
doxically, cities also hold our best chance for a sustainable future. Demographic con-
centration, in a still growing world population of 6.7 billion people, is absolutely 
essential for the preservation of biodiversity. If well designed and administered, the 
compactness and economies of scale of cities can reduce per capita costs, reduce en-
ergy demand and minimise pressures on surrounding land and natural resources. As 
recently emphasised in Habitat’s State of the World Cities Report: “Well-planned and 
well-regulated cities hold the key not only to minimizing environmental losses, but to 
generating creative solutions to enhance the quality of the environment and to miti-
gate the negative consequences of climate change” (UN Habitat, 2008: xiv).
Much has been made recently of the fact that, according to offi  cial data, more 
than half of the world’s population now lives in an urban area. Th e more important 
reality is that the world is undergoing a scale of urban growth that is unprecedented 
in human history. Current projections suggest that the urban population of develop-
ing countries will double in the space of a generation.4 Africa and Asia alone will add 
another 2.7 billion urbanites between now and 2050; this is equivalent to 87% of the 
world’s urban growth in the period. How, where and in what conditions such growth 
will occur will have a huge eff ect on sustainability in general and on climate change 
in particular. Th is eff ect has to be examined in two complimentary frameworks: a) the 
impact of cities on the generation of climate change, and b) the vulnerability of urban 
populations to the eff ects of climate change. Given space limitations, attention here 
is focused primarily on the regions that will be most aff ected by future urban growth.
Cities as drivers of climate change 
Cities have long been the primary locus of economic growth in most countries, and 
the current context of globalisation has served to increase this concentration of eco-
nomic activity in urban areas. Typically, they generate more than 80% of a country’s 
GDP. Th e ecological footprint of cities is attributable primarily to the emission of 
greenhouse gases stemming from energy use and land use change. It is thus not sur-
prising that the results of modelling eff orts described in the previous section suggest 
that the impacts of urbanisation are signifi cant in climate change.
However, the relationship of towns and cities to global climate change diff ers radi-
cally in developed versus developing countries. Cities in the industrialised world, de-
spite some progress towards the reduction of their ecological footprint, still tend to 
generate more GHGs than poor cities. Moreover, as pointed out by Habitat, there are 
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considerable variations between cities according to their spatial organisation and en-
vironmental approaches. For instance, San Diego in the United States generates more 
CO
2 
emissions than the much larger Tokyo, in part because of its greater dependence 
on individual automobile transport (UN Habitat, 2008:133). Th is research addition-
ally shows that CO
2
 emissions are also more related to consumption patterns and 
gross domestic product per capita than they are to urbanisation levels per se. Th us, 
the megacity of São Paulo in Brazil, despite being four times larger than San Diego, 
produces one-tenth of the latter’s emissions (UN Habitat, 2008:xiv). 
Nevertheless, several developing countries, particularly those generally classifi ed as 
“newly industrialising”, are also beginning to make signifi cant contributions to the 
emission of GHGs. For instance, large population sizes, industrialisation, increased 
energy use, changing consumption patterns and increasing use of automobiles in 
countries such as China, India and Brazil are transforming them into prime emitters. 
Indeed, China recently surpassed the United States as the leading emitter of green-
house gases, in large part due to its sources of energy. 
One aspect of urban consumption which has so far received little attention, but 
may soon have a serious impact on the emission of GHGs, stems from the chang-
ing dietary profi les of the rapidly-growing urban middle classes in some parts of the 
developing world. As countries prosper and their middle class grows, urban people 
are switching from diets composed largely of staple food crops to higher-protein diets 
that include more meat, dairy products, eggs and fi sh. Livestock animals naturally 
produce methane as part of their digestive process. Methane is reputed to be 20 times 
more potent a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Some 15% to 20% of global 
methane emissions already come from livestock, and that number is sure to increase 
signifi cantly with changing diets in urban areas. 
Many of the critical environmental problems in urban areas that contribute to 
global warming stem from what has been termed “the unsustainable use of space”.5 
Although data are incomplete, there is little doubt that motorised transport consti-
tutes one of the primary causes of urban energy use and thus of CO
2
. It is also, by 
far, the fastest-growing cause of CO
2
 worldwide. Th e ineffi  cient appropriation of land 
by peri-urbanisation and residential urban sprawl contribute to greater transport and 
energy uses as well as pollution. Th is brings several inter-related topics into focus: the 
size of the urban blot; the spatial location of urban growth by ecosystem; the relative 
importance of urban sprawl versus other urban forms of city structure; and, the rela-
tive signifi cance of transportation modes for longer-term sustainability.6
Although human settlements have so far taken up a relatively small fraction of 
the Earth’s surface area, their specifi c spatial location can still exert signifi cant envi-
ronmental and socio-economic consequences. Th e manner in which this occupation 
of the Earth’s land surface by towns and cities will evolve with urban population 
80 C H A N G I N G  T H E  F O C U S :  S O M E  K E Y  A R E A S
doubling is a real concern. Depending on their future spatial growth patterns, urban 
localities could expand drastically in coming years, both in dimension and in their 
occupation of inappropriate areas. A recent World Bank study provides concrete evi-
dence that urban land areas are growing faster than ever, not only because of their 
increase in absolute numbers of people, but also because their average density (that is, 
the number of inhabitants per square kilometre) is being progressively reduced (Angel 
et al., 2005). 
Th is tendency towards declining density, combined with unprecedented absolute 
increases in the urban population, could greatly expand the land area of cities in the 
future. Where and how this new land is incorporated into the urban makeup could 
have a huge impact on climate change. Given that the world’s urban population is 
expected to double within a relatively short time, and that most of this growth will be 
concentrated in Africa and Asia, it would seem advisable to try to orient this spatial 
growth in ways that not only avoid the invasion and destruction of prized ecologi-
cal and agricultural assets, but that also reduce other environmental costs linked to 
climate change. 
Urban sprawl increases energy use and the emission of GHGs: issues of trans-
portation are critical in this context. For developing countries faced with rapid ex-
pansion of their urban population, automobile-based dispersion is extremely ineffi  -
cient. Although automobile transportation is accessible to only a small portion of the 
population, it is prioritised in the transportation plans, processes and road-building 
activities of a wide variety of places. Car production and utilisation has spread quickly 
throughout the world, leading to higher infrastructure costs, congestion, reduced ef-
fi cacy of land and energy use, as well as greater production of CO
2
. Car-centred 
transport systems are implanted to the detriment of other forms of transit and public 
transportation systems. Since the majority of the population in developing countries 
evidently do not have the economic resources to access automobile transportation, 
this approach leads to increased inequity, as well as greater impacts on climate change.
Th e consequences of the failure to address the land and housing needs of the poor 
for environmental degradation and global warming is perhaps less evident, but they 
are also critically important. Disregard for the land and housing needs of the poor af-
fects both ecosystem services as well as the city’s ability to responsibly and eff ectively 
plan for sustainable growth. Despite being the largest social category, poor people 
seem to go largely unacknowledged in the formulation of city plans in developing 
countries. As a result, the poor end up in slums and informal settlements on the worse 
possible sites. 
Th e resulting lack of access to water, sewage or solid waste management systems in 
informal settlements pollutes rivers and ends up aff ecting the appearance, air quality 
and health of the entire city. Frequently, the pattern of occupation in informal set-
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tlements that results from unequal access is haphazard and asymmetrical, making it 
diffi  cult to provide vehicular transportation or other types of services. Th e sprinkling 
of such settlements throughout the city also creates hurdles for the design of eff ec-
tive mass transportation, increases the costs of implementing it and thus results in 
greater use of energy. Continually adjusted improvisations that ineff ectually attempt 
to accommodate the increasing fl ow of people and vehicles (and sometimes animals) 
through narrow winding streets that bypass these sprawling settlements, not only con-
sume enormous resources, but also contribute to energy waste and pollution. In short, 
failure to address the needs of the poor ends up aff ecting the entire city population 
and further contributes to climate change.
Overall, if urbanisation is viewed in isolation, its net eff ect on climate change 
might appear as negative in light of the high level of emissions of urban areas. How-
ever, this impact merely refl ects society’s chosen patterns of production and consump-
tion, rather than the eff ect of concentration per se. Since results are mediated by social 
and institutional factors, the policy implications of this fi nding revolve around the 
need to plan ahead, incorporating energy effi  cient systems and promoting behavioural 
changes. Given the inevitability of urbanisation, its inherently benefi cial impacts in 
terms of preserving other natural areas, and the potential advantages of cities in terms 
of per capita costs and technological developments, such proactive and environmen-
tally-friendly policies are essential.
Urban vulnerability: Adaptation as the other side of the equation
Climate change will increase the risk of fl ooding, cause other environmental damage 
in coastal areas and increase the frequency of natural disasters. Th ere is already con-
siderable evidence showing that natural disasters have become more frequent during 
the last few decades. Th e damage caused by climate-related disasters in urban areas has 
already had high social, economic and environmental costs: the prognosis is for much 
greater damage unless policies are altered drastically.
One of the primary impacts of expected global warming is its measurable impact 
on sea rise. Sea levels rose by 17 cm in the 20th century, and may rise by 22 to 34 
cm in the present century (Nichols 2004, quoted in McGranahan et al., 2008: 168). 
Th is consequence is of critical relevance for urban areas, and especially for the poorer 
segments of their population. Low elevation coastal zones (LECZs) are particularly 
vulnerable. Th roughout history, people have favoured city-building in coastal areas to 
take advantage of a ready food supply, easy access to transportation, and better defence 
opportunities. Overall, LECZs now contain some 2% of the world’s land area, 10% 
of its population and 13% of its urban population; moreover, these zones also have a 
disproportionate share of all large cities (McGranahan et al., 2008: 172 & 174).
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Asia, which is expected to account for 60% of all urban growth between now and 
mid-century, already has two-thirds of its urban population living in coastal areas. 
Given that this urban population will more than double in that interim, Asia would, 
in theory, still have an excellent opportunity to steer future growth away from LECZs. 
However, the opposite is happening: the current trend is for the number and the 
proportion of urban dwellers to expand briskly in coastal areas. Mega-cities such as 
Dhaka are growing rapidly from both rural-urban migration and natural increase in 
the cities, while government policies, such as in China, often favour coastal urban 
expansion through the creation of special economic zones, in eff orts to build on the 
comparative advantages of coastal cities in promoting rapid economic growth.
Th e threats of global warming should lead decision-makers to urgently begin de-
veloping policies and strategies to prevent further urban development in risky loca-
tions. Th is would mean, for instance, the reversion of policies fostering rapid and 
massive urban growth on the coast of China. Existing cities, particularly some that are 
being raked periodically by fl ooding and whose futures are particularly endangered by 
rises in sea level, such as Dhaka, would need to adopt urgent measures to divert some 
of their rapid growth to other areas while also adopting procedures aimed at reducing 
the eff ects of sea level rise and fl ooding.  Such approaches would, in the long run, be 
considerably more eff ective and less costly than trying to retrofi t infrastructure in cit-
ies to withstand sea level rise, or to displace the enlarged urban population to other 
regions.
A key factor that should infl uence policymaking in relation to the urban impacts 
of climate change is that the vulnerability to these eff ects is particularly signifi cant 
for the largest social segment of developing urban regions: the poor. Poverty, income 
inequality and segregation are key elements in the vulnerability of urban populations 
to the negative consequences of global environmental change (Satterthwaite, 2007).
More than two-fi fths of the urban population in developing countries lives in areas 
that can be described as deprived neighbourhoods or slums. Such low-income popu-
lations are not only more vulnerable to environmental and health risks linked to poor 
sanitation, lack of clean water and air pollution, but they will also bear the brunt of 
future global climate changes. 
Conclusions
Long perceived by the public as a simple issue of the pressure of numbers against 
resources, the impact of the population factor on environmental outcomes and on 
global climate change has to be seen in a more diff erentiated and disaggregated light. 
Population size and growth do matter enormously, but the threat that they present 
cannot be diminished quickly or easily. Moreover, their impacts are increasingly me-
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diated by social organisation, especially consumption patterns. Changing confi gura-
tions of population composition are surfacing as vital components of the population/
environment equation that need further analysis in diff erent contexts.
Urban growth is emerging as the primary focal point of population/environment 
interactions for the future. Th e world’s towns and cities not only congregate more 
than half of the world’s total population and four-fi fths of its GNP, but they also con-
centrate, on a tiny portion of the Earth’s surface most of its aspirations for improved 
social, demographic and environmental conditions. Towns and cities currently ac-
count for an inordinately large share of GHGs that underlie global warming, and also 
amass the most vulnerable population groups. Th is does not occur simply because 
they concentrate population, but because they are the hubs of modern civilisation’s 
production and consumption processes. However, improved urban planning could 
mitigate many of the negative impacts of urban concentration; but this will require 
important changes in approaches and attitudes to policymaking in respect to urban 
growth. 
Ultimately, serious consideration of climate change obliges us to adopt a more 
realistic outlook on the nature of the issues and to forsake the simple panaceas that 
would apparently release humankind from the obligation of taking unappealing but 
necessary decisions with regards to civilisation’s current pathways. Some optimists 
trust market factors and technological development to resolve imbalances between the 
dimension of increased consumption and its environmental implications. Although 
it is important, technological progress alone will be grossly insuffi  cient without ac-
companying changes in behaviour, consumption aspirations and social organisation. 
Similarly, demographic dynamics are undoubtedly critical in the climate change co-
nundrum, but simplistic approaches delay a more piercing examination of the core 
choices faced by humankind with regards to development models, lifestyles, and eq-
uity issues. Hard decisions face humankind, and the window of opportunity may be 
more limited than is generally assumed.   
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Endnotes
1 Cf. for instance, the UNFCC framework.
2 There are other demographic impacts of climate change that will not be considered here due to lack of space, 
such as increases in migration and mortality as a result of events related to climate change.
3 The importance of controlling for types and levels of consumption in rural-urban comparisons on environmental 
impact is illustrated by the fi nding that in both China and India, total energy consumption in rural households 
exceeds that in urban households, because of a continued dependence on ineffi cient solid fuels, which contribute 
to over 85% of rural household energy needs in both countries (Pachauri and Jiang, 2008).
4 All data on urban growth in this paper are taken from UN Population Division, 2008.
5 Cf. Martine (2006) for a discussion of the concept of the “sustainable use of space”.
6 The following discussion is based largely on Martine (2008) and references therein.
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How Will Climate Change Affect Trade’s 
Potential to Foster Development?
Aaron Cosbey
Introduction
Since the demise of the strategy of development through import substitution in the 
1980s, and the apparent success of the newly-industrialised countries of Asia with 
export-led growth strategies, it has been widely acknowledged that trade can serve as 
an important engine of economic growth, and through growth, development. While 
this dynamic is often oversold, and while even the most outward oriented develop-
ment strategies involve some degree of infant industry protection, domestic institu-
tion building or government support, the basic notion of trade as a key element in the 
development process is still largely undisputed.
As such, over the last decade in particular, offi  cial development assistance has be-
gun to focus on helping countries exploit the potential gains off ered by trade and 
trade liberalisation. Th is focus is a keystone of the joint inter-organisational eff ort 
known as the Integrated Framework for Technical Assistance to Least Developed Coun-
tries (the IF), the central aim of which is to integrate trade into national development 
planning, and to help overcome those barriers to increased trade that hold countries 
back from achieving the full potential off ered by access to global markets and foreign 
direct investment.1 
Th e same philosophy is an important part of the programming of many bilateral 
aid agencies. Th e UK’s DFID (2007:7) – one of the fi rst aid agencies to focus on trade 
and a global leader in the fi eld – makes the case strongly: “Trade drives growth. Rapid, 
sustained, growth is the most direct route to reducing poverty.” Th e nature of this 
trade-growth-development linkage is explored briefl y below, but the point is that it 
underlies a great deal of current development assistance activity. Th e G7 in 2005 com-
mitted to increasing expenditures on aid for trade to $4 billion (primarily through the 
IF)(G7, 2005). And the EU has similarly pledged aid for trade funding at EUR 1 bil-
lion per year (European Commission, 2005). Th e WTO’s Doha Development Round 
mandate includes signifi cant commitments on aid for trade as well, inter alia under 
the heading of technical cooperation and capacity building (WTO 2001: ¶ 38-41).
If we accept that trade’s potential is important for development, and that develop-
ment assistance has a signifi cant role to play in realising that potential, we must pay 
close attention to global phenomena that alter that potential. Th is section argues that 
climate change is such a phenomenon. Cosbey (2008a) describes a number of ways 
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in which climate change might impact the patterns of international trade fl ows, and 
the infrastructure for transport that underlies that trade. Th is article follows on from 
there by exploring in greater detail the ways in which those impacts might alter trade’s 
ability to act as an engine for development, and the implications for the practice of 
development assistance that fl ow from that inquiry.
What is the potential for trade to foster development?
To ask what trade’s potential contribution to development might be, we must fi rst 
defi ne what is meant by development. Th is is no easy task. It is made easier in the 
present context, however, by the fact that trade’s contribution to development, how-
ever defi ned, will centre almost exclusively on the economic: trade’s ability to foster 
economic growth, poverty alleviation and increasing income equality. Most, if not all, 
defi nitions of development include economic growth as part of the mix, and it is here 
that we should expect to fi nd the major potential. As such, it will suffi  ce to assume 
that however we defi ne development, the key contributions of interest are economic.
Th ere is a raft of literature devoted to the question of trade’s role in fostering 
economic growth. Th en there is the follow-on question: assuming that trade leads to 
growth, does trade-led economic growth alleviate poverty, or decrease income ineq-
uity? While neither of these questions is settled to the satisfaction of all concerned, it 
is nonetheless possible to draw some broad fi ndings from the work to date in this area.
Generally, the literature shows that trade and trade liberalisation may indeed lead 
to growth, and that growth will tend to increase incomes across the board. It will not, 
however, signifi cantly change the incidence of income inequality within a country. 
But by increasing all incomes it will reduce the absolute numbers of poor. Th at said, 
in the short- to medium-term, the poor may disproportionately suff er the pains of 
transition associated with liberalisation, particularly in the absence of adjustment pro-
grams or social safety nets.
Another important conclusion is that while there may be a relationship between 
openness to trade in goods and economic growth (and thereby to increased personal 
incomes) the link is uncertain, or at least much weaker, in the absence of appropriate 
supporting policies and institutions. Th ese include, for example, policies to achieve 
macroeconomic stability, honest bureaucracy, rule of law, widespread health and edu-
cation. Th is underlines the need to pursue sustainable development as a coherent ef-
fort, rather than relying on partial approaches such as trade liberalisation alone.
In the case of openness to investment, on the other hand, it seems there is no 
demonstrated link between openness to investment and growth. Of the various types 
of investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) stands out as most likely to be signifi -
cant, and there is some evidence that the combination of investment rules and free 
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trade agreements may bring more investment. However, even increased FDI will not 
lead to increased growth, absent the necessary domestic institutions.
Th is basic fi nding, which is echoed in the context of both trade and investment, 
bears repeating, as it will have later importance in this analysis: trade’s potential to act 
as a driver for development depends fundamentally on the existence of prerequisites 
in the form of domestic policies, institutions and infrastructure.
How is trade’s potential affected by the impacts 
of climate change?
Th e previous section briefl y surveyed the ways in which trade might serve as a poten-
tial driver of development. Th is section will assume that this potential exists, and will 
ask how that potential might be aff ected, both positively and negatively, by climate 
change. 
Figure 1:  Impacts of Climate on Trade’s Potential – Some Linkages
Type of Impact Possible linkages Examples
Changes in traditional patterns of 
global trade
Tropical export-oriented agriculture 
less viable due to weather pattern 
disruptions
Increased costs of trade, result of 
damaged trade-related 
infrastructure
Port facilities damaged, shifted in 
response to sea-level rise and 
increasing storm activity
Decreased costs of trade, result of 
climate-related impacts
Opening up of the North-West 
Passage through the Arctic
Mitigation policies increase the cost 
of transportation-related fuel, 
increasing costs of trade
GHG-intensive transport modes such 
as air frieght would be hardest hit
Changes in traditional patterns of 
global trade
Carbon taxes increase costs of fuel 
and electricity used in production.  
Renewable mandates create new 
markets for low-GHG energy 
technologies and products.
The need to address adaptation 
draws resources away from 
investing in prerequisites to gain 
from trade





assistance fosters more competitive 
exporters
Assistance to improve energy 
efficiency, promote new energy 
sources that offer greater reliability 
of supply.




Direct impacts of 
climate change
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Some of the possible linkages are illustrated in Figure 1. Climate change itself can 
have direct impacts, as when it shifts the existing patterns of comparative advantage, 
or aff ects the viability of trade-related transportation infrastructure. Other direct im-
pacts may result from policies and measures taken to address the challenge of climate 
change. New taxes on carbon intensive fuels will add to the cost of transport, and 
disproportionately increase the costs of some traded goods. And trade-based measures 
may be used to punish GHG-intensive goods at the border. Other sorts of policies 
and measures will create markets for new climate-friendly goods exports, or expand 
existing markets. 
Th ere are also important indirect impacts. Expenditures on adaptation will make 
it more diffi  cult to muster the government spending necessary to exploit the poten-
tial gains from trade liberalisation. Further, international climate change agreements 
might result in unprecedented levels of multilateral assistance with spin-off  benefi ts 
for trade-related sectors and infrastructure. Each of these sorts of impacts is discussed 
in greater depth below.
Direct impacts of climate change
One of the most obvious ways in which climate change will aff ect the capacity of 
trade to contribute to development is by changing the viability of traditional export 
streams. Th is is an impact that will be felt at the national level, with some nations 
potentially gaining while others lose. In the area of agriculture, forestry and fi sher-
ies in particular, IPCC Working Group II (2007) notes that there will be signifi cant 
changes in export patterns, driven by such direct impacts as:
• Eff ects of increased atmospheric CO
2
 concentration: these are generally posi-
tive, resulting in increased productivity for food crops, industrial crops and 
forests.2
• Eff ects of increased temperatures: for food crops these are generally negative, 
and in many cases overwhelm the positive impacts of increased CO
2
 concen-
tration. Th ese impacts will be more severely felt in the lower latitudes, and will 
vary by crop. Above 3o temperature rise, productivity falls at all latitudes.3
• Eff ects of changes in rainfall patterns: Th ese may be severe depending on the 
region, and will be augmented as a force for water stress by the increased eva-
potranspiration induced by higher temperatures. Predictable monsoon pat-
terns in Asia and Africa are very likely to be disrupted by increased variability. 
Drought stress is predicted to increase with particular strength in seasonally 
dry and low-latitude regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.4
• Eff ects of decreased glacial runoff , and subsequent impacts on irrigation-based 
agricultural systems. Th e receding or complete disappearance of glaciers in the 
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Andes and the Himalayas, after short-term fl ow increases, is predicted to turn 
even mighty rivers such as the Ganga, the Indus and the Brahmaputra into 
seasonal rivers by 2035.5
• Increases in extreme weather events: For food crops these are typically droughts 
and heavy precipitation; for forestry they are pests and fi res. Th ese impacts are 
projected to be even more economically signifi cant than the impacts of pro-
jected changes in temperature and precipitation.6
• Extinction of local freshwater fi sh populations in response to warming trends, 
increased oxygen demand and increased acidity. Subsequent negative impacts 
on aquaculture – typically an export product – which depends heavily on cap-
ture fi sheries for feed.7
• Changes in oceanic circulation and increases in temperature that may reduce 
primary production in tropical oceanic fi sheries.8
Th e impacts of climate change on food and fi sheries production will vary consider-
ably by region and even by ecosystem within countries, making it diffi  cult to general-
ise about impacts. However, a few general conclusions can be drawn.
For food crops, impacts will generally be felt more strongly in lower latitudes, as 
the result of both higher degree of impact and increased vulnerability (the latter due to 
the low adaptive capacity in most developing countries). Th e impacts will be felt more 
strongly in subsistence (rainfed) agriculture than in irrigated agriculture, though both 
will be impacted. Th e result of this will be detrimental in particular to low latitude net 
food-importing countries as they struggle with increased food insecurity.9 Th e implica-
tion is a signifi cant increase in world agricultural trade, with higher prices, almost all 
of which occurring to the benefi t of exporters in higher latitudes. Fischer et al. (2002) 
estimate that by 2080 developing country cereal imports will rise by 10-40%.
For fi sheries, both freshwater and oceanic, negative economic impacts again will 
be felt primarily in developing countries, with the greatest impact on the economies 
of central and northern Asian countries, the western Sahel and coastal tropical regions 
of South America, as well as some small and medium-sized island states.10 In general 
FAO (2008:87) fi nds cause for concern, and notes that: “In a warmed world, ecosys-
tem productivity is likely to decline in lower latitudes (i.e. most tropical and subtropi-
cal oceans, seas and lakes) and increase in high latitudes.”
For commercial forestry, fewer generalisations are possible, and the presence of 
multiple disturbances (CO
2
 enrichment, increased temperatures, pests, fi res, water 
stress, increased extreme weather events, existing patterns of deforestation) makes pre-
diction diffi  cult. But impacts may be signifi cant; Nepstad et al. (2004), for example, 
predict massive Amazon deforestation; the product of a positive feedback loop includ-
ing deforestation, fragmentation, wildfi res and increased frequency of drought.
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Other sorts of traditional exports are also likely to be aff ected, particularly those 
based on natural resources. Th e export of tourism services from many small island 
developing states, for example (many of which are highly dependent on tourism as 
a source of foreign exchange), is likely to be seriously aff ected by the twin threats of 
sea level rise and coral bleaching. Gössling, Hall and Scott, in this volume, explore 
tourism-related issues in some detail.
Th ese impacts will mean a highly disruptive shifting of traditional comparative ad-
vantage, usually to the detriment of developing country exporters. Th e signifi cance of 
the impacts in those countries will be heightened by the fact that there is less capacity 
in developing countries to anticipate and adapt to changed circumstances than there 
is in developed countries.
Another direct eff ect of climate change is increased cost of transport. Climate 
change is likely to have costly impacts on transportation-related infrastructure such as 
ports. Stern (2006: 155) notes that:
“Rising sea levels will demand heavy investment in fl ood protection around ports and 
the export and import related activities concentrated in and around them. Stronger 
storm surges, winds and heavier rainfall already point to the requirement for stronger 
ships and sturdier off shore oil, gas and other installations. ...Th is would reverse decades 
of building steel mills, petrochemical plants and other energy-related facilities close to 
the deepwater ports accommodating bulk cargo vessels, super-tankers and ever larger 
container ships which have become the key vectors of rising global trade and just-on-
time production schedules. Both increased protection and relocation inland would have 
signifi cant capital and transport costs, and make imports in particular more expensive.”
Nicholls et al. (2008) estimate the value of port-city assets exposed to coastal fl ooding 
due to storm surge and high winds is about 5% of global GDP, and they project that 
unchecked climate change will substantially increase that exposure.
To the extent that transport becomes more costly, trade as a driver of economic 
development becomes less viable. However, the more signifi cant driver for increased 
transport cost is probably indirect, through increased fuel costs as a result of govern-
ment-led climate change policies. Th ese indirect impacts are addressed below, where 
there is a more in-depth discussion of the implications of increased transport costs.
It is worth noting that direct impacts of climate change may also have some posi-
tive eff ects, over and above the positive changes in agricultural export potential of 
some Northern countries. One example is the opening of new and less costly trade 
routes through the previously impassable Northwest Passage in Canada’s Arctic wa-
ters. Relatively few positive impacts have been identifi ed to date, however.
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Direct impacts of climate change policies
One of the most likely outcomes of climate change policy, whether implemented 
under a carbon tax, a cap and trade regime, subsidy reform, or other regulatory initia-
tives, is an increase in the price of CO
2
-rich fuels. Th is will have two types of impacts 
of interest to the present discussion.
First, it will increase the costs of production of goods that are fossil-fuel inten-
sive, with a result that will, as above, force changes in global patterns of trade. Some 
goods, such as aluminium and cement, are energy-intensive by nature, and will 
unavoidably see increases in production costs in regulated environments. Th is will 
benefi t substitutes where they exist, and may spur relocation of industry to those 
locations where regulations create a less costly environment.11 It will matter, of 
course, what the fuel source is: South African steel production, for example, uses al-
most all coal-fi red electricity, which is carbon-intensive. Th e level of technology also 
matters: OECD (2007) notes that China’s energy intensity of production overall is 
20% higher than the OECD average, meaning signifi cantly more GHG emissions 
per unit produced.
A knock-on policy impact may come from an increasing willingness to resort to 
trade-related measures that seek to punish carbon-intensive imported goods in par-
ticular. Th ese measures tend to be formulated with developing country competitors in 
mind. A number of such schemes have been proposed, ranging from the imposition 
of a carbon-based border tax adjustment, to the requirement that importers purchase 
off sets in a domestic cap and trade scheme at the point of import (Cosbey, 2008b). 
In addition, a number of private sector labels have sprung up that seek to show the 
carbon footprint of the labelled goods, ranging from the rather narrow “food miles” 
concept to broader schemes based on full life cycle assessments (Brenton et al., 2008).
Such policies will also increase the cost of internationally traded services, such as 
the provision of tourism. As the cost of air travel rises, those developing countries that 
are highly dependent on tourism revenues can expect to feel the impacts.
Second, and potentially more signifi cant, policies that increase fossil fuel prices 
will increase the costs of transporting goods. It has been estimated that every dollar 
increase in the price of a barrel of oil results in a 1% rise in average transport costs. In 
May 2008, when oil prices were around $120/barrel, Rubin and Tal (2008) calculated 
that infl ated transport costs were the equivalent of a 9% tariff  on all goods shipped 
from China to North America, and declared that the price of oil had eliminated 
China’s cost advantage over US-produced steel. Th e impacts of $150/barrel oil, they 
calculated, were the equivalent of reversing all the tariff  liberalisation accomplished by 
the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade since 
the 1970s. Obviously those forms of transport that are more carbon-intensive, such 
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as air freight, will be hardest hit, with implications for the types of goods (fresh-cut 
fl owers, high-end perishable produce) that use such modes.
Air transport, in fact deserves special consideration as it is likely to be included in 
the post-2012 climate change regime in a way that it was not in the present regime. 
How this inclusion will take shape is as yet unclear. Muller and Hepbun (2006) pro-
pose an air levy: an idea that is popular as a mechanism to raise funds for climate-
related adaptation. In the EU, air travel will be part of the emissions trading scheme 
for the fi rst time starting in 2012 at the advent of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’s 
third phase. One way or another, it is certain that air transport will become more 
costly, which is a development that has implications for both goods transport and, as 
noted above, for those economies that are highly dependent on airline-based tourism.
While regulatory measures are designed to drive innovation, and while they look 
poised to do so in the context of other energy uses such as heat and power, in the short 
term transportation seems to have no viable substitutes for petroleum as a fuel. Until 
such substitutes appear, the end result of regulatory measures that increase fuel costs 
is therefore to blunt the ability of trade to act as an engine of development.
A third direct impact of climate change policies is the obverse of the previous ef-
fect: the rewarding of low-carbon goods and services, including those that are interna-
tionally traded. Whether by subsidies or mandates (such as mandated use of biofuels), 
or though the eff ects of cap-and-trade or carbon tax schemes, those goods that use less 
carbon in production will become relatively cheaper, and those forms of energy that 
are less carbon-intensive will be in greater demand. Th e result may be new sources of 
export revenues for developing countries. For example, Ummel and Wheeler (2008) 
argue that with only modest subsidies it is economic to pursue the export of electricity 
from North African concentrated solar thermal installations to Europe, to help fulfi l 
the EU’s commitment to achieve 20% reduction in emissions by 2020. Newell, in this 
volume, discusses the possibility that tariff s and non-tariff  barriers to environmentally 
friendly goods might be eliminated, as per the WTO’s Doha Round mandate on envi-
ronmental goods and services (If WTO, 2001; ¶31(i)). If this can be achieved, to the 
extent that the list contains low-carbon goods, the eff ect will be similar: Th e overall 
impact of these policy eff ects will at fi rst be a change in traditional export patterns, 
as with the direct eff ects discussed above. However, there will also be a dampening of 
the power of trade as an engine of development, at least in the short to medium term, 
until new low-carbon transportation technologies can be developed.
Indirect impacts
As well as the direct impacts described above, we should expect climate change to have 
several indirect impacts on trade’s potential as a driver for development.
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Perhaps most signifi cantly, anticipating and dealing with climate change impacts 
will demand signifi cant fi nancial, technological and human resources in developing 
countries that have none of these in abundant supply. Adaptation is now one of the 
four pillars of the post-2012 climate change negotiations, and a number of ambitious 
fi nancing schemes are being considered, but it is practically inconceivable that any of 
them will address all the anticipated challenges adequately.12
Th e result will be a burden on developing country governments that will leave 
them with fewer resources to devote to building the capacity to benefi t from the 
opportunities off ered by trade liberalisation. In other words, as it was noted above, 
the benefi ts of trade liberalisation, and trade’s potential as a driver of development, 
depend crucially on domestic prerequisites that in most developing countries will de-
mand government resources: infrastructure development, education spending, health 
investments, regulatory and legal reform, etc. While there are some areas of overlap, 
where adaptation and aid for trade may be simultaneously achieved, that overlap is 
necessarily incomplete. It is almost certain that the challenging task of building ca-
pacity to benefi t from trade will receive less than its due in the context of adaptation’s 
powerful demand for government attention. Th e result would be a smaller potential 
for trade to serve development.
Another sort of indirect impact may have positive eff ects. It is likely that the post-
2012 UNFCCC/Kyoto negotiations will result in a regime or regimes that allow devel-
oping countries to make climate change mitigation commitments that align strongly 
with their development objectives. Th ese would be somehow funded by developed 
countries, either via a carbon market that rewarded policies, or via a fund approach.13 
So, for example, a developing country could pledge to increase the average effi  ciency 
of electrical generation by a number of means including regulatory reform, higher 
standards for permitting new capacity, or other measures. Th is eff ort would be aided 
by developed countries, not only through technical assistance, but also through fi nan-
cial support, whether by purchase of the resulting emission reductions or straightfor-
ward “reward”-type funding. Th is sort of institutional innovation would in part fulfi l 
the mandates specifi ed in the current roadmap for negotiations – the Bali Action Plan 
– with respect to fi nancing, mitigation and technology transfer.14
Such institutional innovation would also, moreover, benefi t developing country 
producers, including exporters, by lowering the costs of their energy inputs and pos-
sibly increasing the reliability of energy supply. Th at is, these sorts of eff orts to achieve 
emissions mitigation in developing countries might well also boost the capacity of 
exporters to compete in world markets, thereby helping them serve as engines of 
development.
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Conclusions
Th e preceding analysis describes a number of ways in which climate change, and the 
policies that it will engender, may signifi cantly aff ect the potential for trade to act as 
an engine of development. Both positive and negative infl uences were found, though 
on the whole the negative seem more likely to prevail.
Most signifi cant among the eff ects noted are:
• Th e shifts in traditional patterns of international trade, a product of climate 
change impacts on natural resource-based production, and of climate change 
policies that will punish GHG-intensive goods and methods of production.
• Th e uneven burden of those shifts, falling most heavily on developing country 
producers and exporters that are at once harder hit by impacts and less capable 
of anticipating and responding to those impacts.
• Th e probable increase in the costs of transport, due to climate change policies 
and the impacts of climate change on coastal transportation infrastructure
Several strong messages emerge from the analysis as presented. Overall, the key mes-
sage seems to be that if development assistance is to be eff ective in the long term, 
it will have to take into account the impacts of climate change and climate change 
policies. Th ere has been a fair amount of work done to mainstream adaptation con-
siderations into development assistance (see the chapter in this volume by Agrawala 
and Crick), but little or no work to try to consider the sorts of trade-related impacts 
highlighted here. While the results of such consideration will vary from country to 
country depending on the context, it seems clear that in many cases the most eff ective 
development policies will rely less on promoting traditional export-led growth as an 
engine of development. Certainly those programmes that focus on enhancing tourism 
as an engine of development need to reassess the long-term viability of their eff orts, 
for example, in the face of such threats as sea-level rise, loss of biodiversity and loom-
ing increases in airfare costs.
Th e alternative might take the form of promoting non-traditional exports, where 
those can be developed, or on more heavily promoting regional, rather than long-
distance, trade. Development eff orts focused on trade facilitation, for example, tend 
to strongly benefi t regional trade, with potential for high economic returns (World 
Bank 2004). Or the alternative might simply involve a stronger focus on endogenous 
development processes that depend less heavily on foreign markets.
In addition, as a possible third alternative, development assistance could focus on 
ameliorating the key predicted impacts where possible. So, for example, if climate 
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change impacts and policies are likely to increase the costs of international trade, 
development practitioners might prioritise programmes that will lower those costs. 
Perez and Wilson (2008) argue the primacy of the high costs of trade as an obstacle 
to African development, a problem that might be addressed by such initiatives as the 
proposed North-South corridor of improved rail and road links. Th e prospect of even 
greater costs of trade, the result of climate change impacts and policies, makes such 
eff orts all the more important.
Clearly any approach that takes climate change into consideration will need to start 
from a detailed assessment of the potential linkages. It has been repeatedly stressed 
here that the salient linkages will vary from country to country, sector to sector. What 
is needed as a starting point is a careful exercise in diagnostics that maps the known 
climate change impacts, along with a realistic assessment of future policy measures, 
overlaid on the existing patterns of trade and comparative advantage, and the po-
tential to develop new “green” export streams. Th is kind of information can serve as 
the basis for development assistance that avoids the risks, and exploits the potential 
opportunities, that climate change poses for trade’s role as an engine of development.
It is worth noting that there are two distinct types of impacts: Th ose that derive 
from climate change impacts are to some extent less amenable to action, short of 
international action to achieve ambitious mitigation targets. Th ose that derive from 
policy, on the other hand, are entirely amenable to action by the implementing policy 
makers. Th at is, if policy makers understand that their policies and measures have 
negative impacts in particular on developing country exporters, it is always possible 
to alter the programme design such that it addresses those concerns. Indeed, there are 
obligations in the Kyoto Protocol text for developed country policy makers to do so:
“Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement [its GHG mitigation com-
mitments] in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic 
impacts on developing country Parties ...” (Kyoto Protocol Article 3.14)
Also:
“Th e Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under 
this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse eff ects, including the adverse eff ects of 
climate change, eff ects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic 
impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties ...” (Kyoto Protocol Article 
2.3).
Finally, it almost goes without saying that any development assistance initiatives 
that can simultaneously achieve development objectives and contribute to mitigation 
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and adaptation goals should be pursued as a priority, given the urgent need from a 
development perspective, of successfully addressing climate change. A good example 
of this sort of synergy can be found in eff orts such as the World Bank’s Energy Sec-
tor Management Assistance Program, which supports capacity building and reform 
aimed at, among other things, energy effi  ciency and conservation objectives. Th ese 
can achieve development goals (energy access, energy security, industrial effi  ciency, 
balance of payments) and at the same time reduce GHG emissions.
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See http://www.integratedframework.org/about.htm. 
2 The results used are derived from controlled experiments, and are generally thought to be high compared to 
actual fi eld results. (IPCC Working Group II, 2007, p. 300)
3 Ibid., 5.4, 5.6.
4 Ibid., Section 5.4.2.
5 Ibid., Section 10.6.2.
6 Ibid., Section 5.8.1.
7 Ibid., Section 5.4.6.
8 Ibid., Section 10.4.1.3
9 Ibid., Table 5.6, p 299.
10 Ibid., p 292.
11 There is a substantial literature on the competitiveness impacts of climate change policy. For a survey of the 
literature and the issues, see Cosbey and Tarasofsky (2007), Hourcade et al. (2007).
12 Flåm and Skjærseth (2008) illustrate the substantial gap between adaptation needs and available fi nancing.
13 See UNFCCC (2009), esp. ¶159-160, for a summary of proposals submitted by the UNFCCC Parties that 
include a number of funding and carbon market schemes.
14 See the relevant sections of the Bali Action Plan, UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1.
15 These obligations have not been treated particularly seriously to date by developed country Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, perhaps in part because we are still at a stage where stringent climate change measures – i.e., those 
with real impact – have not yet been implemented.
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The Challenges of Tourism as a Development 
Strategy in an Era of Global Climate Change
Stefan Gössling, C. Michael Hall and Daniel Scott
Introduction
Th e interrelationships between tourism, development and climate change are present-
ing a signifi cant policy dilemma for many countries and agencies. Climate change is 
a key development issue (e.g. Kok et al. 2008, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC] 2007), while tourism has the potential to contribute to economic de-
velopment (e.g. Telfer & Sharpley 2008; Hall & Lew 2009), and is identifi ed as a po-
tential means of poverty reduction (e.g. United Nations World Tourism Organization 
[UNWTO] 2006). However, tourism also both contributes to and is strongly aff ected 
by climate change, leading to signifi cant challenges with respect to its management 
and regulation, and to long-term development prospects (UNWTO-United Nations 
Environment Programme [UNEP]-World Meteorological Organization [WMO] 
2008). Th is article sets out contemporary perspectives on tourism as a development 
strategy, particularly its potential to contribute to poverty alleviation in least devel-
oped countries (LDCs). Th e major risks climate change poses to the tourism sector, 
and the specifi c challenges these present for developing countries, are then examined, 
in particular attention is paid to: the regulatory risk that climate change mitigation 
policy will increase the cost of travel, especially to long-haul destinations; and the 
physical risks to key tourism products and decreased social-political stability that will 
adversely aff ect the competitive position of destinations.
Tourism and development
Tourism is more than just travel for leisure and holidays. Tourism, whether interna-
tional or domestic, encompasses voluntary travel by people away from their home 
environment for reasons such as leisure, health, study, business and visiting friends 
and relations. Since by defi nition tourism is consumed away from the consumer’s 
home environment, access is critical to successful tourism development. Th is is a ma-
jor challenge faced by developing countries and peripheral and rural regions within 
those countries, as without transport access there can be no tourism. However, when 
successfully developed, the transport access aff orded by tourism can also be utilised 
by other sectors to enhance international and domestic trade opportunities (Coles & 
Hall 2008).
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Table 1. The Importance of Tourism to Developing Economies
Region
Visitor Spending as a % of GDP (2006)
>50% 25-50% 10-24% 5-9%





Middle Africa - - Sao Tome and Principe -
Western Africa - Cape Verde Gambia Ghana
Northern Africa - - Morocco Tunisia, Egypt
Southern Africa - - - Namibia, 
Botswana
Eastern Asia China, Macao 
SAR
- Bahrain Mongolia; China, 
Hong Kong SAR
Western Asia - - Lebanon, Jordan Syrian Arab 
Republic
Southern Asia - Maldives - -
Southeastern Asia - - Cambodia Thailand, 
Singapore




South America - - - Suriname
Caribbean Anguilla Aruba, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Saint 
Lucia, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Grenada, Dominica, 




Oceania Palau, Cook 
Islands




of), Tonga, New 
Caledonia 
SAR = Special Autonomous Region in UNCTAD data
On a global scale, //OR: At the global level,// tourism is an extremely signifi cant eco-
nomic activity. According to the UNWTO (2008a), international tourism arrivals 
expanded by 6% in 2007, to 898 million international tourist arrivals. Th e UNWTO 
(2001) has also forecast that international travel will have almost doubled to 1.6 bil-
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lion arrivals by 2020. Although the vast majority of international tourism currently 
occurs in developed countries, the UNWTO has reported that international tourism 
in emerging and developing markets grew at twice the rate of industrialised countries. 
Between 1996 and 2006, international tourism in developing countries expanded by 
6% as a whole, by 9% for LDCs, and 8% for other low and lower-middle income 
economies (UNWTO 2008b). Th e signifi cant role of tourism in many developing 
economies is indicated in Table 1 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment 2008). However, it should also be noted that the vast majority of tourism is 
domestic rather than international in nature and is not captured in these statistics.
Considering the growth of tourism in developing countries, it is therefore perhaps 
not surprising that international tourism is increasingly promoted by organisations 
such as the UNWTO, and by many government agencies in the international devel-
opment community, as an important element in national poverty reduction strate-
gies and in development fi nancing. According to the UNWTO (2005: 3): “Tourism 
development, if properly developed and supported, can indeed be a “quick-win” in 
overcoming the economic and social conditions that prevail in LDCs and in accelerat-
ing their integration into the world economy.” International tourism is perceived by 
policy-makers as important for developing economies, as it is regarded as representing 
an important avenue for competitive economic specialisation (Komlev & Encontre 
2004) and an opportunity to augment foreign exchange fl ows (Kasahara 2004) in 
order to work towards poverty reduction (UNCTAD 2001). UNWTO estimates that 
tourism is a primary source of foreign exchange earnings in 46 out of 50 of the world’s 
LDCs (UNWTO 2007a). 
Similar perspectives have been presented by other international bodies, such as 
the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) (2004) and the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) (2008), as well as the international development cooperation sector 
in many nations, including the British Department for International Development 
(DFID), German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Canadian In-
ternational Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish Agency for International Devel-
opment Cooperation (Sida) and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). An accurate assessment of the level of assistance provided to sustainable 
tourism projects is not available.
Nevertheless, there has also long been substantial criticism of what has been per-
ceived as the negative impacts of tourism as a development strategy (Hall & Lew 
2009, Telfer & Sharpley 2008, Hall 2007). For example, the supposed comparative 
advantages of LDCs with respect to tourism are not evenly distributed. Th ere are 
many developing countries, and regions within them, which have only a limited op-
portunity to benefi t from tourism. It is also important to note that while tourism 
has been promoted by some in the development community for over 40 years, the 
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mid to long-term relative contribution of tourism projects to development strategies 
remains poorly evaluated. Overall, there has been greater tendency by international 
development agencies to advocate tourism projects than to holistically and critically 
assess the consequences of tourism-related development strategies. Tourism has also 
been associated with substantial environmental change and degradation (e.g., Weav-
er 2004; Gössling & Hall 2006a) and cultural commodifi cation (e.g., Mowforth & 
Munt 2003; Hall & Brown 2006), while economic benefi ts may not be as great as 
expected because of profi t repatriation by foreign investors, relatively low wages, and 
underemployment because of seasonal demand (e.g., Chok et al. 2007; Wattanakul-
jarus & Coxhead 2008, Hall & Lew 2009). 
Th e use of tourism development as a means of poverty reduction in developing 
countries, often described as pro-poor tourism (PPT), has been a substantial focus 
for a number of development agencies, such as DFID, UNWTO, the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank. Yet, as Chok et al. (2007) emphasised in their 
review of poverty alleviation strategies, tourism is all too often regarded as a pana-
cea: an economic, social and environmental ‘cure-all’ whose claims for sustainable 
development, including welfare equity and poverty reduction, need to be seriously 
evaluated and considered in context. For example, Wieranga’s (2008: 133) detailed 
study of the benefi ts of PPT concluded: “All in all, PPT is more of a livelihood sup-
plement than a poverty solution, and poverty elimination through ethnic tourism is 
the exception rather than the rule.” Although the focus of many in the development 
community is on small-scale so-called ‘alternative’ cultural and ecotourism projects 
in more peripheral regions, the reality is that the majority of leisure tourism is what 
may best be described as ‘mass’ tourism. Development community projects are also 
highly dependent on mass tourism as a) they rely on the mass international transport 
infrastructure to bring people to a country; and b) it is often a form of secondary 
activity that people will undertake in addition to, rather than instead of, travel to 
more conventional mass tourism attractions. Th e diffi  culty faced by many tourism 
development projects is that their proponents have often not considered their relative 
inaccessibility to markets, especially in comparison with competing activities and/
or destinations. For example, in some short-term situations ecotourism can provide 
win-win situations for local people and local nature, but there are substantial dif-
fi culties in maintaining such results over time, as a result of competition within the 
tourism sector, relative value of tourism in comparison with alternative resource use, 
and economic and environmental change. Nevertheless, despite potential drawbacks, 
many governments continue to perceive tourism as a key development strategy. Th is is 
understandable given the disparate perspectives that exist, and particularly for island 
LDCs, where tourism may represent perhaps the only development option with the 
exception of fi shing. Taking into account the drawbacks of tourism development is 
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important for understanding the tourism – development – climate change nexus and 
the potential vulnerabilities that may arise from a focus on tourism development in an 
era of rapid climate change and an increasingly carbon-constrained global economy.
In order to understand how climate change could aff ect the prospects of tourism 
development, it is important that the various elements that comprise the tourism 
marketplace be considered. Although the focus of the development dimensions of 
tourism are at the destination, changes elsewhere in the tourism system (compet-
ing destinations, tourism generating countries, transportation networks) are also ex-
tremely signifi cant (Hall 2005), as a negative impact in one part of the tourism system 
may constitute an opportunity elsewhere (Scott et al. 2008). Regulatory initiatives 
developed to mitigate climate change will have signifi cant impacts on transport sys-
tems and thus the mobility of tourists. Th e potential for increased costs for the con-
sumer arising from mitigation practices in one jurisdiction may have implications for 
the comparative price advantage of the destination on an international scale, as well 
as travel within a destination country. One possible eff ect is that those destinations 
which are the most peripheral and least accessible to markets, which typically are 
most in need of development initiatives, are therefore potentially the most likely to 
be impacted in relative terms by the costs of mitigation strategies based on distance 
travelled, size of emissions or energy consumed (Hall & Lew 2009). Such an obser-
vation is vital in understanding the potential impacts of international and national 
climate change mitigation regimes on tourism fl ows and destinations (Gössling et al. 
2008a). While preferred environmental attributes are signifi cant in destination choice 
(Gössling & Hall 2006a; Becken & Hay 2007; United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] 2008; Scott et al. 2008), change in price 
structure resulting from climate policy developments, such as a post-Kyoto Protocol 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction framework that includes bunker fuels, or 
increasing oil prices, may have a signifi cant impact for tourism development in some 
developing nations. 
In the longer term, the direct impacts of substantially changed climate regimes 
and the indirect eff ects of climate-induced environmental change and societal im-
pacts (i.e., reduced economic growth or political destabilisation) will also signifi -
cantly aff ect tourism in some regions, as a result of damage to, or the complete loss 
of, key tourism resources that will alter the competitiveness of destinations (Scott 
et al. 2008). As Table 1 illustrates, those economies that are highly dependent on 
tourism tend to be island states, which are also some of the most vulnerable to the 
eff ects of climate change (Mimura et al. 2007). Importantly, these eff ects need to be 
considered through the various components of the tourism system, also taking into 
account the capacities of tourists to perceive impacts accurately (Gössling & Hall 
2006b, Scott et al. 2008). 
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Climate policy implications for tourism patterns 
Transport, aviation and climate change
Transport is the major contributor to tourism related emissions for the mid and long-
haul travel that characterises most developing countries’ high value tourism markets. 
Of the diff erent forms of transport used for international tourism, aviation is regarded 
as the most signifi cant contributor to global warming. Aviation is now the primary 
mode of transport for international tourists, with an estimated 43% of international 
tourist arrivals being by air (UNWTO 2005). A recent study concludes that 5% of 
global CO 
2
 emissions are caused by tourism, most of this (40%) by aviation (Scott et 
al. 2008). 
Aviation’s share of global emissions of CO2 may appear to be small, as is frequently 
pointed out by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), but most of these 
emissions are generated by the less than 2% of the world’s population that partici-
pate in international aviation on an annual basis (Peeters et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
growth in emissions from this sector have been stron;, and both Airbus (2007) and 
Boeing (2007) are projecting continued growth in passenger numbers of 4.9% and 
4.5% per year, respectively, in the period 2007-2026, with the implication that net 
fuel use and emissions are likely to increas ion the order of 3% per year. Signifi cantly 
for understanding the implications of the relationship between tourism and climate 
change, they forecast that by 2026 nearly 40% of air travel will be to, from, or within 
the Asia-Pacifi c region (Boeing 2007), where most nations are currently exempt from 
international emission reduction targets. While it remains to be seen how these esti-
mates will be aff ected by the fi nancial crisis in 2008, it deserves mention that events of 
the past, such as September 11 (2001), have at best only postponed growth in aviation 
(see also Lee 2009). 
Growth in emissions from aviation is clearly in confl ict with global climate policy. 
Responding to the fi ndings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007), 
the Bali Action Plan negotiated by 180 nations at the Conference of the Parties-13 
(COP-13), recognszed that deep cuts in global GHG emissions are urgently required 
to avoid dangerous climate change. Th e European Union (EU) emission policy target 
is a reduction of 20% by 2020 and some countries, such as the UK, are already dis-
cussing cuts of 80% by 2050 (over the base year 1990). Th is should include aviation, 
and it is thus important to note that aviation is responsible for a higher share of emis-
sions in industrialszed countries than on a global average (e.g. Gössling & Hall 2008); 
with the consequence that climate policy should aff ect the sector more substantially 
in industrialszed countries. Th e relatively high level of economic dependence of some 
developing economies on international tourism (see Table 1) will mean that those 
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countries may be substantially aff ected by mitigation measures that increase the cost 
of air travel.
Climate policy combines command and control measures to regulate GHG emis-
sions. International aviation is not included in the Kyoto Protocold nor was it an 
explicit topic of post-Kyoto emission reduction negotiations at COP-13 in Bali, Indo-
nesia (December 2007), or COP-14 in Poznan, Poland (December 2008). Emissions 
from international aviation are currently not accounted for by any nation. Article 
2 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) is responsible for limiting and reducing emissions from international aviation 
in Annex I nations (ICAO 1997). However, ICAO has been accused of eff ectively 
preventing action towards emissions reductions in the aviation sector for over more 
than a decade (T&E 2007). Growth in GHG emissions from the aviation sector can 
be regulated nationally. Currently, this is only the case within the European Union, 
where all fl ights into and out of Europe will be integrated in the EU emissions trading 
scheme by January 2012. 
Current climate policy is more likely to slow or delay growth in the aviation sector, 
at least with regard to leisure travel, than to achieve absolute reductions in emissions 
(Gössling et al. 2008a, Mayor and Tol 2007). Clearly, growth in leisure mobility is 
such that even under the best scenarios of technology and air traffi  c control manage-
ment (Peeters et al. 2009a), there will be a growing gap between the increase in abso-
lute emissions and post-Kyoto emission reduction needs. 
Consequences of emission trading for arrivals 
in developing countries
So far, only one detailed study has focused specifi cally on the consequences of emis-
sion trading on arrivals in developing countries. In their analysis of emerging climate 
policy in major tourism outbound markets, Gössling et al. (2008a) assessed the direct 
implications of emission trading for the aviation sector and examined the potential 
consequences for travel costs and tourism demand in ten tourism-dependent less-
developed island states with diverse geographic and tourism market characteristics. 
Th e study assumed that additional costs per ton of CO
2
 of €27.4 in 2012 and 
€46.9 would apply by 2020. Th is is certainly too high, as the study considered the 
inclusion of non-CO
2
 emissions in the EU ETS for aviation, at was originally sug-
gested by the EC. Furthermore, the study assumed that emissions from aviation in 
the EU would grow by 40% by 2011 and 100% by 2020, while there would be a cap 
of 90% of 2005 emission levels in 2012 and 79% of 2005 emission levels in 2020, 
with 25% of allowances being auctioned. Current EU policy foresees a cap of 5% by 
2020, with 15% of allowances being auctioned, and these assumptions thus need to 
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be seen as increasing prices far more substantially than climate policy actually will. 
To test the consequences of a tough climate policy, the study also provided a second 
scenario called ‘Worldwide Serious Climate Policy’, where costs of €230 per t of CO
2 
are introduced by 2020 (for technical details see Gössling et al. 2008a). 
Th e results show that climate policy will aff ect markets of tourism-dependent de-
veloping countries, but in view of the post-2001 trends of the considerable increase 
in demand for holidays in most of tse locations in the study, climate policy was not 
projected to lead to a notable decline in tourist arrivals up to 2020. Rather, the result 
would be a slight delay in growth in arrival numbers. For example, in the EU ETS sce-
nario, arrivals would be 0.2% to 5.8% lower relative to a ‘Business as Usual’ scenario. 
Only under a very strong international climate policy for aviatiorewas arrivals growth 
projected to decline in any meaningful way. In the Worldwide Serious Climate Policy 
scenario, arrivals to individual nations declined between 4% to 72% relative to the 
‘Business as Usual’ scenario.
Table 2 illustrates diff erences in the carbon intensity of a number of countries. 
Weighted average emissions per tourist vary between a low of 635 kg CO
2
 in Jamaica 
and 1,873 kg CO
2
 in Seychelles. Th is is of importance, as climate policy is more likely 
to have an impact on countries with a heavy dependence on emission-intense markets 
that have strong climate policies. 
 
Table 2. Energy Characteristics of Tourism in Case Study Islands, 2005
Country Average weighted 
emissions per tourist, 
air travel 











Emissions per tourist, main 
market (return fl ight; kg CO
2
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824 (New Zealand; 36%)
1,935(France; 21%)
606 (India; 21%)
*Source: UNWTO 2007 b, c; **2004
1) Calculation of emissions is based on the main national markets only, using a main airport to main airport 
approach (in the USA: New York; Canada: Toronto; Australia: Brisbane).
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Climate change risks to tourism 
destinations in developing nations
With its close connections to the environment and climate itself, tourism is consid-
ered to be a highly climate-sensitive economic sector similar to agriculture, insurance, 
energy, and transportation (Gössling & Hall 2006, Becken & Hay 2007, Scott et al. 
2008). Climate defi nes the length and quality of tourism seasons and plays a major 
role in destination choice and tourist spending. Climate aff ects a wide range of the 
environmental resources that are critical attractions for tourism in many destinations, 
such as wildlife productivity and biodiversity, water levels and quality, and snow con-
ditions and glacier extent. Climate also has an important infl uence on environmental 
conditions that can deter tourists, including infectious disease, wildfi res, insect or 
water-borne pests (e.g., jellyfi sh, algae blooms), and extreme events such as tropical 
cyclones.
Consequently, it is anticipated that the integrated eff ects of climate change (both 
shifts in climatic means and extremes), climate-induced environmental change, and 
climate-related societal change will have far-reaching impacts on tourism destina-
tions; impacts which are already becoming evident at destinations around the world. 
Th e regional manifestations of climate change will generate both negative and positive 
impacts in the tourism sector and these impacts will vary substantially by market seg-
ment and geographic region. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the full 
range of potential climate change impacts upon the diversity of tourism destinations 
in developing nations.1 However, notable impacts include a gradual shift in preferred 
destinations and tourist spending to higher latitude temperate nations and higher 
elevation mountainous areas (Scott et al. 2004, Amelung et al. 2007, Hamilton et al. 
2005, Berrittella et al. 2006), signifi cant impacts on terrestrial and marine biodiversity 
in many of the biodiversity hotspots in developing nations (IPCC 2007), increased 
risk of extreme events and attendant infrastructure damage and tourism interruption 
IPCC 2007), risks to World Heritage Sites (UNESCO 2008), and major risks to 
coastal tourism infrastructure due to longer term sea level rise (Dasgupta et al.2007). 
Importantly, summary assessments by diff erent groups of international experts have 
consistently identifi ed developing nations in the Caribbean, Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS), Southeast Asia, and Africa as the most at-risk tourism destinations for 
the mid- to late-21st century (Table 3). 
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South America, Caribbean/Mexico, 
Southeast Asia (including China and 
India), Middle East, Africa (b)
Gössling & Hall 2006, 
Hall 2008




Africa, Asia, Latin America, Small Island 
Nations 
Hamilton et al. 2005 2025, +4°C 
warming scenario
Negative Impact 
on Tourist Arrivals 
(d)
Caribbean/Mexico, South America (ex-
cept Chile), Africa (except Zambia and 
Zimbabwe), Middle East, Southeast Asia 
(except China)
Scott et al. 2008 Mid-21st century Vulnerability
Hotspots (e)
Caribbean, Indian and Pacifi c Ocean 
Small Island Nations (f)
a) Impact criteria considered: climatic changes, regulatory burdens, substitution effects, adaptation 
possibilities. Data sources and indicators for these criteria were not identifi ed
b) Many nations in the Middle East and Africa were ‘not examined’, however no rationale was provided 
regarding availability of information for selected nations
c) Impact criteria considered: land and marine biodiversity loss, urbanisation, water security, sea level rise, 
regime change, fuel costs, temperature changes, disease potential
d) Impact criteria considered: change in annual average temperature
e) Impact criteria considered: summer and winter climatic change, increases in extreme events, sea level rise, 
land and marine biodiversity loss, water scarcity, political destabilisation, health impacts/disease potential, 
transportation costs, and relative importance of tourism to the economy
f) South America, Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia were identifi ed as potentially vulnerable, but not listed 
as ‘hotspots’ due to insuffi cient information on magnitude of potential impacts
While our understanding of the impacts of climate change for various destination 
types has continued to improve, both Scott et al. (2008) and Hall (2008) emphasise 
that there remain major regional gaps in our knowledge of how climate change will 
aff ect the natural and cultural resources critical for tourism in Africa, the Caribbean, 
South America, the Middle East and large parts of East Asia. Until more systematic 
regional level assessments are conducted, defi nitive statements on the net impacts on 
the tourism sector and the potential for future tourism development will not be pos-
sible. 
Tourists have the greatest capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change, with 
relative freedom to avoid destinations impacted by climate change. Climate, the natu-
ral environment, personal safety, and travel cost are four primary factors in destination 
choice, and as outlined above, global climate change is anticipated to have signifi cant 
impacts on all of these factors at the regional level. It is the response of tourists to the 
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complexity of destination impacts that will reshape consumer demand patterns and 
play a pivotal role in the eventual impacts on destinations. Th e perceptions of future 
impacts of climate change at destinations will be central to the decision-making of 
tourists, tourism investors, governments and development agencies alike, as percep-
tions of climate conditions or environmental changes are just as important to con-
sumer choices as the actual conditions. Perceptions of climate change impacts in a 
region are often heavily infl uenced by the nature of media coverage. It is therefore 
critical to avoid the type of media speculation and misinformation2 that is likely to 
be more damaging to a tourism destination in the near-term than the actual climate 
impacts. 
All tourism businesses and destinations will need to adapt to climate change in 
order to minimize associated risks and capitalise upon new opportunities, in an eco-
nomically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner. However, knowledge of 
the capability of current climate adaptations to cope successfully with future climate 
change remains rudimentary (Scott et al. 2008). Climate change is slowly entering 
into the decision-making of a range of tourism stakeholders (e.g., investors, insurance 
companies, tourism enterprises, governments, development organizations and tour-
ists). Studies that have examined the climate change risk appraisal of local tourism of-
fi cials and operators have consistently found relatively low levels of concern and little 
evidence of long-term strategic planning in anticipation of future changes in climate 
(Scott et al. 2008). Considering the large information requirements, policy changes 
and investments required to be eff ective, adaptation by tourism destinations will re-
quire decades to implement in some cases: the process of adaptation must commence 
now for destinations anticipated to be among those impacted by mid-century (Scott 
et al. 2008; Simpson et al. 2008b). Development organisations in particular will need 
to develop a greater understanding not only of the implications of climate change 
for the sustainability of tourism products and supporting services (e.g., coastal zones, 
coral reefs, water supply, heritage assets) at the destination of tourism development 
projects, but also the implications of emerging climate policy regimes for relative 
cost and accessibility. Most importantly, a more critical perspective is required as to 
whether tourism will actually be the best development alternative.
Box 1: Tourism, development and climate 
change complexities in the Maldives
In November 2008, the Maldives made international headlines because the coun-
try had, for the fi rst time in its history, democratically elected a president Th e new 
President announced that the country would be likely to disappear because of sea 
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level rise associated with climate change. As a survival strategy, the Maldives pro-
posed to use money derived from their tourism industry to buy land in Sri Lanka, 
India or Australia as an eventual ‘homeland’. Th at this nation has concluded that 
they will have to surrender their homeland to the sea because of collective inaction 
to reduce GHG emissions over the past decade, is a sombre commentary on the 
state of international mitigation eff orts.
As a tropical island state, the Maldives can be seen as representative of many 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Tourism is the most important industry, 
accounting for 28% of GDP, and more than 60% of the Maldives foreign exchange 
earnings. More than 90% of the government tax revenue is derived from tourism-
related taxes, and import duties (CIA World Factbook 2008). However, the distri-
bution of income from tourism appears to be skewed: 
“…Maldives became the richest country in South Asia, with average incomes 
reaching $4,600 a year. But the wealth created was skimmed off  by cronies – leav-
ing a yawning gap between rich and poor. Speedboats and yachts of local multi-
millionaires bob in the lagoon of the capital’s harbour, while offi  cial fi gures show 
almost half of Maldivians earn less than a dollar a day” (Th e Guardian, 10 Novem-
ber 2008).
Tourists come mostly from Europe (78%), entailing high energy use for fl ights 
and food imports, transport in the islands (helicopter, speedboats) as well as accom-
modation (diesel generator-driven electricity production). Th e fl ight alone (return) 
will usually entail emissions of about 2 t CO
2
 (corresponding to Frankfurt/Ger-
many to Male 7,940 km journey), i.e. more than half of what could currently be 
seen as sustainable per capita emissions over a whole year.
A number of key points can be learned from the Maldives. Income derived from 
tourism can boost average income, although not to levels comparable with devel-
oped countries; but the distribution is highly skewed. Furthermore, the develop-
ment is based on an energy-intense, high emission tourism sector, which should be 
considered in the light of recent demands by SIDS for industrialised countries to 
cut emissions of greenhouse gases by 95% by 2050 (see Poznan UN climate talks in 
Poland in December 2008; Reuters 2008). Implementing such deep emission cuts 
would clearly also aff ect long-haul travel by air, and thus the economies of SIDS. 
Th is puts the Maldives in a policy dilemma: they can either continue to develop 
and exploit their energy-intense tourism system to maximise income at the cost of 
hastening climate change and thus the eventual demise of their nation, or embark 
on a less carbon intense development path to become a role model for other coun-
tries to follow. 
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Th e possibility to achieve the rapid and deep emission reductions needed to 
limit climate change and sea level rise to levels that would allow at least some of 
the Maldives islands to remain habitable, has perhaps already been lost (Anderson 
and Bows 2008). So while some may question whether it is prudent or even ethical 
to support further development of energy-intense tourism in the Maldives, with 
no other development alternative and little international resources forthcoming 
to support the type of adaptation the nation will require (i.e., a new homeland), 
tourism development is the only way to secure the resources needed to support the 
eventual relocation of its citizens. Th is nation’s historic and current emissions are 
not the source of its vulnerability; and the reality is that energy-intense tourism de-
velopment is its best option to build adaptive capacity for its population. It is very 
likely that this policy dilemma will play itself out in many SIDS and other LDCs 
in the decades ahead.
Conclusions
Many of the less wealthy countries in the tropics, and in particular island states, de-
pend on international tourism for a large share of their GDP and foreign exchange 
earnings. Scott et al. (2008) estimate that that the total number of international arriv-
als to LDCs corresponds to approximately 0.9% of all international tourist trips made 
in 2005.3 However, as trips from industrialised countries to the LDCs are usually 
long-haul, the share of distances travelled and emissions associated with these trips 
is higher, amounting to 4.7% of the transport volume (pkm) and 4.6% of the CO
2
 
emissions caused by international tourist air transport. Th is highlights that there may 
be a general trade-off  between tourism’s development benefi ts in the LDCs and its 
contribution to climate change.
It seems clear that the current development of tourism in most countries is fol-
lowing pro-growth paradigms, where annual growth in arrival numbers is considered 
both an indicator of success and a proxy for wealth transfer to poor local populations. 
In the light of the results presented here, there may be reason to reconsider such strat-
egies. Increasing energy prices over the longer-term, security concerns and growing 
environmental awareness among travellers make it meaningful to develop tourism 
systems with a strong focus on energy use and emission avoidance. 
Destinations should seek to assess their dependency and vulnerability on energy 
intense tourism. Destinations would seem well-advised to restructure their tourism 
products towards low-carbon and/or high value tourism. Many models now exist to 
strategically reduce the energy intensity of tourism markets, with a focus on maintain-
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ing or increasing yield. For instance, Gössling et al. (2005) have used eco-effi  ciency 
as an integrated indicator combining ecological and economic data. Knowledge of 
the energy intensity of various markets can thus help decision-makers to decide in 
favour of low-carbon tourism that generates high revenue (Becken 2008; Gössling et 
al. 2008b).
While it is clear that tourism growth has encouraged higher levels of social devel-
opment for some countries, it is also clear that tourist arrival numbers as a measure 
of socio-economic development highly simplifi es tourism production systems, omit-
ting much of the complexity of tourism-derived income generation and the socio-
economic benefi t it brings. While higher tourist numbers may generally indicate the 
potential of higher revenue, it is clear that per tourist income varies widely among 
markets, tourist types and production systems. In some cases, a limited number of 
backpackers may actually make a more substantial contribution to livelihoods and 
poverty alleviation than large numbers of upscale travellers (Wunder 2003; see also 
Gössling et al. 2004). Upscale tourists, on the other hand, may make a more substan-
tial contribution to government revenue, but this depends on government policies, 
which may often grant tax exemptions to foreign investors thereby increasing leakage 
from the local economic system, as well as government spending, which may favour 
one public expenditure over another. 
Th e benefi t of tourism to society is thus highly complex and not self-evident. Tour-
ism may, particularly in comparably small countries with high arrival numbers, also 
increase prices for basic staples, and thus have negative consequences for the poorest 
part of the population (Gössling 2003). Th erefore we would agree with Schilcher 
(2007) who argues that in order for tourism to bring benefi ts to the poorer parts of 
society, the focus on growth of tourism per se has to be replaced with a perspective 
on equity and developing an understanding of tourism within the broader context of 
economic and social development objectives. 
Climate change adds a new dimension to this needed transformation, for accu-
mulating evidence indicates that climate change, particularly high emission scenarios, 
would have profound implications that could fundamentally transform aspects of the 
global tourism sector. Climate change is already beginning to aff ect decision-making 
in the tourism sector (e.g., investors, insurance companies, tourism enterprises, gov-
ernments, development organisations, and tourists); and it will be a pivotal issue af-
fecting tourism development and management in the decades ahead (Gössling & Hall 
2006, Becken & Hay 2007, Scott et al. 2008). Despite visibly increased awareness of 
the challenge of climate change within the tourism industry over the last fi ve years, 
including the Davos Declaration (UNWTO-UNEP-WMO 2008) signed by delegates 
from over 80 nations in 2007, and the tourism industry led CEO Challenge on Cli-
mate Change (in Bangkok 2008), a multi-sectoral comparison of climate change risk 
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awareness by KPMG (2008) found that both the tourism and aviation sector rated 
low overall and were considered in the ‘danger zone’ of their climate change risk pre-
paredness framework. Addressing the large information gaps regarding the climate 
change vulnerability of the tourism sector in virtually all developing nations, and 
better informing decision makers of the attendant risks, must be a core component 
of any future strategy for tourism in order to contribute to poverty alleviation and at-
taining the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.
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Endnotes
1 Readers are referred to Scott et al. (2008) for a comprehensive summary of available scientifi c information on 
potential climate change impacts for destinations world-wide.
2 See Scott et al. (2008) for a sample of such media coverage for different regions. Some of this sensational-
ized media coverage has been based on reports that speculate on climate change impacts on tourism, such 
as: Halifax Travel Insurance (2006). Holiday 2030. http://www.hbosplc.com/media/ pressreleases/articles/hali-
fax/2006-09-01-05.asp?section=Halifax
3 This calculation is based on UNWTO data for 2000 and extrapolated by the average annual growth rates 
between 1990 and 2000 to 2005 (international arrivals to the least developed countries was 6.75 million, which 
corresponds to 0.9% of all international tourist trips made in 2005). UNWTO (2006) calculated tourism in LDCs 
at 2.6% of the world market share in terms of international tourist arrivals (ITAs). However, the growth in ITAs has 
been faster in LDCs than in the developing countries as a whole: 42.5% in the former and 30.8% in the latter be-
tween 2001 and 2005 (15.8% for the world). Differences in the two estimates are the result of different data sets 
and defi nitions of which nations are classifi ed as LCDs.
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Agriculture in the Face of Climate Change: 
Shifting the Paradigm towards Sustainability
Lim Li Ching
Introduction
Th e challenges facing agriculture are immense. Global food supplies are under pres-
sure from expanding demand for food, feed, and biofuels; the rising price of energy; 
increasing land and water scarcity; and the eff ects of climate change (World Bank, 
2008). According to the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Sci-
ence and Technology for Development (IAASTD, 2008)1, climate change, coincident 
with increasing demand for food, feed, fi bre and fuel, has the potential to irrevers-
ibly damage the natural resource base on which agriculture depends, with signifi -
cant consequences for food insecurity. Climate change could also signifi cantly con-
strain economic development in developing countries that rely largely on agriculture 
(Rosegrant et al., 2008).
Th e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that warming 
of the climate system is “unequivocal”, as evident by increases in air and ocean tem-
peratures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and sea level rise (IPCC, 2007a). 
Agriculture will therefore have to cope with increased climate variability and more 
extreme weather events. Increased frequency of droughts and fl oods will aff ect crop 
production negatively, especially in subsistence sectors: smallholder and subsistence 
farmers, pastoralists and artisanal fi sherfolk will suff er complex, localised eff ects of 
climate change. Th e impacts of climate change will fall disproportionately on de-
veloping countries, and threaten the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).
Such impacts will further aggravate the stresses faced by developing countries, al-
ready facing unprecedented hikes in food prices. Although prices of major cereals 
have since fallen from their 2008 peaks, they remain high compared to previous years. 
FAO estimates the number of hungry people at 923 million in 2007, an increase of 
more than 80 million since 1990-92 (FAO, 2008). In 2008, another 40 million were 
pushed into hunger, bringing the overall number of undernourished to 963 million. 
While several factors are responsible, the consensus is that high food prices are driving 
millions into food insecurity, worsening conditions for many who were already food-
insecure, and threatening long-term global food security. 
1 The IAASTD is the most recent and comprehensive assessment of agriculture, co-sponsored by the World Bank, FAO, UNEP, UNDP, WHO, 
UNESCO and GEF.
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At the same time, agriculture consumes 85% of the world’s utilised water and 
contributes to deforestation, land degradation, and pollution (World Bank, 2008). 
While agriculture has been successful in meeting food demand, it also accounts for a 
large loss of biodiversity, the degradation of many ecosystem services, increased risks 
of nonlinear changes in ecosystems, the exacerbation of poverty for some, and grow-
ing inequities and disparities across groups of people (MEA, 2005).
Agriculture is thus at a crossroad. It has to fi nd ways to feed the world while coping 
with climate change, at the same time being environmentally, socially and economi-
cally sustainable. Accordingly, critical refl ection on the nature of agricultural develop-
ment that the international community and national governments should invest in is 
necessary. 
Agriculture in the development spotlight
Th e World Development Report 2008 called for greater investment in agriculture in 
developing countries (World Bank, 2008). It warned that the sector must be placed 
at the centre of the development agenda if the MDGs of halving extreme poverty and 
hunger by 2015 are to be realised.
Yet, while 75% of the world’s poor live in rural areas, a mere 4% of offi  cial devel-
opment assistance (ODA) goes to agriculture in developing countries (World Bank, 
2008). Th e share of agriculture in ODA has declined sharply, from a high of about 
18% in 1979 to 3.5% in 2004. In absolute terms, ODA declined from a high of 
about USD 8 billion (2004 USD) in 1984 to USD 3.4 billion in 2004. 
Th is neglect of agriculture is all the more striking because it has occurred in the 
face of rising rural poverty. Yet, for the poorest people, GDP growth originating in 
agriculture is about four times more eff ective in reducing poverty than GDP growth 
originating outside the sector (World Bank, 2008). Th e large share of agriculture in 
poorer economies suggests that strong growth in agriculture is critical for fostering 
overall economic growth. 
Th ere now appears to be a resurgence of agriculture on the development agenda, 
culminating in broad agreement on the need to massively reinvest in agriculture. 
Nonetheless, this still leaves open the question of the nature of agricultural develop-
ment required. 
Th e UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has highlighted the need to sup-
port smallholder farmers and means of agricultural production that are sustainable, 
particularly in the context of climate change (De Schutter, 2008). Th is is because ag-
ricultural science and technology hitherto has mainly benefi ted large-scale enterprises 
and has not focused on the specifi c needs of the rural poor in developing countries. 
Moreover, while intensive export-oriented agriculture has increased, this has been ac-
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companied by both benefi ts and adverse consequences depending on circumstances, 
such as exportation of soil nutrients and water, unsustainable soil or water manage-
ment, or exploitative labour conditions in some cases (IAASTD, 2008). Th ere is lit-
tle clear evidence that export-led poverty alleviation has worked as envisaged, with 
foreign exchange earnings from agricultural development achieved at very low prices 
and little value-added, and bypassing of in-country opportunities for agricultural de-
velopment focused on local and regional markets (Pretty, 2006).
Additionally, the path that agriculture has been on has not been sustainable. For 
example, the widespread promotion of Green Revolution technologies in the 1960s, 
particularly in Asia and Latin America, which involved the massive introduction 
of agricultural inputs such as inorganic fertilizers, chemical pesticides and modern 
seeds, radically transformed agriculture from traditional farming systems to input-
dependent systems characteristic of industrial (commercial) agriculture. Yet, in an 
era of climate change, the sustainability of this model of input- and energy-intensive 
agriculture is questionable. 
Eff orts are currently underway to transform African agriculture via an “African 
Green Revolution” (e.g. the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa), an ambi-
tious approach forged by philanthropic foundations, the public and private sectors, 
and UN agencies. While recognizing the pitfalls of the original Green Revolution, it 
remains to be seen if the solutions off ered are more of the same, or if they truly con-
stitute a pro-poor, pro-environment approach (Daño, 2007).
Th e IAASTD clearly concluded that a radical change is needed in agricultural 
policy and practice, in order to address hunger and poverty, social inequities and 
environmental sustainability (IAASTD, 2008). Th e ‘business-as-usual’ scenario of in-
dustrial farming, input- and energy-intensiveness, damage to the environment and 
marginalisation of small-scale farmers was judged no longer tenable. 
However, because the development choices made have in some cases excluded or 
marginalized key actors, such as small-scale farmers, with preference being given to 
short-term over longer-term considerations, some judgments have been privileged 
over others in decision-making, pushing agriculture along certain pathways to the 
neglect of other well-evidenced options, such as sustainable agriculture practiced by 
small farmers. Additionally, many of the technologies potentially of use in sustainable 
farming are not adopted because small-scale producers lack access to the means and 
supporting services necessary to employ the technologies profi tably (IAASTD, 2008). 
As such, in most countries, sustainable agriculture policies remain at the margins, 
despite recognition of the need to support such interventions (Pretty, 2006). Most 
agricultural sustainability improvements in the last two decades have arisen despite 
existing national and institutional polices, rather than because of them.
Th e IAASTD therefore calls on the international community and national gov-
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ernments to systematically redirect agricultural knowledge, science and technology 
towards sustainable biodiversity-based agriculture and agroecological sciences, while 
addressing the needs of small-scale farmers. (De Schutter, 2008, IAASTD, 2008). 
Such a paradigm shift could better meet the challenges of increasing productivity and 
ensuring sustainability, particularly in the context of climate change. 
Climate change and agriculture 
Th e prognosis for the impacts of climate change on agriculture is sobering (IPCC, 
2007b). While crop productivity is projected to increase slightly at mid- to high-
latitudes for local mean temperature increases of up to 1-3°C depending on the crop, 
it will in contrast decrease beyond that in some regions. More signifi cantly, for many 
developing countries, at lower latitudes, especially in the seasonally dry and tropical 
regions, crop productivity is projected to decrease for even small local temperature 
increases (1-2°C). Th is would increase the risk of hunger. 
On a global scale, the potential for food production is projected to increase with 
increases in local average temperature over a range of 1-3°C, but above this it is pro-
jected to decrease (IPCC, 2007b). Given that warming by the end of the 21st century 
(2090-2099) will be worse than expected and that the best estimates project a rise of 
1.8-4°C, and a likely range of 1.1-6.4°C (IPCC, 2007a), the world is likely to see a 
decline in food production, if we continue business as usual.
For developing countries, including where some of the poorest people live and 
farm, the projections of climate change’s impacts are dire. Agricultural production, 
including access to food, in many African countries and regions, is projected to be 
severely compromised (IPCC, 2007b). Th e area suitable for agriculture, the length of 
growing seasons and yield potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and 
arid areas, are expected to decrease. Th is would further adversely aff ect food security 
and exacerbate malnutrition in Africa. In some countries, yields from rain-fed agri-
culture, which is important for the poorest farmers, could be reduced by up to 50% 
by 2020. 
In East and South-East Asia, crop yields could increase up to 20%, however, yields 
could decrease up to 30% in Central and South Asia, by the mid-21st century (IPCC, 
2007b). Taken together, and considering the infl uence of rapid population growth 
and urbanisation, the risk of hunger is projected to remain very high in several devel-
oping countries of the region. 
In drier areas of Latin America, climate change is expected to lead to salinisation 
and desertifi cation of agricultural land. Productivity of some important crops is pro-
jected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with adverse consequences for 
food security (IPCC, 2007b). 
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While diff erent challenges may emerge for diff erent regions, the general indications 
are that climate change will adversely aff ect agriculture. Moreover, it is the majority of 
the world’s rural poor who live in areas that are resource-poor, highly heterogeneous 
and risk-prone, who will be hardest hit by climate change. For these vulnerable groups 
and subsistence farmers, even minor changes in climate can have disastrous impacts 
on their lives and livelihoods (Altieri and Koohafkan, 2008). With a large number 
of smallholder and subsistence farming households in the dryland tropics, there is 
particular concern over temperature-induced declines in crop yields, and increasing 
frequency and severity of drought, which will lead to the following general impacts: 
increased likelihood of crop failure; increased diseases and mortality of livestock and/
or forced sale of livestock at disadvantageous prices; increase livelihood insecurity, 
resulting in sale of other assets, indebtedness, out-migration and dependency on food 
aid; and a downward spiral on human development indicators such as health and 
education (Easterling et al., 2008).
Th e relationship between climate change and agriculture is however a two-way 
one; climate change in general adversely aff ects agriculture and agriculture contributes 
to climate change in several major ways.





) and nitrous oxide (N
2
O). It accounted for an estimated emis-
sion of 5.1-6.1 GtCO
2
-eq/yr in 2005, about 10-12% of global anthropogenic emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (Smith et al., 2007). Of global anthropogenic emissions 
in 2005, agriculture accounted for about 60% of N
2
O and about 50% of CH
4
. If 
indirect contributions (e.g. land conversion to agriculture, fertilizer production and 
distribution and farm operations) are factored in, some scientists have estimated that 
the contribution of agriculture could be as high as 17-32% of global anthropogenic 
emissions (Bellarby et al., 2008).
In this context of climate change, two questions thus arise: Can agriculture and 
farmers, particularly in developing countries, adapt to the adverse impacts of climate 
change, and are there ways to mitigate the impacts of agriculture on the climate?
Sustainable agriculture has both 
adaptation and mitigation potential
Rethinking agriculture in an era of climate change requires a new agricultural develop-
ment paradigm, one that has to deal with the multiple challenges of climate change, 
ensuring productivity to provide for food security, particularly for the poorest and 
most vulnerable, and ensuring environmental sustainability. Sustainable agriculture, 
which is also variously called ecological agriculture, agroecology, or biological agri-
culture, and includes organic agriculture, could hold the key to this new paradigm. 
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Th e overarching priority is therefore to put the idea of sustainability at the centre of 
agricultural policies rather than at the edge (Pretty, 2006).
What is required is for all agriculture to shift towards more sustainable practices. 
Sustainable agricultural approaches can be in many forms, but generally integrate 
natural, regenerative processes; minimise non-renewable inputs (pesticides and fer-
tilisers); rely on the knowledge and skills of farmers and depend on locally-adapted 
practices to innovate in the face of uncertainty (Pretty 2006, Pretty and Hine, 2001). 
Any comprehensive strategy for addressing climate change must include both 
adaptation and mitigation (IFAD, 2008). For the most vulnerable people, whose 
livelihoods are being impacted now, adaptation is urgent. However, concerted and 
sustained mitigation eff orts are also needed to prevent further deterioration in the 
medium term. Since adaptation becomes costlier and less eff ective as the magnitude 
of climate change increases, mitigation remains essential (Rosegrant et al., 2008).
Climate change adaptation
Adaptation can be both autonomous and planned. Autonomous adaptation is the 
ongoing implementation of existing knowledge and technology in response to the 
changes in climate experienced; planned adaptation in the increase in adaptive capac-
ity by mobilising institutions and policies to establish or strengthen conditions that 
are favourable to eff ective adaptation, and investment in new technologies and infra-
structure (Easterling, 2007).
Autonomous adaptation is highly relevant for smallholder farmers in developing 
countries (IFAD, 2008). Crucially, many of these autonomous adaptation options 
are met by sustainable agriculture practices. By increasing resilience within the agr-
oecosystem, sustainable agriculture increases its ability to continue functioning when 
faced with unexpected events such as climate change (Borron, 2006). 
Practices that enhance biodiversity allow farms to mimic natural ecological proc-
esses, enabling them to better respond to change and reduce risk. Resiliency to climate 
disasters is closely linked to farm biodiversity, so farmers who increase interspecifi c di-
versity via sustainable agriculture suff er less damage compared to conventional farm-
ers planting monocultures (Altieri and Koohafkan, 2008, Borron, 2006, Niggli et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the use of intraspecifi c diversity (diff erent cultivars of the same 
crop) is insurance against future environmental change. 
Sustainable farming practices that preserve soil fertility and maintain or increase 
organic matter can reduce the negative eff ects of drought while increasing productiv-
ity (ITC and FiBL, 2007, Niggli et al., 2008). Water holding capacity of soil is en-
hanced by sustainable agriculture practices that build organic matter, helping farmers 
withstand drought (Altieri and Koohafkan, 2008, Borron, 2006). In addition, water-
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harvesting practices allow farmers to rely on stored water during droughts. Other 
practices such as crop residue retention, mulching, and agroforestry, conserve soil 
moisture and protect crops against microclimate extremes. Organic matter also en-
hances water capture in soils, signifi cantly reducing the risk of fl oods (ITC and FiBL, 
2007, Niggli et al., 2008).
Indigenous and traditional knowledge are a key source of information on adaptive 
capacity, centred on the selective, experimental and resilient capabilities of farmers 
(Altieri and Koohafkan, 2008, Borron, 2006, IAASTD, 2008, ITC and FiBL, 2007, 
Niggli et al., 2008). Many farmers cope with climate change, in diff erent ways: by 
minimising crop failure through increased use of drought-tolerant local varieties, wa-
ter-harvesting, extensive planting, mixed cropping, agroforesty, opportunistic weed-
ing and wild plant gathering. Traditional knowledge, coupled with the right invest-
ments in plant breeding, could yield new varieties with climate adaptation potential.
Development options for adaptation
Many autonomous adaptation measures found within sustainable agriculture are ef-
fective against climate variability, while also contributing to poverty reduction, and 
need to be urgently supported by the development community and integrated into 
development projects. Supporting and facilitating farmers’ knowledge on such meas-
ures needs to be critically enhanced, as they have been by-passed in the past (IAASTD, 
2008). Th is requires creating space for diverse voices and perspectives and a multiplic-
ity of options.
Nonetheless, in the face of accelerating climate change, a longer-term planned 
approach for adaptation is also necessary (IFAD, 2008) and requires integration into 
development projects, policies and strategies. Th ere is urgent need to increase adap-
tive capacity and enhance resilience through purposeful biodiversity management; 
options include irrigation management, water harvesting and conservation technolo-
gies, diversifi cation of agriculture systems, protection of agrobiodiversity, and screen-
ing and breeding germplasm for climate change tolerance (IAASTD, 2008).
Th ese eff orts need to be supported by appropriate policy and decision-making op-
tions, integrated spatial planning, and early warning and communication infrastruc-
ture that support the generation and dissemination of adaptation knowledge, tech-
nologies and practices (IAASTD, 2008). In terms of technical options, the planned 
approach has to include many forms of land use and land use change, new cultivation 
practices, new seed varieties, etc. (IFAD, 2008). Insurance, safety nets and cash trans-
fers to reduce vulnerability to shocks are also part of the solution. 
Development cooperation will have to address the following issues: enhancing 
the capacities of smallholder farmers and their organisations beyond autonomous 
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adaptation, engaging in longer-term planned adaptations to eff ectively address the 
uncertainties of climate change, and options to make planned adaptation a part of a 
longer-term development process (IFAD, 2008).
Adaptation policies in many cases are extensions of development policies that 
seek to eradicate poverty and food insecurity; thus synergies should be maximised 
(Rosegrant et al., 2008). General policies that should be supported include promoting 
growth and diversifi cation; strengthening institutions; protecting natural resources; 
investing in research and development, education and health; creating markets in wa-
ter and environmental services; improving the international trade system; enhancing 
resilience to disasters and improving disaster management; and policies promoting 
risk-sharing.
Climate change mitigation
Agriculture has the potential to change from being one of the largest greenhouse gas 
emitters to a much smaller emitter and even a net carbon sink, while off ering options 
for mitigation by reducing emissions and by sequestering CO
2
 from the atmosphere 
in the soil. Th e solutions call for a shift to more sustainable farming practices that 
build up carbon in the soil and use less chemical fertilizers and pesticides (Bellarby et 
al. 2008, ITC and FiBL, 2007, Ziesemer, 2007). 
Th ere are a variety of sustainable farming practices that can reduce agriculture’s 
contribution to climate change. Th ese include crop rotations and improved farm-
ing system design, improved cropland management, improved nutrient and manure 
management, improved grazing-land and livestock management, maintaining fertile 
soils and restoration of degraded land, improved water and rice management, ferti-
lizer management, land use change and agroforestry (Bellarby et al., 2008; Niggli et 
al., 2008, Smith et al., 2007). 
Niggli et al. (2008) estimate that a conversion to organic agriculture would con-
siderably enhance the sequestration of CO
2
 through the use of sustainable techniques 
that build up soil organic matter, as well as diminish N
2
O emissions by two-thirds 
due to no external mineral nitrogen input and more effi  cient nitrogen use. Organic 
systems have been found to sequester more CO
2
 than conventional farms, while tech-
niques that reduce soil erosion convert carbon losses into gains (Bellarby et al., 2008, 
ITC and FiBL, 2007, Niggli et al., 2008). Organic agriculture is also self-suffi  cient in 
nitrogen due to recycling of manures from livestock and crop residues via compost-
ing, as well as planting of leguminous crops (ITC and FiBL, 2007). 
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Development options for mitigation
Some mitigation measures could provide new opportunities for smallholder farmers, 
pastoralists and forest dwellers in developing countries, through their roles as seques-
ters of carbon, through changes made in land use and cultivation practices to reduce 
emissions, and as small-scale producers of clean energy (IFAD, 2008). Of particular 
relevance to smallholder farmers is the potential of agroforestry in mitigation. 
Th ere is signifi cant room for promoting pro-poor mitigation measures through in-
creasing the profi tability of sustainable agriculture practices (Rosegrant et al., 2008). 
Incentives for smallholder farmers from developing countries to adopt mitigation 
practices need to be enhanced, including payment for environmental services (IFAD, 
2008; Rosegrant et al., 2008). At the same time, because some options may not have 
favourable outcomes for smallholder farmers, these need to be critically assessed, and 
mechanisms to buff er farmers against negative impacts are essential. 
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile exploring the potential contribution of ag-
riculture in developing countries to mitigation and mobilising resources from the 
carbon market for investment in pro-poor and sustainable agricultural development 
(Rosegrant et al., 2008).
The productivity question
A key question that is often asked about sustainable agriculture, including organic 
agriculture, is whether it can be productive enough to meet the world’s food needs. 
However, evidence shows that in general, yields from sustainable agriculture can be 
broadly comparable to conventional yields in developed countries. In developing 
countries, sustainable agriculture practices can greatly increase productivity, particu-
larly if the existing system is low-input, which is largely the case for poor subsistence 
farmers. 
Evidence from global modelling
A recent study examined a global dataset of 293 examples and estimated the average 
yield ratio of diff erent food categories for the developed and developing world  (Badg-
ley et al., 2007). On average, in developed countries, organic systems produce 92% 
of the yield produced by conventional agriculture. In developing countries, however, 
organic systems produce 80% more than conventional farms. Organic methods were 
also found to hypothetically produce enough food on a global per capita basis to 
sustain the current human population, and potentially an even larger population, 
without putting more farmland into production. 
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Evidence from reviews of sustainable agriculture projects
In a review of 286 projects in 57 countries, farmers increased agricultural productivity 
by an average of 79%, by adopting “resource-conserving” agriculture (Pretty, 2006, 
Pretty et al., 2006). A variety of sustainable technologies and practices were used, in-
cluding integrated pest management, integrated nutrient management, conservation 
tillage, agroforestry, water harvesting in dryland areas, and livestock and aquaculture 
integration. 
Th e above study built on earlier research, which found that for 89 projects for 
which there was reliable yield data, farmers had, by adopting sustainable agriculture 
practices, achieved substantial increases in per hectare food production: the yield in-
creases were 50-100% for rain-fed crops, though considerably greater in a number 
of cases, and 5-10% for irrigated crops (Pretty and Hine, 2001). Disaggregated data 
show that average food production per household rose by 1.7 tonnes per year (up 
73%) for 4.42 million small farmers growing cereals and roots. Th ere was an increase 
in food production of 17 tonnes per year (up 150%) for 146,000 farmers cultivating 
roots. Meanwhile, total production rose by 150 tonnes per household (up by 46%) 
for the larger farms in Latin America.
Th e database was reanalysed to produce a summary of the impacts of organic and 
near-organic projects on agricultural productivity in Africa (Hine and Pretty, 2008). 
Th e average crop yield increase was even higher for these projects than the global aver-
age: 116% increase for all African projects and 128% increase for the projects in East 
Africa. Moreover, all case studies that focused on food production where data have 
been reported showed increases in per hectare productivity of food crops, challenging 
the myth that organic agriculture cannot increase agricultural productivity. 
Evidence from specifi c sustainable agriculture interventions
Data from the Tigray Region in Ethiopia, where a sustainable agriculture project has 
been implemented since 1996, demonstrate the benefi ts of compost on productivity. 
Data from 2002-2004 showed that, on average, composted fi elds gave higher yields, 
sometimes double, than those treated with chemical fertilizers (Araya and Edwards, 
2006). Statistical analysis on a larger data set over 2000-2006 inclusive confi rms that 
compost use increased yields (generally doubled) in all the crops analysed, compared 
to crops grown without inputs (Edwards et al., 2008). Compost also gave higher 
yields than chemical fertilizer for all but two crops, where the yields from both inter-
ventions were similar. 
Th ere are many other examples of increased yields following the application of 
sustainable approaches, with concrete benefi ts for smallholder and subsistence farm-
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ers and their households (Hine and Pretty, 2008, Parrott and Marsden, 2002, Pretty 
and Hine, 2001, Scialabba and Hattam, 2002). Benefi ts include a shift from cereal 
defi cit to producing annual surpluses; reduction in chemical use with ensuing health 
and environmental benefi ts; soil fertility improvement and conservation of traditional 
seeds; diversifi cation of food sources; and increased incomes.
Conclusion
Rethinking agricultural development in an era of climate change entails investing more 
resources, research and training into, providing appropriate policy support to, and 
implementing national, regional and international action plans on, sustainable agricul-
ture. Doing so will not only be benefi cial in terms of climate adaptation and mitiga-
tion, but will also be a paradigm shift towards increasing productivity while ensuring 
sustainability and meeting smallholder farmers’ food security needs (IAASTD, 2008). 
Maximising the synergies between adaptation and mitigation means that these 
strategies should be developed simultaneously (Rosegrant et al., 2008). Financial sup-
port for smallholder farmers for implementing adaptation and mitigation options 
has been lacking, and access to many existing funds by smallholder farmers has been 
limited (IFAD, 2008). In particular:
• Th ere should be more research and action on adaptation measures in agriculture, 
especially in developing countries in order to assist farmers there to reduce the 
adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture.
• Action plans for mitigation measures for agriculture should be urgently researched 
and implemented.
• Financing assistance for adaptation and mitigation measures in the agriculture 
sector in developing countries should be prioritized.
• Arrangements should be made for the sharing of experiences and the transfer of 
good practices in agriculture that can constitute mitigation and adaptation. 
• Given the many advantages of organic farming and sustainable agriculture, in 
terms of climate change as well as social equity and farmers’ livelihoods, there 
should be a much more signifi cant share of research, personnel, investment, fi -
nancing and overall support from governments and international agencies that 
should be channeled towards sustainable agriculture. Promotion of sustainable 
agriculture can lead to a superior model of agriculture from the environmental 
and climate change perspective, as high-chemical and water-intensive agriculture 
is phased out, while more natural farming methods are phased in, with research 
and training programmes also promoting better production performances in sus-
tainable agriculture (p.9-10, Khor, 2008).
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Priorities for development agencies and governments moving towards sustainable 
agriculture include investing in research and extension for agricultural sustainability, 
as these are essential for adapting and transferring technologies; technical assistance 
and capacity-building for relevant ministries; land reform to encourage investment in 
asset building; agricultural development programmes that build rural social capital, 
particularly for women to access credit; supporting small-scale agribusinesses in rural 
areas; supporting urban agriculture; working with farmers’ and rural people’s organi-
sations; and establishing appropriate economic and regulatory incentives to encour-
age transitions towards sustainability (Pretty 2006). Th ese priorities can be addressed 
by, among other things, developing partnerships and using participatory approaches; 
integrating the concept of agricultural sustainability into poverty reduction strategies 
and policies; and increasing support for research that addresses the needs of the rural 
poor.
With appropriate focus by the development community on sustainable agriculture 
as providing adaptation, mitigation and increased productivity options, a ‘win-win-
win’ scenario for agricultural development is possible.
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Forests, Development Cooperation, 
and Climate Change – Is There 
Room for Win-Win Situations? 
Markku Kanninen
Why forests matter
It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the world’s forests. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, 1.6 billion people rely heavily on forests for their livelihoods. 
Over 2 billion people, a third of the world’s population, use biomass fuels, mainly 
fi rewood, to cook and heat their homes, and billions rely on traditional medicines 
harvested from the forests. In some 60 developing countries, hunting and fi shing on 
forested land supplies over a fi fth of protein requirements (World Bank, 2004; Mery 
et al., 2005).
Forests have an important role to play in alleviating poverty. In many developing 
countries, they play a vital role as safety nets, helping rural people avoid poverty, or 
helping those who are poor to mitigate it. In addition, forests have great potential to 
increase rural incomes and thus lift people out of poverty (Sunderlin et al., 2005). 
Forests, both natural and planted, make an important contribution to national and 
local economies. In 2003, the international trade in sawn wood, pulp, paper and 
boards amounted to almost USD150 billion, or just over 2% of world trade, with the 
developed world accounting for two-thirds of production and consumption. In many 
developing countries, forest-based enterprises provide at least a third of all rural non-
farm employment and generate income through the sale of wood products, enriching 
private companies, governments and rural communities. Th e value of the trade in 
non-wood forest products, for example, pharmaceutical plants, mushrooms, nuts, 
syrups and cork, has been estimated at USD11 billion (Mery et al., 2005). Th ere is no 
doubt that many more useful forest and tree products will be discovered in the future.
Th e total forest area of the world is just under 4 billion ha, which represents nearly 
30% of the planet Earth’s total area. Approximately 56 % of the world forests are 
located in tropical and subtropical areas. Th e forest cover in the world is unevenly 
distributed; only seven countries possess about 60%, 25 countries about 82% and 
about 170 countries share the remaining 18% of the world’s forest cover. Th ere are 51 
countries with less than 10% of their land covered with forest; they are recognised as 
“low forest cover countries” (FAO, 2007). 
Annual fi nancial fl ows (ODA and investments) to the forest sector in developing 
countries are estimated at the level of 12 to 24 billion USD per year. Th e annual for-
135C H A N G I N G  T H E  F O C U S :  S O M E  K E Y  A R E A S
est sector ODA is about 0.5 to 1.7 billion USD, representing about 0.5% to 1.5% of 
the total annual ODA (El Lakany et al., 2007). Plantation forestry dominates both 
public and private sector funding, thus refl ecting the increasing importance of tropi-
cal fast-growing plantations in the industrial wood production. In the future, climate 
change-related funding, both for mitigation and adaptation is expected to match, or 
even surpass, the “traditional” forest sector fi nancial fl ows. Are we ready for that? Is 
there room for win-win situations?
Ecosystem services: Linking human well-being and forests
Forests provide a range of ecosystem services fundamental to the planet’s wellbeing 
and environmental sustainability. For example, they play an important role in stabilis-
ing soils and protecting land from erosion by wind and water, and they help to main-
tain a steady supply of clean freshwater. Trees and forest soils also lock up atmospheric 
carbon, and forests thus have an important role to play in reducing the concentrations 
of one of the main greenhouse gases which cause global warming. Forests also support 
much of the world’s biodiversity. Although tropical forests cover less than 15% of the 
planet’s land surface, they contain over half the world’s terrestrial species (Mery et al., 
2005). Tropical forests are important providers of ecosystem services at various scales, 
from local (e.g. timber and non-timber forest products, pollination services and scenic 
beauty) to regional (e.g. hydrological services) and global (e.g. carbon sequestration).
Th e Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) defi nes ecosystem services as the 
benefi ts that people obtain from ecosystems. We can separate three types of forest eco-
system services that directly contribute to human wellbeing: (1) provisioning services 
(also called ecosystem goods), such as wood, food and fuel wood; (2) regulating serv-
ices, such as regulation of water, climate or erosion; and (3) cultural services, such as 
recreational, spiritual or religious services (Figure 1). In addition to these three types, 
supporting services represent a fourth type of indirect service to humans, Th is includes 
services that are necessary for the production of other services: for example, primary 
production, nutrient cycling and soil formation (see Figure 1).
However, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other poverty allevia-
tion policies have overlooked forest ecosystem services. In national development pro-
grammes, the links between the forest ecosystem services and the alleviation of poverty 
should be better emphasised and articulated (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). Th ere is 
also an urgent need to include ecosystem services into planning and prioritisation for 
meeting diff erent conservation objectives focusing on human wellbeing (Egoh et al., 
2007). In these eff orts, all institutional levels will be aff ected by the loss of ecosystem 
services, from households through local communities and local fi rms, to national or 
international organisations (Hein et al., 2006).
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According to a recent FAO’s Global Forest Resource Assessment, the global forest 
loss is estimated to be about 13 million hectares annually, amounting to a net loss 
of 7.3 million hectares per year for the period 2000-2005 (FAO, 2007). Th e highest 
rates of deforestation occurred in South America, with 4.3 million hectares per year, 
followed by Africa with 4 million hectares per year. Forest degradation is another 
result of human action, which is changing the structure, composition and integrity 
of forest ecosystems, which could further seriously jeopardise the production of eco-
system services and the social role of forests. Th e expansion of desertifi cation in some 
arid and semi-arid conditions is a serious threat to societies and to sustainable use of 
forest resources.
Climate change will most likely exacerbate the pressures on forests and their eco-
systems services in the future (Fischlin et al., 2007). Projected climatic changes will 
have a wide range of impacts on species and ecosystems, and thus may result in a 
drastic decline in the capacity of forests to produce ecosystem services. Th e loss of 
ecosystem services will reduce human wellbeing at all levels and on all scales (Locatelli 
et al., 2008).
Figure 1. Forest ecosystem services (left) and their link to human wellbeing (right) 
(original in Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, adapted from Locatelli et al., 2008).
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Forests for climate change mitigation
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities are a major source of 
carbon emissions and active contributors to global warming. Th e Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that 1.6 billion tons of carbon (6 billion 
tons of CO
2
) is released annually due to land-use change, of which the major part is 
traced to tropical deforestation (Penman et al., 2007). Th is represents about onefi fth 
of current global carbon emissions, which is more than originates from the fossil 
fuel-intensive global transport sector. Finding ways to reduce carbon emissions from 
land-use change will be one of the key elements in the future negotiations on the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol which expires in 2012. Th is could have large-scale 
implications on forestry sector, land-use, and on rural livelihoods in many developing 
countries (Kanninen et al., 2007).
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is rec-
ognised as one of the major national/international actions on mitigation of climate 
change. REDD off ers new opportunities to promote sustainable forest management 
as an integral component of sustainable development. Whatever form the interna-
tional REDD mechanism takes in the post 2012 climate regime, signifi cant fi nancial 
resources could fl ow from developed world to developing countries to alter the cur-
rent economic landscape that promotes liquidation of forest assets. An international 
REDD mechanism, if properly implemented, could promote economic development 
in rural areas based on protection and sustainable use of forests.
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is based 
on the idea of rewarding individuals, communities, projects, and countries for actions 
that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from forests. In many developing coun-
tries, REDD has the potential to deliver large cuts in emissions at a low cost within a 
short time frame and, at the same time, contribute to reducing poverty and sustain-
able development (Angelsen, 2008).
To complement actions to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, 
there is a need to further reinforce measures aimed at increasing terrestrial carbon 
pools by promoting aff orestation and reforestation (through Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) or other mechanisms), improved forest management, cropland 
management, agroforestry, grazing land management, and re-vegetation. Promoting 
tree and forest planting can be a win-win option in many cases, by simultaneously 
producing ecosystem goods and services for local livelihoods and industries on one 
hand, and carbon sequestration services for climate change mitigation on the other. 
Th ere are also possible synergies between carbon sequestration and adaptation meas-
ures, e.g., through aff orestation of vulnerable areas, watersheds, and rehabilitation of 
degraded lands. 
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Th e Stern Review (2006) emphasises the prevention of further deforestation as 
one of four “key elements” of future international climate frameworks. Th e argument 
for inclusion of forests in a future climate agreement is twofold: forests are the larg-
est emitter not included in the current Kyoto agreement, and the costs of reduced 
emissions compare favourably with most other sectors. At this stage it is impossible 
to estimate the cost or volume of fi nancial fl ows needed for the implementation of a 
global REDD regime. Based on modelling, the current estimates indicate that halv-
ing deforestation rates by 2050 would require an investment of about 7 to 30 billion 
USD per year (Lubowski, 2008). Th is is about onethird of the volume of current 
global carbon markets in 2008 (New Carbon Finance web site) or about the same 
order of magnitude as the annual fi nancial fl ows (ODA & investments) to the forestry 
sector in developing countries (El Lakany et al., 2007). For global carbon markets, 
REDD may not become a major player any time soon, but for the forestry sector in 
developing countries this can represent a major increase in forest funding.
REDD is not only a question of volume of investment, it is also a question of tim-
ing. Early emission reductions through REDD have particular value as a global in-
surance policy for maintaining climatic options in light of scientifi c uncertainty, and 
allowing time for other solutions. Because tropical forests are disappearing, REDD is 
also a cost-eff ective opportunity for reducing emissions that is available now and for a 
limited time only (Angelsen, 2008).
However, the implementation of REDD will not be an easy task. For decades, 
many donors worldwide have invested billions of dollars in conservation and devel-
opment eff orts to save tropical rainforests, with disappointing results. Why would 
conservation work now? As research by the Center for International Forest Research 
(CIFOR) and others has shown, deforestation normally occurs not primarily to har-
vest the trees or manage forests, but from causes lying outside the forest sector, many 
of them related to overall development and globalised economies. For instance, the 
Amazon forest is being cleared mainly due to agricultural expansion of cattle and 
soybean (Wertz-Kanounnikoff  et al., 2008). In Asia, most of the tropical forests are 
under pressure of over-exploitation and conversion to plantations of oil palm and 
fast-growing timber for the pulp industry (Kanninen et al., 2007; Eliash, 2008). Un-
derstanding these external causes is crucial to identifying appropriate incentives to 
curb deforestation. Financing REDD may require signifi cant international funding 
to target these underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, e.g. those 
described above (Kanninen et al., 2007).
Th e success of REDD in reducing emissions will depend on tackling profound 
market and governance failures. REDD policies will have to strengthen the institu-
tional alignment of economic actors and the public interest, a challenge made more 
diffi  cult by the complexity of the issues behind deforestation and the fact that many 
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of the causes are external to the forestry sector.  Policies need to be tailored to address 
diverse local situations while removing subsidies that encourage forest conversion, 
ending unsustainable extraction, devolving rights and responsibilities to local forest 
users, and promoting the other benefi ts and ecosystem services of forests besides car-
bon storage and sequestration (Kanninen et al., 2007).
Forests for adaptation to climate change
Many sectors that are vulnerable to climate change, including agriculture, forestry, 
energy, housing, transport, etc., benefi t from diverse ecosystem services provided by 
forests (see Fig. 1). Th is is because the vulnerability of these sectors depends directly or 
indirectly on the vulnerability of ecosystems surrounding them. Th e major challenge 
is to reduce the vulnerability of these climate sensitive sectors in all future develop-
ment activities. Th is will require developing and implementing “best practice” guide-
lines for developing appropriate strategies. In practice, this requires a major paradigm 
shift in the formulation of national development policies towards: (a) mainstreaming 
and integrating climate concerns into national development planning and sectoral 
policies, and (b) (re)directing investments in ways that increase adaptive capacity and 
reduce the vulnerability of society to climate change. For instance, investments in 
reforestation, aff orestation, and forest management should consider better the role 
of forests in watersheds and in providing clean water for human consumption and 
agriculture. Considerable international funding through the Adaptation Fund under 
the UNFCCC or other channels is required to assist the least developed and most 
vulnerable countries in this process.
Mainstreaming forests into national adaptation policies and programmes is a chal-
lenge that needs attention. Currently, the role of forests for adaptation, and the im-
portance of adaptation of forests to reduce vulnerability of the society, have not been 
well refl ected in the national communications and action plans for adaptation (NA-
PAs) prepared under the UNFCCC (Locatelli et al., 2008). Forests play a secondary 
role (if any at all) in adaptation policies (Kalame et al., 2008), despite their impor-
tance for livelihoods and their interlinkages with other sectors. In most cases, forests 
and forestry are not a priority in the NAPAs. Overcoming these challenges is not an 
easy task. It requires long-term commitment in demonstrating the benefi ts of forests 
for adaptation of the societies. And that is not enough: in addition it requires that so-
cieties take climate adaptation seriously enough to modify their national development 
plans and programs accordingly.
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In search of win-win situations
Finally, some 15 years after signing the UNFCCC in Rio de Janeiro, policy mak-
ers around the world have recognised the need to integrate thinking about climate 
change into all areas of development and public policy making. Although most of 
the eff orts have been directed towards mitigation (reducing emissions), the need to 
develop polices and funding mechanisms for adaptation to a changing climate is now 
widely acknowledged, even in the UNFCCC process. 
It is also becoming evident that adaptation and mitigation are interlinked in many 
ways. For instance, any substantial new mitigation commitments in the post-2012 
climate regime (e.g. through REDD) may be feasible only if they are accompanied 
by stronger support for adaptation of forests to climate change, e.g. through control 
of pests and diseases (Kurtz et al., 2008) and forest fi res (Guariguata, 2008; Locatelli 
et al., 2008). Th ese are examples of synergies and win-win situations that have to be 
pursued in the future.
Th e role of forest in the global carbon balance is important, as onefi fth of global 
carbon emissions originate from forest destruction and forest conversion. In the cur-
rent situation of urgency in terms of curbing climate change, we cannot aff ord to 
leave some 20% of the problem outside our potential solutions. At the same time, 
increased investments into protection and sustainable management of forests (e.g. 
through REDD, CDM and similar mechanism) off er an excellent opportunity to fos-
ter economic development in rural areas, based on sustainable use of forest resources. 
In addition to their role in climate mitigation, forests play an important role in ad-
aptation to climate change through provision of ecosystem services, such as energy 
and clean water, that are of paramount importance for the livelihoods of millions of 
people in developing countries, both in rural and in urban areas.
Successful implementation of these measures will often require strengthening the 
stake of local communities in protecting their forest assets and allowing them to use 
and benefi t from these resources. Governments will need to create new institutions 
and adopt a new paradigm to handle these challenges, and to include climate change 
mitigation and adaptation as an integral part of their development plans and policies. 
Investors and development agencies need to adjust their portfolios to match the con-
stantly increasing challenges that climate change creates for sustainable development.
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Linking Development, 
Peacebuilding and Climate Change
Dan Smith and Karina Kristiansen
A double-headed problem
In April 2007, the United Kingdom used its presidency of the UN Security Council 
to convene a special debate on climate change, security and confl ict. Th ough this put 
the links between climate and peace issues on the international agenda, the linkage 
was not universally understood. Th ere was a mixed reaction, including criticism of the 
UK for mixing separate issues together. In the relatively short period since then, the 
confl ict aspect of the climate change problem has gained an increasing foothold in the 
international debate. Th at is important, but increased awareness alone, of course, is 
not enough. Th e international debate has already started to include the need to design 
a policy response to the climate-confl ict linkage.
Th is article explores the double-headed problem of climate change and confl ict, 
and argues that there is a unifi ed solution. Th e line of argument presented here was 
fi rst laid out in International Alert’s 2007 report A Climate of Confl ict.1 We will not 
explore the science of global warming and climate change but, rather, take the Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change as our 
starting point.2 Th e AR4 refl ected a broad scientifi c consensus that climate change 
is already unfolding as a result of global warming, itself the consequence of human 
activity, and that, without remedial action, the likely consequences are more serious 
than had previously been projected. 
Our argument is that the consequences of climate change will interact with other 
aspects of the social, economic and political realities of aff ected countries and in some 
cases heighten the risk of political instability and violent confl ict. Th is eff ect will 
be especially marked in countries that face problems such as poor governance, state 
fragility, recent armed confl ict, and poverty. For these countries, climate change may 
simply be a pressure that is too much for them to take, coming on top of all the other 
pressures they face.
Even though the world has seen a signifi cant decline in the number of armed con-
fl icts over the past two decades, the decline has now plateaued out and new, severe 
global stress factors have arisen.3 Th e medium-term impact of the global economic 
crisis and the longer-term impact of climate change threaten to aff ect the room to 
manoeuvre allowed the UN, as well as the enhanced focus on the importance of sus-
tainable development for long-term peace that followed the end of the Cold War. In 
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short, after a period of 15 years of relative improvement, we are now entering a period 
of enormous risk for violent confl ict worldwide.
Th is article argues that the best response to the double-headed problem of climate 
change and armed confl ict is to combine peacebuilding and adaptation to climate 
change. Th e capacities that communities need, and the processes that are relevant in 
order to adapt to the unavoidable consequences of climate change, are very similar to 
the capacities that communities need in order to reduce the risk of violent confl ict. 
Th is approach off ers a unifi ed solution to the linked, double-headed problem of cli-
mate change and violent confl ict.
Climate change and insecurity
On the issue of linkages between climate change and insecurity, some confusion has 
been caused by statements that have simplifi ed a complex question – or appear to have, 
or have been interpreted as if they did. Th ere is no simple causal link that allows us to say 
of any armed confl ict that it was caused by a single problem. Armed confl icts, insecurity 
and political instability arise from a variety of interacting factors, some of which lay the 
basic foundations for confl ict, some of which drive the political motivations of the key 
actors, and some of which shape the triggers that detonate an explosion of violence. 
Th us, to understand the linkages between climate change and armed confl ict, we must 
look at how the consequences of the consequences of climate change play out in relation to 
the rest of the social, economic and political reality of aff ected countries. 
A productive way to understand the issue and lay the groundwork for preparing 
a policy response is in terms of risk management. Just as it is impossible to know 
whether any given hurricane or cyclone was caused by climate change, so it is impos-
sible to identify a specifi c number of confl icts that will ensue from climate change if 
corrective action is not taken. However, just as a pattern of changing incidence and 
intensity of typhoons is a predictable (and already unfolding) consequence of global 
warming, so a heightened risk of confl ict and instability is a predictable consequence 
of climate change.
Th e factors that generate risk and shape its nature, scale and intensity depend on 
local conditions. Climate models show these will be extremely diverse but there are 
some key themes that emerge, of which the most important is to do with water. We 
depend on water as a basic condition for life as well as for agriculture and industry, so 
changes in its availability and quality can have a fundamental impact on all societies, 
whatever their level of development. Th e impact is likely to be especially important in 
relation to agriculture and health. Negative developments in these fi elds have impor-
tant but diverse links to confl ict risk. 
Experience shows that needs caused by water and temperature changes, such as 
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food insecurity, often generate clashes with government forces or with other commu-
nities that also face increased livelihood pressure. In the Philippines, for example, the 
rice crisis of increased price and decreasing supply, exacerbated by changed weather 
patterns, is not only leading to malnutrition, but also increases the risk of continued 
and potentially more widespread confl ict.4 Th ere are less direct but no less severe 
consequences if projected changes in disease patterns and prevalence are borne out by 
events, with consequent epidemics. Health systems will come under unprecedented 
stress, which will be made worse if there are food shortages because of problems in 
agriculture, and if people are injured or made homeless by natural disasters. An almost 
inevitable result is reduced economic output, which has been defi nitively shown to be 
closely correlated with increased risk of violent confl ict.5 
All these consequences interact and create severe challenges for development, peace 
and security. What is going on here is that in many areas of the world, the human 
habitat is becoming less habitable. What we must now look at is the social eff ects of 
this. Th ese – the consequences of consequences –  can be illustrated by looking at some of 
the most signifi cant transmission mechanisms that link developments in the natural 
world to the arena of politics and potentially of confl ict. We look here at three dimen-
sions of insecurity: livelihood, food and demographics, and their relationship to the 
quality of governance.
Livelihood insecurity: Poorer countries tend to be agrarian states and will be very 
susceptible to falling crop yields, extreme weather conditions and migratory move-
ments. Th ey have no insurance, either private or state-based, against the eff ects of 
crop failure, and the impacts of climate change will therefore hinder economic devel-
opment, which in turn will hinder the ability to adapt to climate change – another 
negative cycle. Declining coff ee production in Uganda is an example of the vulner-
ability of developing countries whose economies often rely heavily on one or two agri-
cultural products. A temperature increase of 2 degrees would have a dramatic eff ect on 
the coff ee production upon which some fi ve million people rely directly or indirectly.6 
Th e total area suitable for growing Robusta coff ee would be dramatically reduced, 
and only higher altitude areas would remain. Developments such as these will lead to 
widespread diffi  culties in people securing their basic livelihoods.
Food insecurity: Uncertainty and shortages in food supply are the results of losing ara-
ble land to desert and of shorter growing seasons. Th ese losses may be signifi cant for one 
country even if they occur elsewhere, because of dependence on food imports, not least 
rice, in many developing countries. Th ere are also indirect causes of food insecurity, such 
as the loss of roads through fl ooding and the loss of rivers through persistent drought. 
Th ese changes in the food supply chain will interact with consequences of the inter-
national economic downturn, following in the wake of the economic disruption and 
widespread hardship caused by rising oil costs and food prices in the fi rst half of 2008. 
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Demographic insecurity: Loss of food security and livelihood security, combined with 
uncertainty about the physical viability of continuing to dwell in low-lying coastal 
regions and other areas harmed by extreme weather events, will produce pressures to 
migrate. Some of these pressures may be strengthened by confl ict erupting between 
diff erent groups over access to diminishing resources.7 Th e arrival of migrants does not 
need to be a destabilising factor as it often brings economic and social benefi ts to the 
communities that receive immigrants. However, problems do arise, particularly when 
newcomers are seen as an unwanted burden in areas that are only just viable. Th is is 
especially important because most migration related to climate changes will be within 
and between poor countries, not a movement from poor to rich countries. Whether 
migrants go largely to cities or rural areas, there is a risk that the response of social and 
political leaders could generate confl ict. Moreover, when urban migration is consid-
ered, it is important to note that some of the world’s mega-cities are on the coast and 
are themselves at risk over time from rising sea levels. Th e combination of population 
growth, inward migration, declining water supply, other basic shortages and rising sea 
levels in a city of 15-20 million or more inhabitants adds up to a challenge that even the 
most eff ective city and national governments would fi nd hard to cope with.
Quality of governance: Governance is one of the key links in the chain of conse-
quences of consequences. Climate change will put increased pressure on basic state func-
tions such as the provision of basic health care and the guarantee of basic food secu-
rity. Where governance is eff ective, these challenges are important but manageable. In 
the winter of 2007 the North Sea experienced its highest surge ever, without the low 
lying areas of the UK’s east coast and the Netherlands being in any way badly aff ect-
ed.8 Th e same natural event in the seas off  poor and weakly governed states could kill 
hundreds. Failed states, fragile states and states in transition, where the institutions to 
provide for the basic needs of their citizens either do not exist or can barely function, 
will not only fi nd it next to impossible to respond to the challenges of nature: they are 
also likely to be unable to respond to the social pressures and political instability that 
will be unleashed by the consequences of the consequences of climate change.
It is on this that the double-headed challenge of climate change confl ict is found-
ed. Access to livelihood and food are key determinants of human security. In their 
absence, where government cannot make up the defi ciencies, confl ict and migration 
are almost inevitable consequences. Th e key challenge, then, is to identify and manage 
the combined and interacting risks of violent confl ict and climate change.
Adaptation
Th e importance of the quality of governance in the chain of consequences brings us 
to the issue of adaptation. Th is is the key to determining how these issues will play 
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out. Yet the issue of adaptation has been the poor cousin of mitigation in the climate 
change debate for many years. It is fortunate that this has begun to change. 
Mitigation of global warming and climate change by reducing carbon emissions 
over the long term is unarguably crucial. Ambitious targets must be set and met. But 
however eff ective the international eff ort at mitigation is, the next two to three decades 
will see the consequences of climate change unfold because of past carbon emissions.9 
During these next two decades, there will be serious negative consequences which 
will have a particularly severe impact on poorer countries. Th e result will be to hold 
up development and risk widespread social upheavals, political instability and violent 
confl ict. To meet and manage these risks, adaptation to climate change is essential.
Discussion of adaptation tends to emphasise humanitarian disasters and sudden 
shocks, such as cyclone Nargis which hit Burma in May 2008, killing more than 
140,000 and leaving an estimated 2.4 million homeless.10 Th is emphasis on sudden 
shocks has been at the expense of recognising the equally important risk of slow onset 
changes. Such changes occur year to year and are, individually, almost imperceptible. 
Th ey might even seem like random occurrences, yet taken over time they add up to, 
for example, a ten-year drought in Australia that has reduced the country’s rice output 
by 98%.11 A twenty-year drought played a major role in intensifying grievances in 
Darfur (though this alone does not explain the confl ict).12
At the same time, adaptation is usually discussed in terms of preparing fl ood de-
fences, changing crop cycles and crop selection in the face of a dryer climate, building 
houses diff erently, and so on. In other words, the emphasis has been largely technical. 
However, in order for people in local communities to understand the need to change 
their crops, or their way of building their homes, or to put in the work to build fl ood 
defences, they need to participate in the process of adaptation. Th ey need to be in-
volved in discussing issues, working out plans and implementing changes. In other 
words, adaptation is a social process. It is easiest where there is good governance, hard-
est where there is an eff ective absence of governance. 
Some of the processes of adaptation that climate change will necessitate will seem 
to have little to do directly with climate change. If there is large scale migration as 
most observers think probable, the arrival of migrants will likely put stress on places 
where the people living there are already under considerable pressure. Migration does 
not necessarily or always produce confl ict, but it often does; and there always seem to 
be politicians available to exploit and exacerbate the initial tensions and problems. To 
avoid potentially dangerous confl icts, societies will need to adapt so they can accept 
the newcomers peacefully. Adaptation to climate change will almost certainly include 
other examples of social change.
Vulnerability to climate change is usually treated as the product of three factors: 
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity.13 Th e fi rst factor is the degree of expo-
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sure to physical eff ects of climate change such as an increased frequency of extreme 
weather. Secondly, vulnerability is defi ned by the sensitivity of the location: heavy 
rainfall is more of a problem in low lying areas, for example, while gale force winds 
may pose a greater threat in hilly regions. Th e third factor is adaptive capacity. Where 
there is exposure and sensitivity to the eff ects of climate change, low adaptive capac-
ity equates to high vulnerability. Examples of adaptive capacity include those cases in 
which community authorities have built fl ood defences and are ready with quick and 
safe evacuation plans, while the national government has prepared to care for those 
who are displaced and can swiftly allocate resources for repair and rebuilding when 
the fl oods recede. 
If we look at social adaptation to migration, we could use the same terminology. 
Vulnerability is established by exposure to physical eff ects. Sensitivity is determined 
by the nature of the social consequences. Adaptive capacity determines whether the 
society will thrive despite the challenges. Examples of adaptive capacity might be 
city governments working with research centres to forecast the scale of the challenge, 
working with NGOs to look after arriving immigrants and provide them with short-
term accommodation, education and basic services, and working with the building 
industry to construct decent housing and improve the physical infrastructure, draw-
ing on investment resources from international donors.
It is often argued that human society has long experience of adapting to changes 
in climate. Th is is true but, as the IPCC’s AR4 noted in 2007, the changes that are 
unfolding due to climate change are without precedent in their speed and intensity.14 
At the same time as the challenge is becoming increasingly greater, the resilience that 
traditional societies could fall back on has diminished under the impact of develop-
ment. Farming communities in many African countries are half in and half out of 
the modern market system; their resilience against the forces of economic change and 
political pressure is already very limited. Accordingly, a focused eff ort is required to 
engage local communities as well as provincial and national authorities in adapting to 
climate change.
Linking adaptation with peacebuilding
In over 40 countries,15 the greatest obstacle to successful climate change adaptation 
is the fragility of the state. Taking the three-part formula of exposure, sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity that defi nes vulnerability, it is the adaptive capacity that is in prin-
ciple the point of entry for reducing vulnerability. It needs to be strengthened. It can 
be, but to do so requires a system of governance and a relationship between citizens 
and state that makes it possible. Th at is what is lacking in many countries, especially 
poor, war-torn, and badly governed countries. Th eir governments are either unwilling 
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or unable to place enough long-term priority on developing the appropriate measures. 
In these countries, the already daunting task of adaptation has to address the issue of 
state fragility as well as the challenge of climate change.
Th e best way to approach this problem is by explicitly linking peacebuilding with 
adaptation and focusing as far as possible on the idea that these can be one task, with 
synergies between its elements, rather than two largely separate tasks. 
Th e goal of peacebuilding is for a society to move from a situation of danger and 
instability due to violent confl ict, whether through the actual experience or only the 
risk of it, to greater safety. Th is might mean preventing armed confl ict or it might 
mean recovering after war: often the two are barely distinguishable because of the risk 
of relapsing into violence after a peace process has begun. To move towards greater 
safety involves changes in attitudes, behaviour and social structures so that a self-sus-
taining peace is steadily created. Th is means strengthening the peace factors in society: 
security for the population, adequate income and assets, equal access to justice, a fair 
and eff ective system of government and leadership, and peaceable relations between 
diff erent groups in society. 
Like adaptation, peacebuilding is a social process. If it does not engage the energies 
of ordinary citizens and communities, it will not succeed. Th e fact that  both adapta-
tion and peacebuilding are social processes means that the two can be synergistic. 
More than this, climate change can off er an opportunity for peacebuilding. In di-
vided communities, it poses a threat against which to unite, while adaptation off ers a 
task on which to cooperate. It is in this positive relationship between adaptation and 
peacebuilding that the benefi ts of a unifi ed solution are to be found. In the longer 
term, a society that can prepare itself to meet the challenge of climate change will, in 
that process, be strengthening its capacities to manage confl ict peacefully. Likewise, a 
society that can develop the means to address deep-seated confl icts without violence 
is one that will not be destabilised by the challenges of climate change.
Th e resilience that such a society is developing is a good way of thinking about the 
purpose of combining adaptation and peacebuilding. And a society that is growing more 
resilient is, by defi nition, on the road to sustainable development. Oxfam touched upon 
these inter-linkages in their recent report on climate change and poverty in Uganda 
from July 2008.16 Th ey argue that the right strategies to adapt to climate change will also 
be the right strategies for truly sustainable development, which necessarily implies and is 
built on a sustainable peace. Th us poverty reduction, adaptation to climate change and 
peacebuilding can be combined into a single coherent approach.
Identifying the synergies
Coherence between diff erent related components is to be found by identifying the key 
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points of synergy. Th ere are two that need to be targeted: good governance and local 
participation. Th ese are the two fundamental elements for generating social resilience. 
Governments are meant to provide security for their citizens. If they fail in this, 
the basic governance contract between state and society breaks down, leading to in-
stability and uncertainty. As the problems government has to solve get deeper, because 
the demands for resources are becoming more desperate, so the task for government 
becomes more diffi  cult, and the likelihood that it will fail in its basic functions ac-
cordingly increases. Th us, in attempting to foster adaptation to climate change in a 
context of state fragility and confl ict, what is needed is an eff ort to support the gov-
ernance contract from both sides: by supporting the development of a responsible and 
response state and of an active and creative civil society. 
Th e two sides of the contract are equally important. Good governance cannot be im-
plemented top-down. When facing up to climate change, much of the technical knowl-
edge, such as complex climate modelling, would need to be transferred from states with 
more advanced research and development capacity; but fi guring out what to do could 
and should be an inclusive and participatory process. Th e community is the vital level 
for action, which will be more eff ective if it is based in part on an encounter between the 
hard science of climate modelling and local knowledge. Th is can combine to generate 
well-targeted actions and initiatives. Solutions to the problems of climate change must 
be home grown, but external help will make them more eff ective.
Local perspectives are not always adequate, however. Simultaneously addressing 
peacebuilding needs and climate change adaptation means taking diff erent sectors, 
regions and actions into account. Improving basic services for only part of the pop-
ulation can fuel new grievances, for example. Focusing attention and resources on 
hydropower without considering domestic water supply could be a source of ineffi  -
ciency and, at worst, confl ict. Making plans for fl ood defences without planning the 
provisions of the necessary materials, which may have to be transported over some 
distance, will lead to frustration and ineff ectiveness. Planning to change harvest cycles 
and choice of crops means involving farmers, suppliers and traders in a rounded dis-
cussion of the issue. Developing the resilience of communities so they can adapt suc-
cessfully to climate change will include developing the capacity to understand these 
linkages and to act on them.
Implications for climate change
Taking the confl ict and peacebuilding implications of climate change into account has 
only just begun, but it is moving quite quickly. Some European governments’ interna-
tional development budgets are now prioritising climate change adaptation as an essen-
tial part of development aid, and the confl ict angle is being given increased attention.
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Th e state of the debate, however, is not yet satisfactory. Even though adaptation 
has gained more ground in the policy world and played a signifi cantly larger role at 
the climate conference in Poznan in December 2008 than in earlier such talks, the 
emphasis is still mainly on mitigation. Th is is particularly evident in preparation so 
far for the December 2009 Copenhagen conference, intended to prepare the terms of 
a new international treaty on global warming. A disproportionately strong emphasis 
on mitigation may make sense in order to obtain agreement on the new treaty, but it 
will be highly regrettable if people and institutions working on this at a world level 
become accustomed to treating mitigation as the main issue at stake. Th e farmers 
whose crops are ravaged and the villagers whose houses have been fl ooded cannot wait 
for the global community to decide on a sustainable emissions deal. Climate change 
policy should therefore to a larger degree equalise the two climate change aspects: mit-
igation and adaptation. Th is will not diminish the overall impact of mitigation eff orts, 
it will strengthen them by clarifying the many levels of risk that climate change poses. 
It is also important to be aware of the risk of negative consequences of eff orts to 
promote mitigation of global warming through new and cleaner energy sources. It 
is now well documented that the global biofuels boom could increase landlessness 
among rural poor in developing countries by forcing them off  land they depend on 
for agricultural production. Several recent studies, including one by the World Bank 
that has not yet been released, show how large-scale biofuel production is aff ecting 
poor farmers’ access to land in widespread geographic locations: Africa (e.g. Mozam-
bique, Tanzania), Asia and the Pacifi c (India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea) and 
Latin America (e.g. Colombia)17. It is argued that the diversion of food crops and 
land use for the production of biofuels in these places accounts for up to 30% of the 
recent rise in food prices. Moreover, higher food prices have pushed 105 million more 
people into poverty and have threatened the livelihoods of almost 300 million accord-
ing to Oxfam. Indonesia’s crucial palm-oil sector, for example, is threatened by the 
biofuels production. Th e government has stipulated that 40% of palm-oil production 
should be set aside for biofuel. Th is is placing millions of people at risk of losing land 
and is leading to land confl ict as the interests of politicians, plantation companies, 
indigenous peoples, and resettled communities collide. Other analyses suggest that 
the production of biofuels could allow poor groups to increase their access to land 
and improve their livelihoods if the right policies are in place.18 It seems that a more 
rounded analysis of the side-eff ects of the move towards biofuels is needed. 
A continued predominant focus on mitigation is therefore not expedient. Th ere 
are too many risks linked to climate change as it unfolds; and there is an additional set 
of risks in mitigation eff orts themselves. Millions of people in the developing world 
are very likely to suff er in the next couple of decades – not least from confl ict – if 
adaptation does not continue to move up the global policy agenda. Th e Adaptation 
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Fund is a step in the right direction, but clear policies on the actual implementation 
of adaptation are still needed.
When development and adaptation have been considered alongside each other in 
terms of funding, one feature of the argument has often been the insistence that inter-
national support for adaptation by developing countries must be additional funding 
over and above normal Offi  cial Development Assistance.19 Th is is based on the argu-
ment that the importance of adaptation should not allow rich countries out of the 
commitments they have made to support development in poorer countries. 
However, adaptation is not an additional task in development, but a change in 
the core of development.20 Helping local communities understand and identify with 
confi dence the challenges they face and the tasks they can undertake means looking 
at local participation, the quality of governance, the way that development strategy is 
shaped, where the emphasis of development assistance falls and how it is delivered. In 
other words, because adaptation should be a part of development, what will happen 
is that ODA will be spent diff erently. 
Th e scale of spending required for adaptation in developing countries is wholly 
unclear, as currently available estimates range from USD 4 – 109 billion annually.21 
What is clear, though, is that adaptation will require international fi nancial support. 
It seems likely that adaptation will impose additional costs on developing countries. 
Investing in them will not only be economically productive but will also have other 
benefi ts in terms of development, peacebuilding, and resilience to climate change. 
Further research is required here to identify the degree to which an adaptive develop-
ment strategy calls for not just new but additional activities. 
Some policy recommendations
Th e broad conclusion of an assessment of the links between climate change and con-
fl ict, and between adaptation and peacebuilding, is that international support is re-
quired for national governments, local authorities and communities to develop and 
implement practicable ways of adapting to climate change. Th is is not the place to put 
forward a detailed policy list of options to illustrate what this broad message means 
in practice, but some recommendations for the new policy agenda of adaptation and 
peacebuilding could be as follows:
• Build capacity to research the indirect local consequences of climate change: Th ese 
will be diff erent in each place, both because the physical eff ects are diff erent, and 
because the social structure and economic base are diff erent. Th e consequences of 
climate change in Kathmandu are diff erent from the consequences in rural Nepal, 
let alone in Bangladesh, the Nile Delta, or Peru. Researching in detail how these 
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eff ects will play out in regions, countries and localities is the basis for beginning 
to defi ne the necessary scope of adaptation. Because research and action are so 
closely linked, it is necessary to ensure that long-term research competence exists 
in regions and countries that are likely to be aff ected. 
• Prioritise adaptation over mitigation in fragile states: As argued above, in fragile 
states, adaptation to climate change is the most pressing need. With limited inter-
national funds and capacity available among donors and national governments to 
address climate change, priority in fragile states should be given to understanding 
and addressing the social consequences, so as to prevent the even greater interna-
tional problem of climate-related violent confl ict.
• Develop the right institutional context: the key motif is good governance for cli-
mate change. Th e research competence, local participation and multiple levels of 
dialogue outlined above will lead nowhere unless they feed into the right institu-
tional context – political parties, leaders and government departments that can 
both understand and absorb the hard and social science, as well as appreciate the 
validity of local perspectives and knowledge. Developing competence on climate 
change issues, including adaptation, needs to be seen henceforth as an integral 
part of good governance in all the states facing the combined risk of climate 
change impact and violent confl ict or instability. Good governance is an increas-
ingly important part of development cooperation, which means that donor gov-
ernments have every possibility to act on this.
• Align adaptation, development and peacebuilding: Th is begins as a strategic discus-
sion about development paths, not as a technical discussion about development 
assistance. Th e discussion will be at its most diffi  cult in the countries with the 
greatest vulnerability to climate change, because they are the ones with least adap-
tive capacity, which means they are also likely to be at risk of political instability or 
violent confl ict. In other words, where the discussion is most needed, it is hardest. 
Th ere are several diff erent internationally agreed upon frameworks that can help 
with the necessary inter-linkages: for example, the  OECD/DAC guidelines on 
development in fragile states, National Adaptation Programmes of Action, and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, disaster risk reduction frameworks such as 
Hyogo and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, as well as the Glo-
bal Environment Facility and its various funding mechanisms. A concerted eff ort 
is needed in a variety of diff erent international forums to ensure that these diff er-
ent frameworks are coherent with one another and mutually supportive, which 
will be achieved when they recognise the full climate-development-peacebuilding 
linkage.
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Opportunities to Change 
Development Pathways for 
Climate Change Mitigation 
Jayant Sathaye
Introduction1
Th e concept of sustainable development has its roots in the idea of a sustainable socie-
ty (Brown, 1981) and in the management of renewable and non-renewable resources. 
Th e World Commission on Environment and Development adopted the concept and 
launched sustainability into political, public and academic discourses. Th e concept 
was defi ned as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987; Bojo 
et al., 1992). 
While there are many defi nitions of sustainable development, the international 
sustainability discourse is helping to establish some commonly held principles of sus-
tainable development. Th ese include the welfare of future generations, the mainte-
nance of essential biophysical life support systems, ecosystem wellbeing, more univer-
sal participation in development processes and decision-making, and the achievement 
of an acceptable standard of human well-being (WCED, 1987; Meadowcroft, 1997; 
Swart et al., 2003; MA: Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, 2005).
Much of the IPCC mitigation assessment and its underlying literature focuses on 
climate change mitigation that considers climate change programmes and policies in 
their own right (‘climate fi rst’). Recent literature has focused more broadly on treating 
climate change mitigation as an integral element of development policies (‘develop-
ment fi rst’). Co-benefi ts or local benefi ts of mitigation measures, particularly those 
related to energy effi  ciency, are often synergistic and can thus lead to substantial im-
provement in broader development objectives of a country.
Making development more sustainable recognises that there are many ways in 
which societies balance the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sus-
tainable development, including climate change,. It also admits the possibility of con-
fl ict and trade-off s between measures that advance one aspect of sustainable develop-
ment while harming another (Munasinghe, 2000). For a development path to be 
sustainable over a long period, however, wealth, resources, and opportunity must be 
1 This article is based on Chapter 12 of the IPCC (Sathaye et al. (2007)) on Sustainable Development and Mitigation. It represents a 
condensed version of the chapter with a focus on development pathways and a concrete list of priorities for action.  
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shared so that all citizens have access to minimum standards of security, human rights, 
and social benefi ts, such as food, health, education, shelter, and opportunity for self-
development (Reed, 1996).  
Th is article explores ways to make development more sustainable. It explores the 
relationships of development paths with carbon and energy intensity and the oppor-
tunities to change these paths at the sectoral level, and discusses ways to mainstream 
climate change mitigation into development choices. Both synergies and tradeoff s 
between mitigation options and sustainable development and adaption activities are 
explored. 
Development paths and emissions scenarios
Historical evidence of changes in carbon intensity
Economic activity is a key driver of CO
2
 emissions. How economic growth translates 
into new emissions, however, is ambiguous. As the economy expands, demand for 
and supply of energy and of energy-intensive goods also increases, pushing CO
2
 emis-
sions upward. On the other hand, economic growth may drive technological change, 
increase effi  ciency and foster the development of institutions and preferences more 
conducive to environmental protection and emissions mitigation. Also, economic 
growth may be associated with specialisation in sectors with low (or high) emissions 
per unit of output, such as services, manufacturing or heavy industries, thus resulting 
in a faster (or slower) de-linking between domestic emissions and GDP.
Th ere is a growing empirical literature on the relationship between economic 
growth and CO
2
 emissions. Studies using GDP and emissions data over multiple 
countries and multiple time-periods consistently fi nd that GDP per capita and emis-
sions per capita move in the same direction among most or all of the sample (e.g., 
Schmalensee et al., 1998; Ravallion et al., 2000; Heil and Selden, 2001). A one per-
cent increase in GDP per capita was found to lead to an increase in CO
2
 emissions 
per capita between 0.5% to 1.5%. Th ese studies also fi nd evidence that this coeffi  cient 
is not constant but varies as per capita income rises. Until recently, these studies con-
sistently found a relationship between per capita GDP and per capita CO
2
 emissions 
such that, beyond a certain level of GDP per capita (usually, higher than the highest 
per capita GDP in the sample considered), per capita CO
2
 emissions would start 
decreasing as income increase. However, Harbaugh et al., 2002 and Millimet et al., 
2003 cast doubt on this last fi nding, claiming that the econometric relationship be-
tween GDP and emissions data is less robust than previously thought. 
Studies using time-series at the country level typically fi nd less robust relationships 
between GDP per capita and CO
2
 emissions per capita. For example, Moomaw and 
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Unruh (1997) show that international oil price shocks, and not per capita GDP 
growth, explains most of the variations in per capita emissions in OECD countries. 
Similarly, Coondoo and Dinda (2002) fi nd a strong correlation between emissions 
and income in developed countries and Latin America, but a weaker correlation in 
Africa and Asia. Th is is consistent with recent fi ndings on the relationships between 
GDP per capita and pollution. For example, Dasgupta et al. (2006) show that the 
relationship between GDP per capita and pollution mostly disappears when other 
explanatory variables, notably governance, are introduced. Neither taking trade into 
account as a new explanatory variable nor correcting emissions for trade eff ects, how-
ever, signifi cantly increases the robustness of the correlation between observed levels 
of GDP per capita and observed levels of emissions.
To sum up, the econometric literature on the relationship between GDP per capita 
and CO
2
 emissions per capita does not support an optimistic view that “the problem 
will take care of itself ” because richer people will automatically emit less. On the 
other hand, the monotonically increasing relation between economic activity and 
CO
2
 emissions that emerges from the data does not appear to be econometrically very 
robust, especially at country level and at higher GDP per capita level. In other words, 
the pessimistic interpretation that growth and CO
2
 emissions would be irrevocably 
linked is not supported by the data either. Th ere is apparently some degree of fl ex-





 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion in China remained es-
sentially constant from 1997 to 2001 despite a +30% growth of  GDP  due to inter 
alia a combination of closing of small-scale, ineffi  cient power plants, shift in industry 
ownership away from the public sector, and introduction of energy effi  ciency and 
environmental regulation (Streets et al., 2001; Wu et al., 2005).
Another example of how diff erent development paths can unfold in relatively simi-
lar countries is given by Hourcade and Kostopoulou (1994) who analyse how France, 
Italy, Germany and Japan – countries with similar levels of GDP per capita in 1973 
– responded to the fi rst oil shock. France moved aggressively to develop domestic 
supply of nuclear energy and a new building code, while Japan made an aggressive 
shift of its industry towards less energy-intensive activities and simultaneously used 
its exchange-rate policies to alleviate the burden of oil purchases, whereas Germany 
built up industrial exports to compensate the trade balance defi cit in the energy sec-
tor. Much of the variations of CO
2
 emissions per unit of GDP from 1971 to 1990 can 
be attributed to these choices. Yet CO
2
 emissions per unit of GDP diminished by half 
in France, by a third in Japan, and “only” by a quarter in Germany. At the same time 
the macroeconomic performances of these countries have been relatively comparable 
from 1973 to 1990 (Figure 1 right), suggesting that widely diff erent environmental 
outcome can be obtained at similar welfare costs in the long-run.




































































































































































































Figure 1: (left) Evolution of CO
2
 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion in France, Germany, Italy and 
Japan between 1971 and 1990; (right) Evolution of GDP per capita in France, Germany, Italy and Japan 
between 1971 and 1990. Data source: IEA (2004a)
Historical evidence of changes in energy intensity
Energy intensity is defi ned as energy use per unit of GDP and is an aggregate measure 
of the energy productivity of an economy. Changes in energy effi  ciency are one factor 
that explain changes in energy intensity. Energy intensities vary by country and are 
infl uenced by other factors such as natural resource endowments, economic structure 
and climate regimes.  Figure 2 shows the changes in energy intensity since 1970 for 
several developed and developing countries. Oil price shocks in the 1970s were a key 
driver for improved vehicle fuel economy, shift away from oil-fi red power plants, and 
the tightening or initialisation of effi  ciency standards in OECD countries. Th ese re-
sulted in a sharp decline in energy intensity that has continued since then. Over the 
period 1973-1998, the IEA (2004) estimates that the decline in energy intensities – 
driven both by policies and by autonomous technical improvements – have resulted 
in energy savings corresponding to almost 50% of 1998 IEA-11 energy consumption 
levels. In other words, absent these savings, energy use (and CO
2
 emissions) in 1998 
would have been almost 50% higher than observed. Th e Chinese economy promoted 
and implemented strict energy effi  ciency regulatory measures that resulted in an en-
ergy/GDP elasticity of 0.5 until 2002. Energy intensity of the Indian economy, on the 
other hand, only started to decline since the early 1990s after the economic liberalisa-
tion in 1991, and has accelerated since 1997. A rapid capital stock turnover brought 
about by faster economic growth and the advent of the information technology sector 
both contributed to this decline. 
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Figure 2: Primary energy supply per unit of GDP (excl. biomass); (MJ/US$2000 Market Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3 highlights the relationship between changes in electricity intensity and sus-
tainable development attributes and illustrates that it is not a rigid connection and 
can be decoupled. A high human development index (HDI) (>0.85) may be achieved 
at a level of annual electricity consumption that stretches from about 7,000 to 30,000 
kWh/capita/year. On the other hand, a wide range of human development is seen 
at low levels of electricity consumption – but not the highest. In the case of South 
Africa, for example, high electricity consumption does not necessarily result in a high 
HDI. Th e structural factors driving energy intensity – a focus on the minerals-energy 
complex and low levels of effi  ciency – and lower life expectancy due to HIV/AIDS 
has outweighed any shifts towards less energy-intensive economic activities over time 
in that country.
Opportunities to change development paths at the sectoral level  
In previous sections, we have argued that the link between GHG emissions, energy use 
and economic activity was not rigid at the macro level: Th ere are examples of countries 
with comparable economic performances and very diff erent GHG emissions.  In the 
present section, we provide examples of de-coupling between GHG emissions and 
increased and/or improved activity -- i.e., changes in development paths -- at the sec-
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toral level.  To be as relevant to decision-making as possible, we group these examples 
by policies that are susceptible to lead to a shift in development path. In line with the 
general topic of this article, we draw examples mostly from the energy sector -- but 
use transportation to show how the same logic applies to other sectors as well.  Finally, 
though some policies, such as energy effi  ciency or energy subsidy removal, lead mostly 
to reduced emissions, we also present examples where the link is more ambiguous.
Policies that increase energy effi  ciency – both on the demand and on the supply 
side – aim at reducing demand for energy without aff ecting, or while increasing, out-
put at very low costs. However, some of the direct gains might be off set by increased 
demand due to lower energy costs per unit of output (rebound eff ect), either directly 
or via macroeconomic adjustments. Empirical estimates vary, but suggest that the 
rebound eff ect is in general small to moderate (e.g., Greening et al., 2000, Small and 
Van Dender, 2007). Th e impact on CO
2
 emissions, in turn, tends to be positive, but 
depends heavily on the carbon content of the energy supply. For example,  Gilling-
ham et al. (2006)) estimate that the annual energy savings generated by all current 
Demand-Side Management (DSM) programs in the U.S. represent about 6% of the 
country’s non-transportation energy consumption, and lead to reductions in CO
2
 
emissions equivalent to (at most) 3.5% of the country’s total. 
In the energy sector, implications of improved access to commercial fuels on GHG 
emissions are ambiguous. Emissions from fossil-fuels increase, albeit by a small mar-
gin. But unsustainable use of fuelwood and related deforestation decreases (Davidson 
and Sokona, 2002). Similarly, electrifi cation increases emissions as a result of easier 
access and induced economic benefi ts. But emissions per unit of energy consumed 
might decrease if the carbon content of the electricity that is newly provided is lower 
than the carbon content of the fuel it displaces (de Gouvello and Maigne, 2000).
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Figure 3: Human development 
compared to electricity 
consumption
Source: UNDP (2007)
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Th e impact of energy subsidies removal on CO
2
 emissions is likely to be posi-
tive in most cases, as higher prices trigger lower demand for energy and induce en-
ergy conservation. Removal of energy subsidies has been identifi ed as instrumental 
in reducing GHG emissions relative to business-as-usual in China and India over the 
past twenty years (Chandler et al., 2002). However, subsidies removal may result in 
increased emissions if poor consumers are forced off -grid and back to highly carbon 
intensive fuels, such as non-sustainable charcoal or diesel generators.
Th e impact of energy security policies on emissions is ambiguous, depending in 
particular on the fuel sources being favoured. For example, in response to the fi rst 
oil shock, Brazil launched in 1975 the National Alcohol Fuel Program to increase 
the production of sugarcane ethanol as a substitute for oil, at a time when Brazil 
was importing about 80% of its oil supply. Th is program resulted in an estimated 
1.5 Mt CO
2
/yr emission savings (Szklo et al., 2005). However, Brazil also provides 
an example where emissions increased as a result of energy-security driven policies. 
During the 90s, Brazil faced lack of investment in the power system and a growing 
supply-demand imbalance, culminating in electricity shortage and rationing in 2001. 
Th is forced the country to install and run emergency fossil-fuel plants, leading to 
substantial a increase in GHG emissions (Geller et al., 2004). 
Emissions from the transportation sector result from the combination of the 
amount of travel that goods and people make, and of the set of technologies with 
which those trips are undertaken. A wide array of policies aff ect both demand for 
transportation and technologies. For example, Nivola (1999) argues that the diff er-
ences in urban forms of transportation in American and European cities – sprawled 
vs. compact – cannot be explained only by diff erences in demography, geography, 
technology or income; a signifi cant part of the diff erence also stems from major dif-
ferences in public policies in the U.S. relative to Europe: preference in public fi nanc-
ing of roads against other modes of transportation; dedicated pools of resources for 
highway construction; lower taxes on gasoline; housing policies geared towards sup-
porting new homes; a tax system more in favour of homeowners; lower support from 
the federal Government to local governments; and the quasi-absence of regulations fa-
vouring small in-city outlets against shopping malls. Th ese diff erences in urban plan-




Although the examples discussed above are very diverse, some general patterns 
emerge from the literature. First, any country is likely to have opportunities to adopt 
“win-win-win” policies, i.e. policies that free up resources and bolster growth, meet 
other sustainable development goals and also, incidentally, reduce GHG emissions 
relative to baseline (for example, improving effi  ciency in sectors using highly energy 
ineffi  cient equipment). Conversely, the closer one gets to the production frontier, the 
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more trade-off s are likely to appear between reducing emissions and meeting other 
goals (Hourcade et al., 1996). Second, because some of the key dynamics for GHG 
emissions, such as technological development or land-use patterns, present a lot of 
inertia, and thus need sustained eff ort to be oriented, what matters is not only that a 
“good” choice is made at a certain point in time, but also that the initial policy per-
sists for a long time – sometimes several decades – to truly have eff ects. For example, 
Nivola (1999) points out that sustained policies over time are critical to change the 
dynamics of urban forms. Th is raises deep institutional questions about the possibility 
of governments to make credible long-term commitments (Stiglitz, 1998). Finally, it 
is often not one policy decision, but an array of decisions that are necessary to infl u-
ence emissions. Th is raises, in turn, important issues of coordination between policies 
in several sectors, and at various scales.
Mainstreaming climate change into development paths
Th e sections above have highlighted that development policies in various sectors can 
have strong impacts on GHG emissions. Th e operational question is how to harness 
that potential. In other words, how can climate change mitigation considerations be 
mainstreamed into development policies?
Mainstreaming means that development policies, programs and/or individual ac-
tions that otherwise would not have taken climate change mitigation into considera-
tion explicitly include these. Th e extent to which mainstreaming leads to a sustainable 
development path will depend on the technological, social, economic and political 
processes that aff ect the current and future development path trajectories. Merely 
piggybacking climate change onto an existing political agenda is unlikely to succeed 
(IPCC 2007, p. 711).
Th e ease or diffi  culty with which mainstreaming is accomplished will depend on 
both the mitigation technology or practice, and the underlying development path. 
No-regrets energy effi  ciency options, for instance, are likely to be easier to implement 
than others that have higher direct cost, require coordination among stakeholders, 
and/or require a trade-off  against other environmental, social and economic benefi ts. 
Weighing other development benefi ts against climate benefi ts will be a key basis for 
choosing development sectors for mainstreaming climate change considerations. In 
some cases, it may even be rational to disregard climate change considerations because 
of an action’s other development benefi ts (Smith, 2002).  
Development policies, such as electricity privatisation, can increase emissions if 
they result in construction of natural gas power plants in place of hydroelectric power, 
however, they can reduce emissions if energy effi  ciency (demand-side management) 
programs avoid coal or other fossil-fuelled power plants from being built. Judicious 
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and informed choices will be needed when pursuing development policies in order to 
ensure that GHG emissions are reduced and not increased. 
Th ere are many diff erent types of non-climate development policies in which cli-
mate mitigation activities can be mainstreamed. Examples of these include (1) ra-
tionalised energy and water pricing and ban on import of ineffi  cient equipment, (2) 
forest conservation and sustainable forest management practices that can contribute 
to conservation of biodiversity, watershed protection, rural employment generation, 
increased incomes to forest dwellers and carbon sink enhancement, (3) increased mar-
ket penetration of cost-eff ective energy effi  ciency technologies in electricity genera-
tion, transmission, distribution, and end-use which will also reduce local pollution, 
(4)  reducing oil imports as a strategy to improve energy security while minimising the 
use of coal as a substitute, and increasing use of less-carbon-intensive energy sources 
and reducing energy intensity of the economy (IEA (International Energy Agency), 
2004b), (5) provision of incentives by multilateral development banks (MDBs) in 
their own lending to directly and indirectly infl uence the emissions of borrowing 
countries, and (6) insurance premiums diff erentiated to refl ect vehicle fuel economy; 
liability insurance exclusions for large emitters; improved terms to recognise the lower 
risks associated with green buildings; or new insurance products to help manage tech-
nical, regulatory, and fi nancial risks associated with emissions trading (Mills, 2003). 
Mainstreaming mitigation options will depend on the mitigative capacity of each 
country. Winkler et al. (2007) have suggested that mitigative capacity (MC) be de-
fi ned as “a country’s ability to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gases or enhance 
natural sinks.” 
Higher levels of development tend to increase mitigative (and adaptive) capacity 
(Sathaye et al. 2007). To show this, capacity can be assessed on the basis of objective 
factors such as costs, institutions and technology, together with more subjective fac-
tors such as political willingness (Winkler et al. 2007). Mitigative capacity of diff erent 
countries is shaped by two economic factors: namely average abatement cost (or miti-
gation potential; high cost means low potential); and ability to pay, as approximated 
by GDP per capita. A signifi cant portion of the mitigation potential would be realised 
through energy effi  ciency. 
Implications of mitigation choices for sustainable development goals
Mitigation options often have positive eff ects on aspects of sustainability, but may not 
always be sustainable with respect to all three dimensions of SD -- economic, envi-
ronmental and social. For example, removing subsidies for coal increases its price and 
creates unemployment of coal mine workers, independently of the actual mitigation 
(IPCC ,2001). In some cases the positive eff ects on sustainability are more indirect, 
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because they are the results of side-eff ects of reducing GHG-emissions. Th erefore, it 
is often diffi  cult to assess the net outcome of the various eff ects. 
Th e sustainable development benefi ts of mitigation options vary over sectors and 
regions. Generally, mitigation options that improve productivity of resource use, 
whether it is energy, water, or land, yield positive benefi ts across all three dimensions 
of sustainable development. In the agricultural sector for instance, improved manage-
ment practices for rice cultivation and grazing land, and use of bioenergy and effi  cient 
cook stoves enhance productivity, and reduce the burden on women of fi nding and 
gathering fuel wood often in harsh environments. Other categories of mitigation op-
tions have a more uncertain impact and depend on the wider socioeconomic context 
within which the option is being implemented. Some energy effi  ciency mitigation 
activities with GHG benefi ts may be of limited duration without the persistent re-
placement and long-term use of the effi  cient device. 
Evaluation of mitigation policies typically focuses on cost estimates that may be 
reported for each sector at both the global and country-specifi c levels. Yet mitigation 
costs are just one part of the broader economic impacts of SD. Other impacts include 
growth and distribution of income, employment and availability of jobs, government 
fi scal budgets, and competitiveness of the economy or sector within a globalising 
market. It is important to fully understand all three aspects of SD -- -- economic, 
environmental and social.
Environmental impacts include those occurring in local areas on air, water, and 
land, including the loss of biodiversity. Virtually all forms of energy supply and use, 
and land-use changes cause some level of environmental damage. Th e emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) is often directly related to the emissions of other pollutants, 
either airborne, e.g. sulphur dioxide from burning coal which causes local or indoor 
air pollution, or waterborne, e.g., from leaching of nitrates from fertilizer application 
in intensive agriculture.
Th e social dimension includes issues such as gender equality, governance, equitable 
income distribution, housing and education opportunity, health impacts, and cor-
ruption. Most mitigation options will impact one or more of these issues, and both 
benefi ts and tradeoff s are likely.
Conclusion
Changing development paths will be critical to stabilising climate change because 
research to date shows that climate mitigation alone will not solve the climate prob-
lem. Th is will require that development be made more sustainable, i.e., address both 
its local and global deleterious impacts. Historical data at the global and country 
level illustrate that it is indeed possible to decouple economic growth from energy 
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use and carbon emissions. An important step in this regard would be to identify rel-
evant non-climate policies in every sector including trade, fi nance, rural and urban 
development, insurance, and forestry. Examples from the past suggest that sectors far 
away from their production frontier may have more opportunities than sectors that 
are close to the production frontier to adopt policies that bolster growth, meet other 
sustainable development goals and reduce GHG emissions relative to baseline. Past 
experience also suggests that shifting development paths towards less carbon-intensive 
trajectories usually results from an array of coordinated policies and measures that are 
sustained over time, and not from a single, one-off  decision in one sector. Th us, such 
steps will of necessity be context specifi c and will work only within local and national 
contexts. 
Mitigation options can be synergistic or create tradeoff s between carbon emissions 
reduction and other sustainable development criteria. Synergies and tradeoff s also 
exist between mitigation and adaptation approaches to climate change and capac-
ity building, which suggests that the two should be considered simultaneously in 
the development of sector policies. Th is implies the establishment of institutional 
links and a governance structure between the now often disparate policy domains of 
government, business and civil society. In the last few years, industry and other busi-
nesses have begun to investigate and take responsibility for their carbon and energy 
“footprints”. Communicating the footprint data in a reliable manner to help inform 
consumer purchase decisions is still being debated. Th e way forward requires that 
development choices that display synergy between climate mitigation and adaptation, 
and local sustainable development characteristics, be identifi ed, evaluated, and main-
streamed in order to make development more sustainable.    
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Does Human Development Really Require 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?
The greenhouse gas emissions
take-off in rapidly industrialising countries  
and possibilities for averting it
Axel Michaelowa and Katharina Michaelowa
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that greenhouse gas emissions are inextricably linked to hu-
man and industrial development. Th is is based upon the historical experience that 
countries able to embark on industrial development rapidly increased their green-
house gas emissions. 
A key question in current climate policy is whether today’s developing countries 
need to follow the same development path, or whether high levels of human develop-
ment can be reached at low levels of per capita emissions. A large body of literature 
has tried to determine an environmental “Kuznets Curve” relating per capita income 
to per capita greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995). How-
ever, so far no level of per capita income has been found that would unambiguously 
determine a maximum level of per capita emissions (see Moomaw and Unruh 1997, 
Azomahou et al. 2006). Some researchers even say that per capita emissions would 
continue to increase with per capita income (Galeotti et al. 2006).
Income is only a partial indicator for the degree of human development. Th erefore, 
it is desirable to delink the discussion from the level of per capita income, by asking 
whether the level of human development is also linked to per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions. Here, the UN Human Development Index (HDI) will be used as a gener-
ally accepted measure of human development1, and an assessment will be made of 
the extent to which improvements in the HDI were accompanied by increases in per 
capita emissions. Th e take-off  phases of per capita greenhouse gas emissions in rapidly 
industrialising countries will then be analysed to determine the drivers for emissions 
increases. Subsequently, diff erent policy options for slowing down emissions growth 
during rapid industrialisation processes will be considered. Finally, we discuss whether 
high levels of human development can be reached and sustained with low greenhouse 
gas emissions. In this context, the role of consumption patterns will be highlighted. 
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Links between human development 
and greenhouse gas emissions
For the period 1975 to 2005, data for HDI and per capita emissions are readily avail-
able for over 100 countries (HDI data from UNDP 2007 and per capita CO
2
 emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion from IEA 2007). Th is period is suffi  ciently long 
to show success stories in development. Our data comprise all countries with an im-
provement of HDI by more than 10 percentage points, which will be called a “devel-
opment success”. Looking at the pattern of development of the HDI in relation to per 
capita emissions, three main patterns can be distinguished: emissions-extensive devel-
opment, emissions-intensive development and a pattern where emissions-extensive 
development over time becomes emissions-intensive (see Figure 1 for typical country 
examples from the Middle East/North African region)-
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Note: emissions-extensive: Tunisia; emissions-intensive: United Arab Emirates (UAE); transition: Oman. 
The vertical line denotes world average per capita emissions in 2005.
Source: HDI data from UNDP (2007), per capita emissions data from IEA (2007)
Th ese three diff erent patterns will be analysed below to try to explain why countries 
have chosen such diff erent emissions paths at similar levels of development. We be-
gin with the emissions-extensive category which is defi ned as countries that reached 
a HDI level of at least 0.5 and kept their per capita emissions level below 2 t CO
2
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(Figure 2). Th is group includes countries from all continents, ranging from very large 
(India, Brazil, Pakistan) to small. Latin America is somewhat overrepresented. Th e 
most intriguing feature of the graph is a group of four countries with negligible per 
capita emissions: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana and Nepal. Sri Lanka belonged to 
that group until the mid1990s even at a HDI of over 0.7, but has since switched to a 
more emissions-intensive path. A number of small Latin American countries has re-
mained in the bracket of 0.5 to 1 t CO
2
 per inhabitant, while several large countries in 
the group (India, Pakistan and Egypt) appear to be in transition to a more emissions-
intensive development. 
How do countries achieve an emissions-extensive development path? Th e main 
reason seems to be a low carbon energy system. Most countries in the group have a 
high share of hydropower in electricity generation. Moreover, they do not have heavy 
industry and are not fossil fuel producers. Th e notable exceptions are countries with 
a large population which is still mainly engaged in subsistence agriculture. Th is is the 
case for India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt. India is the outlier in terms 
of a sizeable heavy industry as well as a very carbonintensive electricity generation sys-
tem; however, these factors are still small with respect to India’s sheer population size.




















Source: HDI data from UNDP (2007), per capita emissions data from IEA (2007)
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At the other end of the classifi cation, all countries that have exceeded the average 
global per capita emissions level fall into the emissions-intensive category. Such a 
development path is frequently built on the extraction of fossil fuels. Th e archetypical 
examples are the sparsely populated countries in the Persian Gulf region which were 
catapulted from a medieval zero-emissions lifestyle towards world record per capita 
emissions levels almost overnight. For example, already in 1975, Kuwait’s per capita 
emissions were above 20 t CO
2
! For the more populous countries such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, emissions increased consistently over time as emissions-intensive indus-
trial and domestic infrastructure was commissioned. Moreover, highly subsidised en-
ergy prices led to wasteful behaviour. Outside the oil producing-countries, Australia 
exhibits a similar pattern.































Source: HDI data from UNDP (2007), per capita emissions data from IEA (2007)
Another group that has recently emerged in the emissions-intensive category are 
the rapidly industrialising countries who build their success on a large manufacturing 
base. Th is development approach was pioneered by Korea, whose emissions increased 
from 2.1 to 9.3 t CO
2
 per capita between 1975 and 2005. Korea focused on heavy 
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industries such as basic chemicals and shipbuilding. Only recently has it switched to 
higher value-added productions, and thus emissions growth has slowed. China is now 
following on the same path as Korea, and it is intriguing to see how Chinese emissions 
growth has accelerated within the last 5 years. Interestingly, also the European states 
of Portugal and Spain also follow this pattern: once per capita emissions have reached 
around 4 t CO
2
, they rapidly increase. 
Even the city states Singapore and Hong Kong exhibit similar emissions-intensive 
features: a rapid emissions growth after reaching a HDI level of 0.8, which stops once 
the HDI approaches the level of 0.9. Probably this emissions growth was linked to 
the substantial increase in private car and apartment ownership and stopped as policy 
measures were introduced to rein in utilisation of private cars.
The takeoff of per capita emissions 
in rapidly industrialising countries
What are the reasons for the spurt of per capita emissions in rapidly industrialising 
countries which is shown in Figure 4 in more detail? 





















Source: HDI data from UNDP (2007), per capita emissions data from IEA (2007)
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Th ere are evidently two main reasons. Once industrialisation has reached a certain 
level and wages begin to increase, there will be a rapid growth of a middle class. Typi-
cally, this middle class lives in or moves to cities and quickly adopts energy-intensive 
lifestyles. Th is trend is documented by the explosive growth in electricity-consuming 
household appliances and private cars in China (see Figure 5) and all over South East 
Asia. In China, all urban households acquired air conditioning within a decade. Th is 
occurred during a period in which urban population grew by 150 million people 
(Allard 2007, p. 3). Th e same phenomenon is now starting in India, where air condi-
tioner sales grow by 20% per year. Neill and Letschert (2008, p. 7) predict a take-off  
of air-conditioner sales at around USD 4000 per capita GDP.











































Note: According to current trends, penetration in rural areas starts 10-15 years later.
Source: Fridley et al. (2007, p. 8).
Given the low purchasing power of populations in developing countries, appliance 
manufacturers try to keep sales prices as low as possible, while not putting any focus 
on energy effi  ciency. Th e average energy effi  ciency of Chinese air conditioners in 2005 
reached just 53% of Japanese air conditioners of the same type (Koizumi 2007). In 
addition to the direct demand for appliances, the shift to more value added produc-
tion in industry (see Price 2008), and the growth of cities and the middle class in 
general, leads to a strong demand for infrastructure improvement. Building up an 
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Infrastructure Increase 1990-1995 Increase 1995-2000 Increase 2000-2004
Residential buildings (billion m2) 1.1 1.3 5.2
Commercial buildings (billion m2) 0.7 0.6 2
Heated space (billion m2) 0.4 0.5 1.1
Road surface (km2) 360 550 1620
Gas pipelines (1000 km) 17.5 14.5 99.6
Wastewater pipes (1000 km) 53 32 77
Table 1: Increases in infrastructural elements in Chinese cities 1995-2004
Source: Allard (2007)
infrastructure is very resource intensive and thus leads to high emissions. Th e Chinese 
urbanisation process provides very impressive fi gures (see Table 1). 
Nevertheless, the average fl oor space by inhabitant in China has only increased 
from 10 to 14 m2, so further growth can be expected. Given the frenetic speed of 
building, the quality of the new buildings is often doubtful and thermal insulation 
non-existent.
Roads have also been built at a frantic rate in China, making car use attractive. 
Total length of paved roads increased from 0.69 million km in 1990 to 1.09 million 
in 2000, and 1.54 million in 2006. Motorway length literally exploded from 500 km 
in 1990 to 16,300 km in 2000 and 45,300 km in 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China 2007). As one can see in Figure 6, private cars have begun their take-off  in 
Chinese cities, where as late as the mid-1990s, twothirds of all trips were made on foot 
or bicycle. Although urban car ownership averaged only 4% of households in 2005, 
Beijing had already reached over 10%. In 2007, the number of cars in China grew by 
15 million to reach 57 million (Chinese Car Times 2008). Th is development corrobo-
rates research by Chamon et al. (2008) who have found a remarkably stable relation-
ship between GDP per capita and car ownership. Up to per capita incomes of about 
USD 5000, car ownership is low; it then takes off  very rapidly. China is currently 
nearing this threshold; India is still quite far from it. However, the recent announce-
ment of the Indian car manufacturer, Tata Motors, of their new mini car set at a price 
of USD 2200 might shift the Indian car take-off  threshold to a lower income level.
Production of steel and cement is a necessary requirement for building urban and 
transport infrastructure. Figure 6 shows the enormous increase in production of those 
carbon-emissions intensive commodities (see also Zhou et al. 2008). It also shows the 
diff erence between China and India, where urbanisation and development of trans-
port have not yet reached the take-off  level.
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Data sources: Steel: International Iron and Steel Institute (2008), China cement: US Geological Service, 
Mineral Commodity Summaries, different issues of the journal Cement, India cement: Government 
of India, Department of Economic Affairs, Economic Division: Monthly Economic Report from certain 
months of each year.
Policy options to prevent emissions takeoff
What can be done to prevent a take-off  phase of emissions on a level similar to that 
of Korea in the past and China in the present? A cornerstone of a low-emissions path 
would be an integrated planning policy that prevents haphazard urbanisation and 
related take-off  of car traffi  c. While not numerous, there are some successful examples 
of such policies. Th e Brazilian city of Curitiba was able to keep car use at 25% of 
comparable cities by developing an urban master-plan that prevented urban sprawl, 
along with a high-capacity public bus system (Rabinovitch and Leitman 1996). In 
Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore and Hong Kong, early restraint of car ownership and/or 
use, which began before car ownership reached 10% of households, provided a time 
period in which high quality public transport could be built, and in which a public 
transport-friendly urban infrastructure could develop (Barter and Kenworthy 1997). 
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Hong Kong has been able to limit per capita emissions to 6 t CO
2
 despite a fossil-
fuel dominated electricity generation system (see Figure 4). Obviously, such a path 
requires public transport infrastructures, but these can be relative emissions-extensive 
as the rapid bus transport system of Curitiba shows.
Th e second component of a low emissions path would be a far-reaching energy 
effi  ciency policy for domestic appliances. Even before appliance penetration starts, 
appliance effi  ciency standards should be set at levels comparable to those of industr-
ialised countries. If China had used the Japanese top runner approach for air condi-
tioners and had reached the average effi  ciency of the Japanese models, over 10 million 
t CO
2
 per year for the 50 million installed units could have been avoided (Koizumi 
2007). After achieving an almost 100% penetration of air conditioners, China is 
improving its air conditioner standards (see Fridley et al. 2007) and manufacturers 
are marketing their effi  cient models under the motto “Energy-saving, healthy, and 
stylish” (He and Wu 2008). A necessary condition for such a path is a high electricity 
price. At prevailing, subsidised Chinese electricity prices, investment in a higher ef-
fi ciency air conditioner that costs USD 250 more than low-effi  ciency models would 
not make sense (Koizumi 2007). Given the initial low purchasing power of potential 
appliance buyers, creative fi nancing models such as revolving funds would have to be 
developed (Taylor et al. 2008).
It should be noted that the window of opportunity for appliance energy standards 
stands is open for only a short period, because once saturation with appliances has 
been reached, replacement will take a long time. While for China, the window of 
opportunity seems to be already closing, in India it should remain open for another 
decade. Th erefore, the future climate policy regime should focus on options that pre-
vent emissions take-off . Given the fi nancing challenges at the beginning of such a 
take-off  phase, industrialised countries will be asked to provide fi nancial and tech-
nical support. For example development of energy effi  ciency standards and a cred-
ible enforcement structure could be supported by development cooperation. Ger-
man technical cooperation supported the Indian government in setting up a Bureau 
of Energy Effi  ciency, which is now developing effi  ciency standards. Currently, these 
Indian standards are still voluntary, but future cooperation could help with making 
them mandatory. Development of air conditioner effi  ciency standards has been done 
in Ghana with the support of the World Bank. For energy effi  ciency improvement of 
consumption goods, a revised version of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
could also be a good vehicle to provide the necessary fi nancial fl ows. Th e fi rst activity 
of this type has just started in India, where production of highly effi  cient refrigerators 
by the company Godrej will earn CDM credits. It uses a new, substantially simplifi ed 
methodology for calculation of emission reductions.
One component of a low-emissions path depends on the availability of carbon-
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free energy sources. Countries with high hydropower potential are advantaged; in the 
future countries with a high potential in wind or solar thermal energy might have a 
similar advantage. 
Obviously, countries that are the “workshop of the world” and provide cheap in-
dustrial goods will have a high emissions profi le. Currently, it is impossible to operate 
heavy industry at a low carbon emissions level. Zhou et al. (2008) show this nicely 
in the Chinese case. Th is means that it is not possible to keep global emissions low 
if global consumption of industrial goods continues to increase, unless technological 
breakthroughs for carbon-free industrial production are made. 
High human development with low greenhouse 
gas emissions: A dream or a real possibility?
As our data have shown, it is possible to achieve a medium level of human develop-
ment at very low per capita emissions levels. A HDI of 0.8 has been reached by a 
number of countries at per capita emissions levels of 0.5 – 1.5 t CO
2
. Th is however 
requires refraining from entering into the consumption age and keeping heavy indus-
try at bay. As soon as an urbanised middle class develops, emissions surge. While there 
are policy options to limit this emissions increase, no country has managed to reach 
a HDI level above 0.92 at an emissions level below 5.5 t CO
2
 per capita. Th is means 
that world emissions would have to grow by at least 30% if the goal is universal hu-
man development of over 0.9. People will always be able to invent new forms of con-
sumption3 and thus all estimates of future emissions based on current consumption 
patterns will be too optimistic. However, all available scientifi c assessments indicate 
that to avoid a temperature increase of more than 2°C from preindustrial times, global 
emissions have to peak within the next 10-15 years and then decline in all regions 
(Gupta et al. 2007, p. 776). Th ere are three possible options for achieving this: we can 
try to increase demand side energy effi  ciency, we can decarbonise all energy sources, 
or we can limit consumption of greenhouse gas intensive goods and services.
Th e fi rst option has been paid lip service in many countries but it has not been pos-
sible to increase energy effi  ciency suffi  ciently to embark on a real downward emissions 
path. At best, energy effi  ciency has only just been able to keep up with the expansion 
of consumption. For example, the improvement of car engines was only able to off set 
the impact of increased engine strength required by consumer demand for heavier, 
more quickly accelerating cars. Similarly, the improvement of building energy effi  -
ciency in many industrialised countries has been eaten up by a strong increase in the 
per capita dwelling space (see Figure 7 for the case of Germany).
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Politically, the second option is the most palatable, but an energy system fully based 
on renewables has not yet been introduced successfully anywhere. Th e country that 
has come closest to it is Brazil, with an electricity system built on hydropower and a 
transport system built on ethanol from sugarcane bagasse. Th ese two factors have al-
lowed Brazil to keep its per capita emissions at less than 2 t CO
2
. Th e recent turmoil 
on the food markets due to the attempts to increase the share of land devoted to 
biofuel production clearly shows the limitations of decarbonisation of transport fuels. 
While having made some inroads in industrialised countries, renewable electricity 
generation has not achieved cost parity with fossil fuel electricity production; and 
the storage problem for intermittent electricity sources remains unsolved. Currently, 
carbon capture and geological storage is seen as the magic bullet for decarbonisation 
of the electricity sector which would allow the continued use of coal in countries like 
China and India (Michaelowa 2005). However, its large-scale applicability is doubt-
ful and its costs are likely to be high. Nuclear power is seen by some as a baseload 
carbon-free electricity source. Th e huge cost overruns in the recent Finnish reactor 
development project and the problems witnessed in nuclear power plant operation 
in Japan, as well as the still unsolved fi nal waste disposal, show the limitations of this 
technology.
Th is leaves us with the third and rarely discussed option of limiting consumption 
(for an exception see Pan 2005, who however only addresses the issue from the angle 
of determining emissions commitments for developing countries). No politician in 
industrialised countries and even less in developing countries dares to propose such a 
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strategy to his voters. Even researchers are obfuscating the issue by framing it in terms 
of “sustainable consumption” (see e.g. Hobson 2002) or “lifestyle changes”. Usually, 
in assessments of greenhouse gas mitigation potential, neither the availability of new, 
hitherto unimagined consumer goods or services, nor the limitation of consumption, 
is taken into account.4 Eventually the climate challenge will confront us with the need 
to decide whether limitless travel, instant global communication, or a living space of 
100 m2 per person is acceptable. Pan (2005, p. 92ff ) has listed basic needs for a de-
cent level of human development; an in-depth discussion of this concept is required. 
We will need a “suffi  ciency revolution” to keep our planet in a climatic range that is 
manageable.
Conclusions
Reaching a decent level of human development is possible at a low per capita green-
house gas emissions level, as has been shown by a number of countries. However, 
development of a typical, industrialised, middle class lifestyle with car-oriented ur-
banisation and penetration of low energy-effi  ciency appliances leads to a rapid emis-
sions take-off . Such a take-off  has occurred in China in the last decade and is likely to 
be repeated in India. Policies are urgently required that address urban planning and 
appliance energy effi  ciency before the take-off  starts. Th e future climate policy regime 
and support strategies for rapidly industrialising countries should focus on such poli-
cies. Nevertheless, in the long run a limitation of consumption is inevitable to prevent 
a dangerous level of climate change.
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Endnotes
1 The HDI measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: 
a long and healthy life; access to knowledge; and a decent standard of living. Parameters are life expectancy 
at birth, adult literacy and combined gross enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education, and gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. The HDI scale ranges from 0 to 1. See UNDP (2007, p. 225).
2 A HDI of 0.9 has been reached by 28 out of 177 countries and typically corresponds to a life expectancy of over 
78 years, full adult literacy and full primary and secondary enrolment, as well as GDP per capita over 22,000 $ 
(PPP, 2005) (UNDP 2007, p. 229-232).
3  Air travel and 24 hour internet accessibility are just the tip of the iceberg.
4 The IPCC (2007, p. 16) noted dryly that lifestyle changes were not addressed in its estimate of mitigation po-
tential. Interestingly, IPCC chairman Pachauri raised reduction of consumption in an interview and called for less 
meat consumption and less car use (see AFP 2008). 
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Th is is a key moment for both the development community and the climate com-
munity. Th ere is a growing recognition that the onset of further climate change has 
the potential to dramatically reverse progress made in alleviating the suff ering of the 
world’s poorest people (World Bank Group 2003; Grice 2003). At the same time, to-
day’s development paths, promoted by some of the world’s most powerful institutions 
in the areas of trade, aid and fi nance, continue to fund and encourage activities which 
accelerate the onset of dangerous climate change (Newell 2008). 
It is this central issue which forms the focus of this paper: how to construct a de-
velopment architecture that is fi t for purpose in a carbon constrained world. Clearly, 
an analysis as brief as this can only highlight problems and fl oat key ideas, rather than 
elaborate concrete proposals. In doing so, however, I hope to prompt critical and 
timely engagement with a huge governance gap in the climate regime that needs to be 
addressed if the Copenhagen Protocol or indeed any international agreement among 
nations is to make a diff erence.
Having established the centrality of these issues, I identify key problem areas in 
the current development architecture before outlining some alternative ideas and con-
crete propositions.
Climate and poverty
Our collective understanding of the severity of climate change improves with each 
report on the state of scientifi c knowledge. Th e latest Fourth Assessment Report of 
the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) spelt out the gravity of the 
situation in no uncertain terms. What has become particularly clear is the impact of 
climate change on the poor. Indeed, a multi-donor report on Poverty and Climate 
Change rightly acknowledges that ‘Climate change is a serious risk to poverty re-
duction and threatens to undo decades of development eff orts’ (World Bank Group 
2003). Th e development community: donors, regional and multilateral development 
banks and investors in the developing world have moved centre stage. 
Th is is just as well. Energy is clearly pivotal to development. Yet meeting the de-
velopment needs of the majority of the world’s people in a carbon-constrained world 
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presents a global challenge of staggering proportions. Today 1.6 billion people are 
without electricity. Electricity demand in developing countries is projected to increase 
three to fi ve times over the next 30 years (Davidson et al. 2003) and 57% of future 
power sector investment will occur in developing countries (UNFCCC 2007). With-
out a signifi cant change of course, most of this will be fossil-fuel based electricity 
production that will exacerbate climate change. A recent UN report notes that of the 
‘substantial shifts in investment patterns’ required to mitigate climate change, ‘half of 
these should occur in developing countries, which will require incentives and support 
for policy formulation and implementation’ (UNFCCC 2007: 26).
We encounter a situation in which we have never known so much about our con-
dition and collective fate yet never felt less capable of facing up to the scale of the chal-
lenge that we must now address. Th e scale of economic re-structuring that is required 
and the challenge the issue poses to conventional ideas of progress and economic 
growth seem overwhelming. However, this paper attempts to suggest ways in which 
threats to business as usual and development as usual could be re-positioned as oppor-
tunities. It does not under-estimate the power of those whose interests are threatened 
by actions to address the threat of climate change, but it looks to the possibility of new 
coalitions of actors in favour of change.
A series of factors suggest that this may be an opportune moment to consider the 
question of the development architecture in relation to climate change. 
(i) First, the World Bank is looking to defi ne its role and mission in new ways. 
Since climate change threatens to undo much of the progress the World Bank seeks to 
achieve as the world’s largest development actor, it is unsurprising that the institution 
has sought to carve out for itself a leading role in response to the issue, most recently 
through the launch of the World Bank-administered Climate Investment Funds and 
the Bank’s increasing portfolio of carbon fi nance funds, amongst a raft of other ac-
tivities (World Bank 2008). Th ere can be no more timely mandate than steering the 
world towards a low carbon future with all the development opportunities that might 
bring. It is argued below, however, that for this to happen the World Bank in particu-
lar will have to change fundamentally the way it operates.
(ii) A second opening is provided ironically by the economic recession currently 
enveloping the global economy. Rising fuel and food costs aff ected by the escalat-
ing price of oil provide an opportunity to address energy saving as well as carbon-
intensive import dependency. It is estimated that every dollar increase in the price of a 
barrel of oil results in a 1% rise in average transport costs.1 Th e current down-turn in 
the global economy has focussed attention on the need to guarantee security of energy 
supply and the desirability of measures which dramatically reduce energy consump-
tion and transport use. In the US, a country embroiled in ongoing confl icts around 
the world in areas upon which it depends for its fossil fuels, the human cost of oil 
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import dependency from volatile regions of the world may strengthen the environ-
mental case for reducing use and developing safer renewable supplies closer to home. 
Many have called for a ‘New Green Deal’ echoing President Roosevelt’s programme 
to lift the US out of an economic crisis, but this time emphasising an environmental 
and particularly climate change focus (NEF 2008). Such measures include creating and 
training a ‘carbon army’ of workers to provide the human resources for a vast environ-
mental reconstruction programme, and establishing an Oil Legacy Fund, paid for by a 
windfall tax on the profi ts of oil and gas companies as part of a wide-ranging package 
of fi nancial innovations and incentives to assemble the tens of billions of pounds that 
need to be invested in transitions to a low carbon economy. Th e window of opportu-
nity to re-think energy security should also direct attention towards global as well as 
national reform proposals including an important role for development cooperation 
as part of a potential climate ‘Marshall plan’. 
(iii) Th ird, the crisis in world trade talks may provide an opportunity to go for a 
carbon markets and services agreement aimed at reducing barriers to trade in energy 
technologies and products that help to reduce GHGs,2 perhaps cast as a broader ‘en-
ergy round’. Th e recent breakdown of the world trade talks (the Doha development 
round) in many ways results from failure by developed countries to open up their 
markets to agricultural products from the south and their refusal to relinquish sub-
sidies to their own domestic producers. One way of garnering trust would be to de-
velop an agreement in energy technologies and services that sought to reduce barriers 
to trade in low-carbon technologies. Such an agreement would allow market leaders 
like China, Mexico and India, also a country with one of the world’s highest levels of 
poverty despite its new found wealth, to export the latest in renewable technologies. 
Th ese countries are already among the top 10 exporters of environmental goods rel-
evant to climate change mitigation. Th is is discussed further below. 
A more diffi  cult question is whether the world trade system needs to adapt to the 
reality of climate change by ensuring that countries do not gain a competitive advan-
tage from forms of production that are hugely carbon or energy intensive. Expressing 
this concern LeQuesne notes;
‘current WTO rules provide an inadequate framework for sustainable development 
precisely because they do undermine governments’ ability to legislate in favour of envi-
ronmental sustainability… current trade rules discourage governments from pursuing 
a strategy of internalising costs precisely because they prohibit governments from pro-
tecting their domestic industry from cheaper competition from countries who have not 
internalised costs to the same extent’ (LeQuesne 1996:73-74). 
Given what was said above about energy pathways in the developing world in par-
ticular, this is a hugely sensitive issue. Trade is one way in which policy signals can be 
187T O W A R D S  A  B E T T E R  W O R L D :  U P D A T I N G  T H E  V I S I O N
sent, in a coordinated manner through international institutions about what counts as 
legitimate comparative advantage in a carbon-constrained world. For example, trade 
negotiators may need to agree on the terms on which countries may employ border-
tax adjustments (or Border Carbon Adjustments) as has been proposed by some in 
the US and EU.3 Th ese take a range of forms, but essentially serve as a way of deter-
ring carbon leakage whereby investors shift their production to areas of the world not 
subject to emissions reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol or act as a driver 
for developing countries to accept emissions reductions (Cosbey 2008). Th e eff ect of 
their use would impose higher taxes on products which are produced in a highly en-
ergy or carbon-intensive fashion. Fears on the part of export-led developing countries, 
that the use of such measures may signal the rise of climate protectionism, will need to 
addressed if such measures are to gain traction. Th ey will also be opposed by powerful 
sectors most likely to be aff ected by the measures, such as steel, aluminium, paper, 
chemicals and cement. In the past, the WTO has maintained a separation between 
measures aimed at fi nal products as opposed to the process by which they were made 
where the former, under certain circumstances, was considered compatible with free 
trade rules and the latter not. Th e issue of climate change may force us to reconsider 
these distinctions, but to do so in a way which does not trigger a new round of trade 
confl ict. For such proposals to progress they will need to overcome a range of concerns 
regarding competitiveness, legal compatibility with WTO rules, administrative feasi-
bility and ultimately, eff ectiveness (Cosbey 2008).
The current architecture: Problems and limitations
Th e fi rst thing to note is that we do not really have a development architecture. It is 
more the case that we have a dispersed, disparate, uncoordinated set of actors pursu-
ing competing agendas. Th at, in part, is the problem. Neither is there a global regime 
of energy governance akin to that which we have for trade and in a disaggregated way, 
for the environment. Th ere are bilateral and regional energy agreements. Th ere is the 
IEA (International Energy Agency) and the World Energy Council and of course 
there is OPEC. But until now we have lacked the means of promoting and providing 
sustainable energy: a body or agreement that sets out a strategy for the international 
system that seeks to reconcile the at times competing goals of aff ordable, reliable and 
sustainable supplies and use of energy. A consortium of European governments is 
currently developing the world’s fi rst International Renewable Energy Agency (IRE-
NA). Th e agency plans to off er technical, fi nancial, and policy advice for governments 
worldwide, according to its founders, Germany, Spain, and Denmark (Block 2008). 
Alongside this there is REN21 which describes itself as ‘a global policy network that 
provides a forum for international leadership on renewable energy. Its goal is to bolster 
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policy development for the rapid expansion of renewable energies in developing and 
industrialised economies. Open to a wide variety of dedicated stakeholders, REN21 
connects governments, international institutions, non-governmental organisations, 
industry associations, and other partnerships and initiatives’ (REN21 2008).
However, instead of coordinated strategies between global bodies working in rel-
evant areas and across levels of governance from local government up to the global, 
we fi nd high levels of incoherence. Th e activities of one set of body systematically 
undermine those of others. New trade agreements increase the transport of goods over 
longer distances, adding to the emissions that climate negotiators are struggling to 
reduce (NEF 2003). Multilateral Development Bank lending supports projects that 
commit vast amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. For instance the World 
Bank supported the USD 4.14 billion coal powered ’Ultra Mega’ 4,000 mega watt 
power plant in Gujarat, India, which will emit more carbon dioxide annually than the 
nation of Tunisia according to the US Department of Energy (Swan 2008). While the 
US demands that developing countries commit to emissions reductions as a condition 
for its own participation in global eff orts to reduce greenhouse emissions, it uses its 
own tax payers’ money to support World Bank projects in developing countries which 
lock them into fossil fuel dependent development pathways. 
Th e problem here is that the climate impacts of World Bank policies, including 
policies of energy market deregulation, are not factored into their formulation. Th e 
Bank concedes ‘unregulated electricity markets are likely to put renewable energy 
technologies at a disadvantage in the short-run because they favour the cheapest en-
ergy as determined purely by price, but do not capture environmental and social 
externalities’ (Tellam 2000: 33). One report found that during the past three years, 
less than 30% of the World Bank’s lending to the energy sector has integrated climate 
considerations into project decision-making. As late as 2007, more than 50% of the 
World Bank’s USD 1.8 billion energy-sector portfolio did not include climate change 
considerations at all (WRI 2008). In 2006 the World Bank raised its energy sector 
commitments from USD 2.8 to USD 4.4 billion. Th e oil and gas sector received a 
93% increase in funding, while the power sector (largely transmission, generation and 
distribution) increased by 130%. In comparison, investment into ‘new renewables’ 
increased by only 1.4%. While oil, gas and power sector commitments account for 
77% of the total energy sector programme, ‘new renewables’ account for only 5% 
(Practical Action 2007).4 
Addressing the role of the big public actors in development and their role in tack-
ling climate change is just part of the story, however. If we seek to address the problem 
of climate change through public international law without addressing the blind-
spots and governance defi cits that exist with regard to fl ows of private investment and 
fi nance, then we run the risk of creating ‘islands’ of formal climate governance in a 
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sea of un-regulated, un-governed fl ows of trade and fi nance unguided by the impera-
tive of addressing climate change. Th e Clean Development Mechanism created by 
the Kyoto Protocol oversees only a fraction of the global fl ows of public and private 
investment that need to be steered towards the construction of a low carbon economy. 
In overall terms then, only a small percentage of trade, aid, production and fi nance 
is governed by public bodies charged with tackling climate change. Offi  cial Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) funds are currently less than 1% of investment globally (UN-
FCCC 2007). Hence there is a real danger that while we fi ght over public fl ows and 
resources in climate negotiations, the global economy continues on a business as usual 
trajectory. Of course there is an element here of trying to control those things which 
we are in a position to control. But we need to extend the governance for clean devel-
opment to a much broader range of areas. Th is means going beyond public governance 
of public fi nance, to the public governance of private fi nance as well as private governance 
of private fi nance. Th e fi rst refers to aid money and public expenditure on activities 
that impact on the climate change. Th e second refers to mechanisms for overseeing 
private fl ows: oversight of what the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation 
is doing or the criteria employed by Export Credit Agencies, for example. Th e third 
area refers to the forms of private and self-regulation that have been set up in recent 
years, whether it is the CDM Gold Standard, the Carbon Disclosure Project or the 
Voluntary Carbon Standard. What this means in practice is identifying a series of 
policies, strategies and interventions which are able to steer fi nancial fl ows, public and 
private, to where they are most needed, but in ways that are consistent with the goal 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For those countries most integrated within the 
global trading system (OECD plus BRICS), an agreement on trade in energy services 
and the use of energy-intensity indicators may make sense. For others, such as coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, less well integrated into the global economy and more 
aid dependent, important support can be provided by donors to enable clean energy 
transitions. Th e World Bank and regional development banks meanwhile can play a 
key role in screening public and private fl ows going into countries that are already 
attractive investment locations, as well as provide inducements that reduce the risk of 
investors entering new markets in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have 
not received such fl ows to date.
Th is implies the vertical alignment of actors working in this area. Even amongst 
public bodies working on climate change there are poor levels of coordination, dupli-
cation of activities and waste of resources. I discuss this further below. Perhaps most 
alarming of all is the fact that the governments and leading international institutions 
charged with serving the public interest on climate change continue to promote a 
model of economic development that is clearly unsustainable, one that is energy in-
tensive, export-oriented, and produces widespread social and environmental exter-
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nalities. Rather than being part of the solution, through their own activities many of 
these actors are exacerbating the problem.
Outline of an alternative
Calling for a development architecture that is up to the challenge of tackling climate 
change is not the same as proposing a new institution. Previous such proposals for a 
World Environment Organisation (WEO) have fallen on deaf ears for reasons of po-
litical will, ineffi  ciency, transaction costs and the fact that creating a new institution 
will not necessarily solve the problem (Newell 2002), even if we do require a new way 
of doing politics.
Th e need instead is for greater coherence, coordination, accountability and rep-
resentation among those institutions we already have. Th ese are political challenges 
about what and whom the institutions serve, how they function and align their ac-
tivities with other bodies working in the same area, whose voices and interests shape 
policy and how they can be held to account for their actions and inactions. Increas-
ingly global bodies will have to justify their role in relation to eff orts to tackle cli-
mate change. Th ough it may sound overly drastic to say it, those that fail to should 
ultimately be disbanded. Th e gravity of the situation is such that global institutions 
whose activities actively undermine global eff orts to tackle climate change cannot jus-
tify their existence. Th e only way these institutions and actors can retain legitimacy in 
a carbon-constrained world is to align, in some cases transform, their goals and means 
of operation towards the goal of facilitating a transition to a low-carbon future. In 
some cases this may not just be about doing things diff erently, it may be about doing 
less of them or not doing them at all.
Th is is not a demand for more money, therefore. Th e UNFCCC report on invest-
ment and fi nancial fl ows to address climate change argues that: ‘With appropriate 
policies and/or incentives, a substantial part of the additional investment and fi nan-
cial fl ows needed could be covered by the currently available sources.’  It also suggests, 
however, that: ‘Th e Carbon market ...would have to be signifi cantly expanded to 
address needs for additional investment and fi nancial fl ows’ (UNFCCC 2007: Execu-
tive summary). My argument is that fewer, targeted and demand-driven interventions 
may be more eff ective. If the wealth to be re-distributed by banks and donors derives 
from unsustainable climate change accelerating activities (from their own or others), 
it is detrimental to the purpose of tackling climate change. Th is is one of the problems 
at the moment: demands for further money for action on climate change, whether 
mitigation or adaptation, imply enhanced production and consumption of fossil fuels 
given their current centrality to the way wealth is generated. Proposals for the adap-
tation fund to be fi nanced through a tax on aviation tie the ability of the poorest to 
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survive the eff ects of climate change to increased fl ying by the world’s wealthiest citi-
zens, an act which itself exacerbates the vulnerability of the poor to climate change. In 
other words, unless generated from funds withdrawn from destructive investments, 
there is a danger that the process of generating the funds will exacerbate the problem 
they were intended to address.
Th ese then are just some of the deeply sensitive issues that need to be addressed. 
Th ey relate to the very sustainability of the way we produce and consume and measure 
economic growth. Th e challenges facing such a shift should not be under-estimated 
given the interests at stake and the vast amounts of money that continue to be made 
from fossil-fuel dependent growth trajectories. Th e following section, nevertheless, 
spells out some near-term modest but concrete steps that could be taken to begin to 
address these issues.
Next steps
Th e following are just four areas where important progress could be made. While 
supportive of the conclusion of a strong agreement at Copenhagen and beyond, it is 
important to note that such measures can be negotiated and undertaken alongside 
the climate negotiations and will need to continue long after a deal has been struck.
(i) Concrete proposals for an energy round in the WTO aimed at addressing 
energy needs through access to services and technologies that simultaneously seek to 
meeting the needs of the poor and address climate change. If the WTO is to dem-
onstrate its credibility as an institution responsive to poorer countries and able to 
promote sustainability, it needs to rise to the challenge of climate change. Indeed the 
WTO is aware of the issue. It states: 
‘Facilitating access to products and services in this area can help improve energy ef-
fi ciency, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and have a positive impact on air quality, 
water, soil and natural resources conservation. A successful outcome of the negotiations 
on environmental goods and services could deliver a triple-win for WTO members: a 
win for the environment, a win for trade and a win for development’ (WTO 2008).
Many of the technologies needed to combat climate change involve products that 
were being negotiated in the Doha negotiations. Th ese include wind and hydropower 
turbines, solar water heaters, tanks for the production of biogas, and landfi ll lin-
ers for methane collection. A submission by the European Communities and the 
United States in December 2007 proposed to give priority in the WTO negotiations 
to climate-friendly goods and to services linked to addressing climate change. Th ese 
‘climate-friendly products’ as the WTO labels them comprise about one-third of the 
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environmental goods already identifi ed by a group of delegations (WTO 2008). Ac-
cording to the World Bank the removal of tariff s for four basic clean energy technolo-
gies (solar, wind, clean coal and effi  cient lightening) in 18 developing countries with 
high levels of greenhouse gas emissions would result in trade gains of up to 7%. Th e 
removal of both tariff s and non-tariff  barriers could boost trade by as much as 13% 
(World Bank 2007). Many developing countries were initially sceptical about pro-
posals for an agreement on environmental products and services, but amid demands 
in the climate negotiations for technology transfer as part of the Bali action plan, 
developing countries could benefi t as both recipients and providers of clean energy 
technologies.
What is missing from this positive statement is the net eff ect on climate change 
of trade agreements that increase the distances over which goods are transported, 
challenges to national regulation which actively discriminates in favour of clean pro-
duction or intellectual property provisions which prevent the diff usion of key tech-
nologies. While recognising the potential for important gains, a net assessment has 
to be undertaken about policy areas to be enhanced and those to be reformed if we 
are to achieve a degree of policy coherence (Sampson 2004). We also need to recall 
that trade liberalization is just one of a range of factors that aff ect the trade and dif-
fusion of climate mitigation goods, which also include FDI, technical assistance and 
frameworks of environmental regulation. Investment frameworks and IPR-related 
costs also determine access to, and aff ordability of, climate mitigation technologies 
(IISD 2008). To be successful, such a round would need to ensure the strength of the 
developmental dimension of this package to avoid a situation whereby:
‘Th e liberalization of climate mitigation goods will bring benefi ts mainly to devel-
oped and a few middle-income developing countries, and may not lead to any envi-
ronmental benefi ts in developing countries that lack purchasing power or have other 
import priorities’ (IISD 2008).
(ii) Review of what roles the World Bank and other multi-lateral and regional 
development banks might realistically play in facilitating a shift to a lower carbon 
economy. Th is would have to include a holistic assessment of the investment profi les of 
these institutions to identify areas of incompatibility with climate policy objectives and 
an openness and commitment to change in light of this. Th e issues raised above would 
have to be systematically addressed, including incentives to loan big when, for exam-
ple, support to micro-energy provision for the rural poor may be more appropriate. 
It will certainly imply a phased end to support for large-scale fossil fuel development. 
Long-standing commitments to privatisation and the removal of subsidies where these 
may be supporting renewable energy access for the poor may have to be revised.
(iii) Mapping of the climate change work of bilateral donors towards identifying 
synergies, reducing overlaps, building on strengths and identifying sustainable forms 
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of fi nancing (generated by economic activities compatible with climate policy goals). 
As more funds from governments, foundations and the private sector become avail-
able for work on climate change, there is a ‘honey pot eff ect’ where actors gravitate 
towards new sources of funding on an issue where they sometimes do not have a track 
record or the capability to deliver eff ective action. Th e assessment being proposed here 
needs to be able to answer the question: which actors are best placed to address which 
aspect of the climate change problem. Moving from a crowded and competitive mar-
ket to a division of labour which allows each actor to do what they do best is critical. 
Providing a consolidated assessment of who is doing what, and how eff ectively is an 
important fi rst step in that direction. Th e United Nations Environment Programme 
may be the appropriate body to take a lead in undertaking such an assessment in the 
fi rst instance.
(iv) Given that 86% of global investment and fi nancial fl ows in this area come 
from the private sector (UNFCCC 2007), an assessment of which incentives and 
disincentives are necessary to get businesses of diff erent sizes, sectors and from diff er-
ent regions fully engaged in a transition to a lower carbon future, would be invaluable. 
Similar such studies and guides have been produced for specifi c areas of private fi -
nance, exploring leverage points for generating change (Ganzi et al 1998). Th is would 
build on existing practice and look forward to what forms of support, regulation and 
screening may be required to engineer this shift. It is clearly critical to get business on 
board in eff orts to tackle climate change. But businesses need clear signals. Diff erent 
elements of the business community respond to diff erent incentives over diff erent 
time-frames, so a broad suite of measures will be needed to target specifi c areas of the 
private sector for reform. Th ese might include a combination of taxes (pollution taxes 
and tax breaks), subsidies, codes of conduct, guidelines, certifi cation schemes and of 
course private and state-based regulation. Voluntary eff orts and market based instru-
ments need rules, procedures and sanctions to be eff ective, however, despite frequent 
claims to the contrary. It has to be made absolutely clear that only those fi rms that 
have business models consistent with enabling a transition to a low carbon future have 
a long term future. For some, the transition away from business models incompatible 
with this will be longer than others and will require substantial government assist-
ance to help with upgrading and re-training of employers and employees. But it has 
to happen in all cases and, therefore, the sooner the transition takes place, painful as 
it may be, the easier it will be to manage the adjustment in socially and economically 
acceptable ways.
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1 Rubin and Tal (2008) calculate that the impact of USD150/barrel of oil would be the equivalent of reversing all the 
tariff liberalisation accomplished by the WTO and GATT since the 1970s. Cited in Cosbey this volume.
2  Indeed the World Bank (2007) has proposed the accelerated liberalisation of products, technologies and serv-
ices used in CDM projects aimed at reducing equipment and transaction costs.
3 For example in the Warner-Lieberman bill in the US and, initially by the EC mandated High Level Group on Com-
petitiveness, Energy and Environmental Policies, although in its second report the BCA proposal was dropped. 
Some proposals would require importers to purchase offsets in a domestic cap and trade scheme at the point of 
import. 
4 According to the World Bank, ‘new renewable energy’ applies to energy from biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, 
small hydro (under 10MW).
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Fair Wealth: Pathways 
into Post-Development
Wolfgang Sachs
Th e rise of Europe to world dominance in the 19th century has excited the curiosity of 
historians for a long time. Why was Europe able to leap ahead of the rest of the world? 
A variety of answers has been off ered by several generations of researchers. Europe 
was thought to have benefi tted from its rational spirit, its liberal institutions, or its 
temperate climate. A few years ago, however, Kenneth Pomeranz of the University of 
California at Los Angeles advanced an “environmental” hypothesis (Pomeranz 2000). 
Putting the question more specifi cally, he wondered how England had succeeded in 
moving ahead of China, notwithstanding the fact that China had been on a level 
of development comparable to England as recently as around 1750. According to 
Pomeranz, at the end of the 18th century both the Yangtze Delta and England were 
constrained in their economic development by the scarcity of land available to grow 
food, supply fuel, and provide raw materials. But it was only England that succeeded 
in overcoming this limit. England was able to tap into new stocks of resources; it be-
gan to massively import agricultural goods from North America, and, above all, set 
out to systematically utilize coal for industrial processes. Only as foreign land replaced 
domestic land and carbon substituted for wood, were the natural resources constraints 
left behind and the English economy was able to take off . In contrast, China neither 
developed colonies overseas nor mobilised coal reserves in distant Manchuria. Put 
more generally, access to fossil resources from the crust of the Earth and to biotic re-
sources from colonies was essential to the rise of the Euro-Atlantic civilization. Indus-
trial society would not exist in today’s form, had not resources been mobilised from 
both the depth of geological time and the expanse of geographical space.
The development dilemma
In hindsight, Europe’s development path turns out to be a special case; it cannot be 
repeated everywhere and any time: the wealth of fossil and renewable raw materials at 
Europe’s disposal in the 19th and 20th centuries is no longer available. Th e use of fossil 
resources, apart from gradually depleting supplies,  is destabilising the Earth’s climate, 
just as is the use of  the biotic reserves of the planet that are still left. Resources, now 
and in the foreseeable future, are neither easily accessible nor cheaply available. Cli-
mate chaos as well as the Peak Oil phenomenon suggest that the past 200 years of 
Euro-Atlantic development will remain a parenthesis in world history. 
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Yet the end of conventional development has thrown the world into a tragic di-
lemma since fossil-driven development cannot simply be called off : it has already 
spread worldwide in both structures and minds. Obviously, urban life is underpinned 
almost everywhere by fossil-based systems of energy, transport, and food production. 
But more importantly,  the meme of fossil-driven development has colonised the 
minds of people across the globe, even the minds of those who live in slums, villages 
or forests and are excluded from enjoying the fruits of economic progress. Partly 
through imposition, partly through attraction, the Euro-Atlantic development model 
has shaped Southern desires, off ering tangible examples not only of a diff erent, but of 
a supposedly better life. Countries in general do not aspire to become more “Indian”, 
more “Brazilian” or for that matter more “Islamic”; instead, assertions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, they long to achieve industrial modernity. More often than not the 
idea prevails that shopping malls and steelmills, freeways and factory farms indicate 
the path to  a successful society. Despite decolonisation in the political sense, which 
has led to independent states, and despite decolonisation in the economic sense, which 
has made some countries into economic powers,  a decolonisation of the imagination 
did not occur. On the contrary, worldwide hopes for the future are fi xed on Euro-
Atlantic patterns of production and consumption. It is the tragedy of the 21st century 
that the imagination of the world is shaped by the Euro-Atlantic civilisation, yet the 
means for everyone in the world to live in such a civilisation are ever less available.
China provides the most visible example of where the world stands in the scramble 
for colonies and carbon today. No doubt, the rise of China is a success story in terms 
of conventional development. It has not only continuously achieved high growth 
rates, but also dramatically reduced the share of poor people earning less than one dol-
lar a day, from 33% of the population in 1990 to 10% in 2006. Yet, what is a success 
for China is a failure for the planet.  In absolute terms, China has become the world’s 
second largest emitter of carbon dioxide after the United States, as well as the sec-
ond largest importer of oil. Even more marked than the pressure Chinese economic 
growth has put on global resources has been the stress on local habitats: cities sick 
from polluted air, shrinking areas of cultivated land and dwindling water stocks are 
the emergency signs of a gathering environmental crisis. Th e annual economic costs 
of environmental damage as a result of economic growth were estimated in the 1990s 
between 8% and13%  of China’s domestic product (Smil/Mao 1998): this means that 
the losses were higher than the growth-rate of the national economy! Furthermore, 
China is increasingly a burden on the rest of the world:  it can be compared to a 
vacuum cleaner sucking up resources around the globe, be it copper from Chile, soya 
from Brazil or oil from West Africa. To be sure, China stands out because of the size of 
its population, but similar tendencies are at work in Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Indonesia and other ‘take off ’ countries. With conventional development, the exit 
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from poverty and powerlessness leads straight into overuse and overexploitation. A 
higher income beckons, but in reality these riches just represent a greater share in the 
environmental robber-baron economy. 
Indeed, it is diffi  cult to see how, for instance, the automobile society, high-rise 
housing, chemical agriculture, or a meat-based food system could be spread across 
the globe. Th e resources required for democratising these models of wealth globally 
would be too vast, too expensive, and too damaging for local ecosystems and the 
biosphere. Since the Euro-Atlantic model of wealth has grown under historically ex-
ceptional conditions, it cannot be transferred to the world at large. In other  words, 
the model is structurally incapable of social justice. Development, therefore, is at 
a crossroads. Either well-being remains confi ned to a global minority because the 
prevailing styles of production and consumption cannot be generalised across the 
board, or sustainable models of well-being gain acceptance, opening the opportunity 
of suffi  cient prosperity for all. Since industrial affl  uence and global equity cannot be 
attained at the same time, politics in both North and South faces a crucial challenge. 
Countries can either opt for affl  uence along with oligarchy or for suffi  ciency with a 
view to equity. Production and consumption patterns will not be capable of justice 
unless they are resource-light and compatible with living systems. For that reason, 
there will be no equity without ecology in the 21th century (Sachs/Santarius 2007). 
Contraction and convergence
In order to picture which development paths might bring the world to a greater level 
of resource justice, it may be useful to employ the model of ‘contraction and conver-
gence’ (Meyer 2000). Th is model schematically envisages  two diff erent development 
paths: one for industrial countries, one for developing countries. All nations of the 
world would adjust their use of  resources so that in half a century from now they 
no longer overstretch the absorption and regeneration capacity of the biosphere. Th e 
model assumes no nation has the right to a disproportionate share of the global en-
vironment, so each one endeavours – though with individual variations – to achieve 
the common goal of material and energy consumption compatible with the demands 
of other countries, while remaining within the carrying capacity of the biosphere. 
In the end, there is no justifi cation for any other distribution of globally important 
resources; the right of all nations to self-defi ned, self-determined and equal develop-
ment permits it only to make claims that are socially and ecologically sustainable at a 
global level. Th is is what the contraction and convergence argument inspired by Kant 
comes down to: institutional patterns of resource consumption should be considered 
unjust if they rest upon rules which  cannot in principle be adopted by all other na-
tions.
199T O W A R D S  A  B E T T E R  W O R L D :  U P D A T I N G  T H E  V I S I O N
Consequently, the model requires that the industrial countries contract – that is, 
that they reduce their consumption of resources drastically. Resource justice in the 
world crucially depends on whether the industrial countries are capable of retreating 
from overconsumption of the global environment. Th e example of greenhouses gases 
may serve to illustrate the path of shrinking resource consumption. By the middle 
of the century, the overconsumers must reduce by 80% to 90% the strain they put 
on the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels, in order to  do justice to the precepts of 
both ecology and fairness. It goes without saying that this fi gure refers to the global 
North, i.e. the consumer class in the countries of the South is placed under the same 
responsibility. On the other hand, developing countries appear in the model as tracing 
an upward curve in resource consumption. First, poorer countries have an unques-
tionable right to attain at least a ‘dignity line’ of resource consumption which should 
apply to all citizens of the world. Without access to kerosene or biogas, without an 
energy and transport infrastructure, it is hard to satisfy even the basic needs of mod-
ern human life. Moreover, each country will try to achieve diff erent images and forms 
of a prosperous society – an ambition that in turn requires access to resources such as 
energy, materials and land. However, this upward movement ends at an upper line of 
ecological sustainability for all; natural limits set the framework for justice. As it hap-
pens, a number of emerging economies are already about to hit that limit in the com-
ing decade.  Th e conceptual model of ‘contraction and convergence’ thus combines 
ecology and justice. It begins with the insight that environmental space is fi nite, and 
it ends with a fair sharing of  the environment by the citizens of the world.  
The triad of effi ciency, consistency and suffi ciency
How can the transition to a low-carbon and resource-saving economy be achieved? 
Over the last thirty years, a host of engineers, managers, activists, thinkers and scien-
tists have been busily investigating the challenges of such a transition. What can be 
extracted from all their endeavours adds up to a conceptual triad: effi  ciency, consist-
ency and suffi  ciency.
First, with regard to effi  cient resource consumption, the idea is to reduce the use 
of materials and energy per unit of goods and services, through improved technology 
and organisation, recycling and waste avoidance. Th ere are numerous examples: wash-
ing-machines that save on water and electricity, lightweight motor vehicles,  frequen-
cy-controlled industrial motors, high-effi  ciency power stations, recyclable products 
such as newspapers or chairs. Resource-effi  cient initiatives concentrate on the design 
of products for greater durability and repeated use, on the reduction of energy and 
material fl ows in the production process, and on corporate strategies to promote the 
extended use of products over numbers of physical sales (Weizsäcker/Lovins/Lovins 
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1997; Hawken/Lovins/Lovins 1999). In particular, there is considerable potential to 
raise the effi  ciency of energy use, as there is  hidden scope at every level of the chain 
from production to consumption. Whereas for more than a century utilities have 
seen their profi ts as existing in expanding supply, today, under an ‘effi  ciency strategy’, 
they are expected to be as successful at avoiding waste. Instead of responding to ever 
increasing demand, they will have to learn to keep it fl at. Th is change of perspective 
implies that the rational conversion and use of energy will take priority over its pro-
duction. 
But the effi  ciency strategy has an Achilles heel: it may score major successes in  cut-
ting the use of resources per unit of output, but it does not prevent greater overall con-
sumption. Th e sum total of all resource and energy savings may be eaten up and  even 
exceeded by global growth in demand for goods and services. In fact, that is what has 
been happening. And so, although the effi  ciency strategy has the greatest  potential as 
the fi rst step on the road to sustainability, it reaches its limits as soon as the increased 
production of goods combined with increased consumption of resources outweighs 
the total savings.  
With regard to consistency, the key question is the compatibility of technology 
with the environment. Th e principle is that industrial metabolic processes must not 
disturb natural cycles; the two should as far as possible complement or even reinforce 
each other.  Where this is not possible, substances damaging to the environment 
should be placed in a fail-safe technical circuit of their own or – if that is not success-
ful – taken out of service altogether (Braungart/McDonough 2002). An economy can 
be organised in such a way that – except for the inevitable entropy – the waste from 
one activity is used as raw material for the next (Pauli 1999). In this organisation, it 
is less important to reduce energy consumptions and material fl ows than to manage 
them in an ecologically sound manner. Th is is precisely the charm of renewable ener-
gies: solar collectors and solar cells for the production of heat and current directly use 
the sun’s rays; wind and water power are indirectly derived from solar energy; heat 
pumps draw on heat from the surrounding air, water and soil; and geothermic power 
stations use the energy stored in the earth. Even solar-generated hydrogen might one 
day make it possible to have an energy supply that does not damage the atmosphere. 
Th ere is a similar potential in bionics, a technology which takes nature as a model to 
be imitated.
Th e consistency strategy is not a panacea, either. Agrofuels, for example, may not 
pollute the atmosphere, but they require arable land that is available only to a limited 
degree.  Indeed, for all biomass applications, it is land which turns out to be the ul-
timate scarce resource.  Furthermore, not all waste can become raw material for new 
products. Th ere are some natural substances such as carbon dioxide or liquid manure 
which, in large quantities, cause ecological problems. 
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Suffi  ciency, on the other hand, raises the question of how much is enough, what is 
good for the economy and patterns of life.  Th e etymology gives us a clue: the Latin 
suffi  cere, derived from sub and facere, means in its transitive use ‘laying the ground’, 
and in its intransitive use ‘to be disposable, to be enough, to be able or capable’. Th e 
point of suffi  ciency, then, is not to fall victim to excess and overstretching, but to take 
only as much as is benefi cial for the well-being of individuals and the whole. Whereas, 
to borrow from Paul Hawken, effi  ciency requires us to do things right, suffi  ciency 
calls for the right things to be done. It is doubtful whether the expectations raised in 
the age of resource abundance can be sustained in the age of resource saving. Straw-
berries in winter, four by fours in city traffi  c, hot water on tap day and night: such 
comforts add little but cost a great deal. A resource-light economy would therefore be 
better advised to adjust itself to an intermediate level of performance. For instance, if 
the target for a country like Germany is to use 50% less primary energy by the year 
2050, effi  ciency and suffi  ciency will have to work together. Quantitative limits on 
the use of fossil fuels, as envisaged in the European emission trading system, will be 
defi ned for purposes of putting a cap on the use of vital resource stocks. Likewise, in 
transport, the avoidance of travel is part of a suffi  ciency strategy. Transport-saving 
urban planning cuts down on the need for moving around,  walking and cycling can 
again gain ground, and initiatives such as car sharing (with the slogan ‘access instead 
of ownership’) off er the opportunity to downgrade the private transport option, to 
save costs, but to keep access to a car for special situations.
At any rate, the question ‘How much is enough?’ cannot be avoided (Sachs 1998, 
Segal 1999,  Linz 2004). Since it is necessary to change behaviour and the way people 
relate to goods and services, eco-suffi  ciency is closely connected with what has been 
known since antiquity as the ‘due measure’, the good life, the art of living. And it may 
well be that the reasons for eco-suffi  ciency also stem from that wise ancient maxim: 
‘Nothing in excess’. Th e transition to a sustainable economy, therefore, moves on two 
tracks: the reinvention of means as well as the moderation of ends. 
Ecological leapfrogging
Two main obstacles stand in the way of greater environmental justice in the world: 
the resource-intensive models of prosperity in the North, and the drive in the global 
South to copy those models. Skyscrapers in Shanghai, motorways in India, shopping 
malls in Morocco: historically outmoded types of construction,  technology and mar-
keting are spreading around the globe. Yet they embody the hope of escaping from 
poverty and powerlessness. It is precisely the challenge of sustainable development to 
achieve greater international equity without endangering the biosphere.
Such forms of development will aim both to ensure a livelihood for all citizens 
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and to maintain and renew the country’s resource base. However, the historical pat-
tern of scarcity, which has shaped economic development so far, is today  outdated. 
While in the old days the world appeared full of nature, but empty of people, today 
the world is empty of nature, but full of people.  Th e satisfaction of needs and wants 
is not constrained so much by the paucity of hands and brains, but by the scarcity of 
resources and ecosystems. Nature is now more of a limiting factor than money, given 
that development is more and more restricted not by the number of fi shing boats, but 
by the decreasing numbers of fi sh; not by the power of pumps, but by the depletion of 
aquifers; not by the number of chainsaws but by the disappearance of primary forests 
(Daly 1996).  In particular for Southern countries, the relevant question will be: How 
can both the abundance of people and the scarcity of natural resources be addressed 
by making the right choices? 
Th e answer is to move out of an industrial economy wasteful of both natural re-
sources and people, and head for a regenerative economy mindful of resources and 
in need of people. An economy that is  based on the assumption that there are “free 
goods” in the world – pure water, clean air, hydrocarbon combustion, virgin forests, 
veins of minerals – will favour large-scale, energy and material intensive production 
methods; and labour will remain marginalised. In contrast, if an economy discourages 
profl igate resource use and privileges non-fossil resources, a decentralised and smaller-
scale production pattern requiring more labour and intelligence is likely to prosper. 
Rather than laying off  people, greater gains can come from laying off  wasted kilowatt-
hours, barrels of oil, and pulp from old-growth forests. People will in part have to be 
a substitute for natural resources; such an economy, evolving with a minimum input 
from the natural environment, will have to rely much more on the strength, the skill, 
and the knowledge of people.  Indeed, it will be post-industrial in the true sense of 
the word: fi nding new balances between hardware, biological productivity, and hu-
man intelligence. 
Th is is even more true when it comes to changing the resource base altogether, from 
fossil-based to solar-based energies and materials. Apart from the obvious environ-
mental benefi ts, the point here is that fossil resources usually imply long supply chains 
that make countries dependent on distant energy sources. Most countries and cities, 
fi nding themselves at the downstream end of the chain, are strangled by the high cost 
of fuel and resources imported from abroad.  Th ey pay, but most gains and jobs arise 
elsewhere. However, a change in resource base would turn this logic around (Scheer 
1999).  Reliance on photo-voltaic, wind, small hydropower, and bio-mass of all sorts, 
implies much shorter supply chains, not just for the energy resource, but often also for 
the conversion technology involved. As a result, income and jobs would largely stay at 
the local/regional level, recycling money within local economies. Furthermore, since 
sunshine and bio-mass are geographically diff used, they lend themselves to decentral-
203T O W A R D S  A  B E T T E R  W O R L D :  U P D A T I N G  T H E  V I S I O N
ised structures of production and use, unlike fossil resources that are concentrated in a 
few places and give rise to centralised large-scale structures.  Th e industrial pattern of 
squandering nature instead of cherishing people would be reversed; a solar economy 
holds the prospect of both encompassing people and saving resources.
Indeed, Southern countries have the opportunity to leapfrog into a solar economy, 
much earlier and much more solidly than Northern economies. In fact, it would be 
self-defeating for them, both in terms of livelihoods and in terms of the environment, 
to go through the same stages of industrial evolution that the Northern countries 
did. For instance, Southern countries face important decisions about introducing 
infrastructures such as energy, transport, sewage, and communication systems, the 
introduction and maintenance of which in industrial countries have caused the earth’s 
resources to dwindle.  Today, many countries are still in a position to avoid this unsus-
tainable course, opting without further delay for infrastructures which would allow 
them to embark on a low emission and resource-light trajectory. Th is is equally the 
case for transition countries, where it is often preferable to build new infrastructure 
systems rather than to upgrade aging ones. Investment in infrastructure such as light 
rail systems, decentralised energy production, public transport, grey-water sewage, lo-
cally adapted housing, regionalised food systems, and transport-light urban settings, 
could set a country on a road towards cleaner, less costly, and more equitable produc-
tion and consumption patterns. Consider the following three examples.
Decentralised electricity generation.  In industrial countries, electrical energy is over-
whelmingly supplied direct from high-output power stations along high-voltage net-
works, to the centres of consumption. Th e power fl ow is thus essentially vertical. In a 
mainly decentralised supply system, by contrast, a considerable part of the current is 
generated in small, modular output units, whose priority  is to supply a large number 
of small consumers. Power generation becomes a local economic activity, and energy 
consumers increasingly become energy producers. Indeed, from the point of view of 
an Indonesian farmer, it would be real leapfrogging to have an energy-effi  cient cooker, 
a solar pump or a biogas system: all these technologies make living easier and spare 
the natural environment, and their sources – sunshine and biomass – are accessible 
everywhere.  
Mobility without car dependence. A country with a low degree of motorisation faces 
an alternative: either it can promote a system based on high motorisation for a minor-
ity, or it can opt for a moderate motorisation favouring as many people as possible. 
Many countries strive to reach Northern levels of car ownership, but these are unat-
tainable because the ecological as well as the social and economic costs will prove 
too high. At some point things will  get stuck: either the fuel imports will become 
unaff ordable or the land for roads will run out or the weaker sections of society will 
not have suffi  cient purchasing power. A sustainable strategy will therefore opt for a 
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diff erent structure of transport growth, concentrating on where it will bring the great-
est advantage to society. Th is means, for example, extending roads to remote areas so 
that teachers and doctors can reach people, and farm produce can be supplied to local 
markets, instead of building motorways and ring roads demanded by the car-owning 
upper classes. First walk, then bike, then ride, this ought to be the order of priority for 
transport planning in developing countries – and elsewhere.  
Regenerative agriculture. Industrial agriculture – in both North and South – has 
manoeuvred itself into an ecological and social dead end. It results in soil erosion 
and declining fertility, in the pollution of groundwater, lakes and seas, and in a 
decrease in agro-biodiversity that is only worsened by the introduction of geneti-
cally engineered plants and animals. Methods of regenerative agriculture involve the 
following essential principles: simultaneous growing of several crops alongside one 
another in a single fi eld (e.g., mixed and intercropping), so as to off er a habitat for 
natural enemies of pests and to stimulate the biotic activity of the soil; crop rotation 
to regenerate the fertility of the soil and to break the life cycles of pests; mixed use 
of land for agriculture and forest; and, fi nally, the integration of agriculture, animal 
farming and, where possible,  fi shing, to obtain suffi  cient biomass and to return both 
organic and natural nutrients to the cycles of matter (Altieri 2004). Regenerative 
agriculture is therefore more cost-effi  cient than industrial agriculture, especially in 
lowwage regions: labour-intensive units operating on relatively small plots of land 
permit considerable savings in comparison with outside methods involving machin-
ery, mineral fertilizer and pesticides. Since the ecosystem survives intact and species 
diversity is preserved, poor people in particular can continue to practise hunting and 
gathering as sources of food and income. Moreover, in a oil-short world, labour-
intensive and energy-saving production would enable a reversal of the role played 
by agriculture in the economy. It could become a branch of the future, as a central 
source of energy supply. Th e countries of the South have a historic opportunity to 
become the spearhead of this development and to make their farmers the ‘oil sheikhs’ 
of the twenty-fi rst century. 
Decoupling justice from development
For a long time it has been a core political certainty that justice is created through 
growth, both nationally and internationally. After the Second World War, coupling 
the pursuit of justice to the idea of economic growth has became the conceptual 
cornerstone of the development age. In the last few decades, however, since the fi nite 
nature of the biosphere became evident, this cornerstone has been on shaky ground: 
in a limited environmental space,  conventional growth can no longer create justice – 
except at the price of a ruined biosphere. 
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In the development age, justice was understood as a greater share for more and 
more people in a growing world economy. Th e social contract between North and 
South envisaged that growth and social policy would start a process whereby the dis-
advantaged countries and peoples would be able to ‘catch up’ with the rich nations. 
Th is was the tacit assumption behind the United Nations system and bilateral devel-
opment cooperation. Th is assumption has acquired proverbial status in the metaphor 
of ‘a rising tide’ that will ‘lift all boats’ (not only luxury liners but also little sloops), a 
metaphor which presides over so many development eff orts: the forces of growth will 
raise the income of rich and poor alike. 
Comfortably enough, linking justice to growth allowed the developed world to 
evade the hard issue of distribution,  delegating justice to future growth. Indeed, for 
decades development experts defi ned equity primarily as a problem of the poor. Th ey 
highlighted the lack of income, the lack of technologies, and the lack of market ac-
cess, and advocated remedies for raising the living standard of the poor. In short, they 
worked at lifting the threshold – rather than modifying or even lowering the ceiling. 
With the emergence of bio-physical constraints to economic growth, however, this 
approach has turned out to be defi nitely one-sided; it is not just the poor, but also the 
rich, and their economy as well that have to be called into question.  At any rate, the 
quest for fairness in a fi nite world means changing the rich in the fi rst place, not the 
poor. Poverty alleviation, in other words, cannot be separated from wealth alleviation.
It was in October 1926 that Mohandas Gandhi already sensed the impasse of 
development. In one of his columns for Young India, the mouthpiece of the Indian 
independence movement, he wrote: “God forbid that India should ever take to indus-
trialisation after the manner of the West. Th e economic imperialism of a single tiny 
island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 
300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like 
locusts.” Nearly eighty years later this statement has lost none of its relevance. Indeed, 
its importance has increased, since today there are no longer 300 million but 1,000 
million setting out to imitate Britain. Gandhi suspected that it would not be possible 
to restore India’s dignity, and still less China’s or Indonesia’s,  at the economic level of 
Britain. Th e bio-physical limits to  the spread of industrial civilisation have impres-
sively confi rmed Gandhi’s intuition.  
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By now it is evident that the impacts of climate change have become a major threat to efforts to 
eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In order to lead to sustainable 
outcomes, all development actions must take this emerging factor into account. Moreover, it is 
important to try to look critically at the long-term vision behind development efforts and the strategies 
applied in building “a better world”. New ways and means have to be found through which people 
in all countries can lead a life worthy of human dignity, in a way that is compatible with the constraints 
set by nature.
This book brings forward some challenges arising from the prevailing development paradigms in the 
context of climate change. What are the future prospects of reducing poverty by means of international 
trade? Can we develop the agricultural sector to deal with reducing crops in areas already suffering 
from hunger? Can we reconcile the increasing needs for energy with efforts at mitigating climate 
change? Could high levels of human development be reached at low levels of per capita emissions? 
What are the keys for choosing a certain development pathway? Can we shift the focus from growth 
to distribution and more equity in a global scale?
The authors, with background in academic institutions, UN organisations and NGOs, provide inputs 
both into the process leading to the Copenhagen Climate Conference, and for practical development 
work. For climate change negotiators and experts, the articles can help by setting policies in a wider 
context, with a view to finding practicable win-win-win solutions. For the benefit of the development 
community, they elaborate underlying interlinkages and present practical aspects for day-to-day work. 
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